



UNIVERSITÄT
PADERBORN

GfeW

Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V.

41. JAHRESTAGUNG PROGRAMM

17.09.2018
–
19.09.2018

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Zugang zum WLAN auf dem Campus über **eduroam** oder über personalisierten Zugang (dem Programmheft beigelegt).

VORWORT

Liebe Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer,

wir heißen Sie herzlich an der Universität Paderborn willkommen! Nach fast 10 Jahren experimenteller Wirtschaftsforschung im BaER-Lab der Universität Paderborn freuen wir uns, Gastgeber der diesjährigen Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. (GfeW) zu sein.

Die Universität Paderborn blickt in ihrer jüngeren Geschichte auf ein außerordentliches Wachstum zurück. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren ist unsere Universität mit ihrem Personal und Budget um ca. 50 Prozent gewachsen. Die Zahl der Studierenden stieg in dieser Zeit von gut 13.000 auf über 20.000. Beeindruckend ist dabei die Anzahl neuer und moderner Gebäude, von denen wir mit dem Tagungsort in Gebäude O und beim Empfang in Gebäude Q gleich zwei näher kennen lernen werden.

Die Tagung besteht aus dem traditionell offenen Tagungsteil mit parallelen Sitzungen sowie drei eingeladenen Gastvorträgen. Für diese haben wir drei höchst interessante und renommierte Gastredner gewinnen können, die – davon sind wir überzeugt – neue Impulse für die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung setzen werden.

Wir danken besonders dem Organisationsteam Christiane Borghoff, Angelika Endres, Melanie Fearn, Ludger Knollmann und Marius Protte, ohne deren großes und unermüdliches Engagement diese Veranstaltung nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Für finanzielle und organisatorische Unterstützung bedanken wir uns beim SFB 901 „On-The-Fly Computing“ sowie der Universität Paderborn.

Wir wünschen Ihnen eine produktive Tagung mit angeregten Diskussionen, vielen neuen Einblicken, Ideen und Kontakten.

René Fahr und Burkhard Hehenkamp

ANREISE UNIVERSITÄT PADERBORN

TAGUNGSRÄUME:

O-Gebäude
Pohlweg 51
33098 Paderborn



EMPFANGSABEND:

Q-Gebäude
Fanny-Nathan-Straße
33098 Paderborn



MENSA:

ME Gebäude
Speisepan: <https://www.studierendenwerk-pb.de/gastronomie/speiseplaene/mensa-academica/>


ANREISE:

Mit Bus:

Linie 4 oder 9, Haltestelle Uni-Südring
Linie 68, Haltestelle Uni-Schöne Aussicht

Mit KFZ:

reservierte Parkplätze (innerhalb der Markierung)




ANREISE KONFERENZDINNER

Dienstag, 18.09.2018 ab 19:00 Uhr

Adresse Gasthaus Haxterpark:
Haxterhöhe 2, 33100 Paderborn
(rote Stecknadel)

Startpunkt:
O-Gebäude
(lila Stecknadel)

Zu Fuß: 15 Minuten
Mit dem Auto: 5 Minuten



KEYNOTES

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: **Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann**

TITLE: **General 2x2 Games With Coupled Populations: An Experiment in Continuous Time (with Volker Benndorf and Ismael Martínez-Martínez)**

ABSTRACT: We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. We complement the theoretical analysis with a continuous-time laboratory experiment using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are weaker, play converges to steady states located farther from the prediction.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: **Prof. Dr. Eyke Hüllermeier**

TITLE: **The New Data Science: On the Amalgamation of Statistics and Machine Learning**

ABSTRACT: Statistics and machine learning are two scientific disciplines in the core of the emerging field of data science, both being concerned with empirical inference and learning from data. While classical statistics can look back at a prolific scientific history and disposes of well developed methodological foundations, machine learning has more recently been propelled by some spectacular practical successes and has become a "hot topic" in virtually all branches of science, industry, and society.

This talk is mainly conceived as an insight into contemporary machine

learning for an audience with a background in statistics, albeit it will necessarily remain incomplete in this regard. To this end, commonalities as well as differences between the two disciplines will be highlighted, including a discussion of generative versus predictive modeling and the inspection of machine learning from a computer science (algorithmic) and systems engineering perspective. As an illustration, recent developments in so-called preference learning will be outlined, a subfield of machine learning with strong connections to discrete choice and conjoint analysis.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: **Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher**

TITEL: **Unethisches Verhalten - Einflussfaktoren und Anreize**

ABSTRACT: Unethisches und unmoralisches Verhalten wird immer häufiger in ökonomischen Labor- und Feldexperimenten untersucht. Dabei geht es z.B. um Lügen, Betrügen oder um andere Verstöße gegen allgemein anerkannte Normen. Wodurch unterscheidet sich unethisches Verhalten von unsozialem Verhalten? Gibt es robuste Determinanten, die unethisches Verhalten vorhersagen? Welche Anreize und Umwelten begünstigen unethisches Verhalten und welche wirken als "Gegenmittel"? Ist unethisches Verhalten, wenn es uns Vorteile bringt, instinktiv oder sozial determiniert? Der Vortrag gibt anhand aktueller Arbeiten einen beispielhaften Überblick und arbeitet die offenen Forschungsfragen heraus.

**INFORMATIONEN
ZU DEN SESSIONS**

SESSION 1 (17.09.2018 um 14:00 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224	Raum O 2
Auktionen & Wettstreite	Öffentliche Güter I	Finanzmärkte
Opportunity Cost, Inattention and the Bidder's Curse	Revealing the Donor's Identity – Individuals and Groups in a Donation Experiment	Portfoliodiversifikation: Der Einfluss von Herdenverhalten, Status-quo-Verzerrung und Spielerirtum
Herr Philipp Reiss (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, KIT)	Herr Sven Christens (Universität Kassel)	Herr Ibrahim Filiz (Ostfalia Hochschule für angewandte Wissenschaften)
Conflict and Migration: Mobility in Group Contests	The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game	Social Recognition and Investor Overconfidence
Herr Florian Heine* (Tilburg University)	Frau Britta Butz (RWTH Aachen)	Herr Matthias Pelster (Universität Paderborn)
	Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems – An Experimental Analysis	Who inflates the Bubble? Forecasters and Traders in Experimental Asset Markets
	Herr Dirk van Straaten* (Universität Paderborn)	Herr Marcus Giamattei* (Universität Passau)

*Session chair

AUKTIONEN & WETTSTREITE

TITEL: **Opportunity Cost, Inattention and the Bidder's Curse**

AUTOREN: David J. Freeman, Erik O. Kimbrough, J. Philipp Reiss

ABSTRACT: Auction winners sometimes suffer a „bidder's curse“, paying more for an item at auction than the posted price charged for an identical item by other sellers. This seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders, yet they seem to ignore it. To understand this behavior, we consider the bidders' decisions whether to acquire information about the posted price before bidding, in the presence of opportunity costs. Our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model, with a posted price aftermarket selling an identical good. When information about the posted price is costly, bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction, generating the bidder's curse. To assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation, we study the model's predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a posted price and bid in an auction. We find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted. Most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder's curse.

TITEL: **Conflict and Migration: Mobility in Group Contests**

AUTOREN: **Florian Heine**, Arno Riedl, Henrik Zaunbrecher

ABSTRACT: Group contests have been used to study conflict between countries, R&D competitions, sports competition and lobbying. Usually, it is assumed that individuals belong to one group and that this group membership will remain unchanged. However, in practice, soldiers can defect, employees switch employers and athletes switch teams. We introduce intergroup mobility to a group contest and test how this affects contest contributions in a lab experiment. We find

that endogenous (voluntary) migration increases contest contributions, whereas exogenous migration (displacement) has a negative but insignificant effect relative to a baseline without intergroup mobility. Ingroup bias as measured by modified dictator games persists throughout the experiment in the control treatment and does not decrease in the migration treatments. In the endogenous migration treatment, the decision to leave the own group is mainly driven by bad prospects of winning.

ÖFFENTLICHE GÜTER I

TITEL: **Revealing the Donor's Identity – Individuals and Groups in a Donation Experiment**

AUTOREN: **Sven Christens**, Astrid Dannenberg, Florian Sachs

ABSTRACT: Previous studies have demonstrated that donations to charitable organizations can be increased by revealing the donors' identities (Reinstein & Riener 2012) and by making these donations publicly (Alpizar et al. 2008). However, little research has been done to examine groups' donations in general and whether the disclosure of the donors' identities has the same effect on groups. In many cases decisions on donations are made by groups such as families, firms or organizations and can be observed by third persons. Preliminary results from our laboratory experiment suggest that individuals donate somewhat more than groups. When deciding individually and anonymously men donate significantly less than women. But while the disclosure of identities has no impact on women's donations, men increase their donations to the level of women when their photo and names are shown.

TITEL: **The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game**

AUTOREN: **Britta Butz**, Christine Harbring

ABSTRACT: We investigate whether revealing identities in a public

good game which includes a donation incentive lead to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good rise significantly when taking place in public. Especially the amount of charitable giving seems to be sensitive to revealing identities. Reasons seem to be the fear of negative intersocial consequences and image concern as people like to be seen as good citizens. Using a laboratory experiment we examine a team incentive which consists of a twenty-percent donation share which is dependent on participants' contributions. In this setting, we explore whether informing participants about the fact that the group member's identities will be disclosed at the end of the experiment leads to higher contributions to the public good.

TITEL: **Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems – An Experimental Analysis**

AUTOREN: Britta Hoyer, **Dirk van Straaten**

ABSTRACT: Reputation systems are a fundamental part of today's online commerce as they are the only independent source of information in marketplaces and, hence, a device for building trust. Since customer reviews in these systems are a public good and free riding is expected, the motivation behind writing customer reviews has been already analyzed in the literature (Bolton et al. 2004). Dellarocas et al. (2010) look at the four main motivational categories of online Word of Mouth communication. They find that altruism or concern for others only plays a minor part with regard to people leaving reviews. Instead, their findings point to self-expression and self-confirmation as the dominant reasons. At the same time, there are growing concerns with regard to privacy on the internet. It can be argued that guaranteeing more privacy to customers would affect the reputation systems as well. Given that self-expression and self-confirmation are identified as the main drivers of reviewing products online, it is questionable whether customers would leave reviews in anonymous reputation systems, where by design these aspects no longer play a role. Using a laboratory experiment, we can vary the degree of anonymity in reputation systems and compare the propensity of customers to leave Reviews. Consequently, we can analyze whether anonymity affects customers'

propensity to leave ratings in online markets. Instead of modeling a complete online market, we simplify the process as far as possible. As we are only interested in the behavior of the customers, the sellers are computerized. Participants take the role of the customers who are interested in maximizing their satisfaction by choosing the best product in a purchasing decision. After a personal identifier is determined at the very beginning of the experiment, the experiment consists of three phases that are repeated in each of overall 10 periods. In Phase I the customers choose the seller from whom to buy. Afterwards, in Phase II the customers are informed about the actual satisfaction they received. Finally, in Phase III the customers can decide on whether to rate the seller or not. These ratings are then presented in Phase I of the following periods. To analyze whether customers' propensity of leaving a rating is different between anonymous and non-anonymous reputation systems, we designed two treatments. In the anonymity treatment, subjects will simply get a customer number. This ID is private information and will not even be published with the provided ratings. Instead, ratings will be presented as follows. „A customer chose seller 5. As a member of group A the satisfaction was 8.“ In the identity treatment, we let subjects choose a personal identifier at the beginning of the experiment which will serve as their pseudonym in the online market. Thus, once they decide to leave a rating, it will be displayed with the personal identifier. Other customers can therefore see whether this customer has rated multiple sellers and how many ratings he has published. Here, ratings are presented after each round as follows. „Michael: I chose seller 5. As a member of group A my satisfaction was 8.“ Addressing the self-expression in the information treatment, a ranking of the participants is additionally shown at the end of each period. Comparing the two treatments allows us to draw inference on whether anonymity affects the rating behavior of customers. In addition, our results will not only point out potential consequences of anonymity on the efficiency of (online) markets, but also lead to further insights into the role of self-expression and identity in public good provision in general. The experiment will be conducted at the Business and Economic Research Laboratory (BaER-Lab) in the summer term 2018 at Paderborn University, Germany and results will be present in September 2018.

FINANZMÄRKTE

TITEL: **Portfoliodiversifikation: Der Einfluss von Herdenverhalten, Status-quo-Verzerrung und Spielerirrtum**

AUTOREN: **Ibrahim Filiz**, Thomas Nahmer, Markus Spiwoks, Kilian Bizer

ABSTRACT: In dieser experimentellen Studie wird betrachtet, welchen Einfluss Herdenverhalten (Orientierung an der Mehrheit der Mitspieler oder Orientierung am erfolgreichsten Mitspieler (Guru)), die Status-quo-Verzerrung und der Spielerirrtum auf das Diversifikationsverhalten haben. Dabei zeigt sich, dass weder Herdenverhalten noch Status-quo-Verzerrungen einen nennenswerten Beitrag zur Erklärung von nicht-optimalen Portfolioentscheidungen liefern. Der Spielerirrtum hingegen wird bei Portfolioentscheidungen wirksam. Viele Probanden bemühen sich, in der Historie von Zufallsereignissen Muster zu erkennen und Rückschlüsse auf künftige Zufallsereignisse zu ziehen. Der Spielerirrtum trägt wesentlich dazu bei, dass die optimale Portfoliozusammensetzung nur in 37,7% aller Entscheidungen Berücksichtigung findet.

TITEL: **Social Recognition and Investor Over-confidence**

AUTOREN: Bastian Breitmayer, Mona Mensmann, **Matthias Pelster**

ABSTRACT: We investigate the trading patterns of 21,694 investors who received social recognition for their investment decisions between 2012 and 2015. We find that confirmatory social recognition leads to increased trading activity, which can be explained by overconfidence associated with biased self-attribution and misinterpretation of observed feedback. On average, investors execute 29 additional trades in the month after receiving confirmatory social recognition for the first time. We further demonstrate that under certain circumstances, the effect of social recognition on trading activity is greater than that of financial outcomes.

TITEL: **Who inflates the Bubble? - Forecasters and Traders in Experimental Asset Markets**

AUTOREN: **Marcus Giamattei**, Jürgen Huber, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Andreas Nicklisch, Stefan Palan

ABSTRACT: We study the extent to which forecasting and trading contribute to mispricing in experimental asset markets. Prior to trading, we elicit forecasts in a Baseline and implement two treatments that increasingly isolate forecasts from trading by, first, separating the two tasks and allocate them to two different players in treatment Same-Pay and additionally disconnecting forecasts from profits by paying forecaster for Accuracy. We provide forecasters with information on dividends from which they can estimate an asset's fundamental value. Based on this, they send a forecast to their traders. The traders, who are not informed about fundamentals, buy and sell assets in a continuous double auction market. We find that both, forecasting and trading, are strongly anchored on past prices. Evidence for trend extrapolation and a resulting major effect on mispricing is found only for forecasting, in particular in the treatment Accuracy. Our findings are informative for tracing the sources of mispricing as well as for financial stability and regulatory policy.

SESSION 2 (17.09.2018 um 15:45 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224
Risiko & Unsicherheit	Öffentliche Güter II
Messung der Risikoneigung	Does a Social Framing Reduce Immoral Behavior? A Study on Donation Embezzlement
Herr Thomas Nahmer (Universität Göttingen)	Frau Nina Lucia Stephan (Universität Paderborn)
First- and second-order Beliefs in Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence	When does the Frame matter? An Experimental Study on Giving and Taking
Herr Thomas Neumann* (Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg)	Herr Maximilian Späth (Universität Göttingen)
	Guilty Privilege: Does Solidarity depend on Hardship?
	Herr Björn Frank* (Universität Kassel)

*Session chair

RISIKO & UNSICHERHEIT

TITEL: **Messung der Risikoneigung**

AUTOREN: Ibrahim Filiz, **Thomas Nahmer**, Markus Spiwoks,
Zulia Gubaydullina

ABSTRACT: Bisherige Verfahren zur Ermittlung der Risikoneigung (risikoavers, risikoneutral oder risikoliebend) weisen einige Schwächen auf. Sie sind zum Teil so komplex und anspruchsvoll, dass man von den Probanden häufig spontane, unüberlegte Antworten erhält. Dadurch kann die tatsächliche Risikoneigung häufig nicht zutreffend ermittelt werden. Darüber hinaus gibt es bei diesen Verfahren Konstellationen, in denen keine eindeutige Zuordnung zu den drei Kategorien der Risikoneigung möglich ist. Außerdem wird bei den bisherigen Ansätzen die Verlustaversion als wichtiger Einfluss auf die Risikoneigung nicht oder nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Wir schlagen ein neues Verfahren zur Ermittlung der Risikoneigung vor, das (1) extrem einfach und überschaubar ist, das (2) eine eindeutige Unterscheidung von risikoaversen, risikoneutralen und risikoliebenden Wirtschaftssubjekten erlaubt und das (3) den Einfluss der Verlustaversion auf die Risikoneigung angemessen berücksichtigt.

TITEL: **First- and second-order Beliefs in Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence**

AUTOREN: **Thomas Neumann**, Bodo Vogt

Abstract: The equilibrium behavior in a 2x2 coordination game requires knowledge of the other player's behavior. However, in games in which players simultaneously select a strategy, they do not have access to objective information about this behavior. As a consequence, players' beliefs about other players' behavior (i.e., strategy choice and/or beliefs) become crucial in determining outcomes for the game. In this experimental study, we analyze the equilibrium behavior of players as they participate in a particular coordination game, the 2x2 stag hunt game. We directly elicited probabilistic beliefs using a proper scoring

rule to reward subjects for stating their first- and second-order belief. Additionally, we elicited players' risk attitudes using lottery choices, and, to deepen the understanding of the underlying reasoning process, participants additionally took part in a beauty contest game. Our findings reveal that an agent's expectation (or belief) of the other player's behavior (rather than an agent's risk attitude) is key to understanding how humans make choices in coordination games. The elicitation of second-order beliefs supports the interpretation of the relationship between observed choices in the coordination game and elicited beliefs in terms of best-response. However, we found that the participants' depth of reasoning did not affect behavior in the coordination game.

ÖFFENTLICHE GÜTER II

Titel: **Does a Social Framing Reduce Immoral Behavior? A Study on Donation Embezzlement**

Autoren: **Nina Lucia Stephan**

Abstract: Human decision-making happens within social environments, and being aware of that, decision-makers take moral rules into account. Recent literature suggests that socially framing an experience, reminds decision makers of moral concerns, and can thus be used to prevent immoral behavior. This experimental study contributes to existing literature by investigating the effect of socially framing the reception of initial endowments on one of the major forms of immoral work behavior: embezzlement. The social framing, to remind participants of the existence of a social context, is induced by letting half of the participants receive an initial endowment as a gift from a previous participant. Subsequently, participants act as middlemen, forwarding donation money, and decide whether to engage in embezzlement by manipulating the donation. We find a height-of-endowment specific effect of social framing on embezzlement. The social framing successfully reduces moral behavior when initial endowments are generous. There is, however, one caveat: social framing encourages immoral behavior when endowments are meager.

TITEL: **When does the Frame matter? An Experimental Study on Giving and Taking**

AUTOREN: Claudia Keser, **Maximilian Späth**

ABSTRACT: Decades of research have analyzed why and how much people are willing to voluntarily donate in situations, where they cannot expect a direct benefit from their donation. While our intention is not to offer an overview over all impacting factors in Dictator Games, we instead focus on one dimension: the framework. More precisely, we compare a “giving” to a “taking” frame.

Previous research that compares the giving to the taking frame presents ambiguous results. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we go deeper into this literature. We focus on experiments that allow for a clear comparison of the two frames, without making the change in the frame salient for the participants. We therefore do not consider designs in which the action space was altered (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Brosig et al. 2017) or in which the entitlement of dictators and recipients are altered along with the frame (Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008). Finally, we exclude within-subject designs (Koronek et al., 2014; Koronek et al., 2018), as they are particularly prone to experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). Of the remaining studies that were considered above, only Krupka & Weber (2013) find a small divergence between giving and not taking. The rest (Grossman & Eckel, 2015; Dreber et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al. 2017; Kettner & Cecatto 2014; Smith, 2015; Suvoy, 2003) share a unique result: They find no overall difference between giving and not taking. On the other hand, Krupka & Weber (2013) confirm the intuitive idea that the same outcome is perceived as less appropriate when achieved in a taking than in a giving frame. So, why do findings point in direction of an irrelevance of the frame? And when does the frame matter? In an attempt to answer these questions, we take up a theoretical comment made by Grosman & Eckel (2015). They predict and indeed find the irrelevance of the frame in a context, in which social norms are straightforward. With our experiment we test if this argument can be reversed: Does the frame matter in a situation, in which social norms are somehow vague? We test this idea by conducting an experiment, in which participants can donate to a charity. In contrast to Grossman & Eckel (2015), the chosen charity is relatively unknown. This creates a situation, in which it is

more difficult for participants to estimate the lowest socially acceptable donation. The double-blind transfer decision into a larger questionnaire. Using a between-subject design, we run two treatments that only differ in the allocation of endowments. In the GIVE treatment, the dictator receives the endowment and is allowed to transfer money to the charity. In the TAKE treatment, the charity is endowed and the dictator can transfer money away from the charity. Our results show a strong and significant difference between giving and not taking. The average income of the recipients is roughly four times higher in the TAKE (53 percent of the endowment) than in the GIVE treatment (12 percent of the endowment). Regarding the extensive margin, we find a higher share of donors in the TAKE (90 percent) than in the GIVE (59 percent) treatment. We argue that these results speak in favor of the previously stated idea: In a context, in which the social norm is not well defined, the frame does matter. This finding indicates that charities should reflect their own type. A well-known charity needs to put less emphasize on advertising the social norm of donating than a less-known charity needs to.

TITEL: **Guilty Privilege: Does Solidarity depend on Hardship?**

AUTOREN: Maria Monge, **Björn Frank**

Abstract: In this paper, we use a solidarity game variant to study whether donations are affected by how hard the initial circumstances of the donor and the recipient are. In the open-door-day of a university, 260 participants played a Can Knockdown game that could be either easy (3 cans) or hard (6 cans). Before assigning the participants to the easy or the hard game, we asked them how much they would donate to another participant in case that they won and the other participant lost. The participants stated their donations for 4 scenarios: (1) both play with 6 cans, (2) only the recipient plays with 6 cans, (3) only the donor plays with 6 cans, (4) both play with 3 cans. We find that conditional donations are higher when the recipient faces hard circumstances and when the donor faces easy circumstances.

SESSION 3 (18.09.2018 um 09:00 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224
Korruption & Compliance I	Individuelle Entscheidungen
<p>Experimental Evidence on Collusive Bribery and the Value of Corrupt Networks</p> <p>Herr Burkhard Hehenkamp (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Attraction Effect in Labor Supply Decisions</p> <p>Herr Peter Mohr (Freie Universität Berlin)</p>
<p>The Microfoundations of Error Reporting – The Role of Error Severity</p> <p>Herr Luca Carduck-Eick (RWTH Aachen)</p>	<p>Using Insights from Behavioral Economics for the Design of Financial Incentives Based on Loss Aversion to Improve Medication Persistence - An Experimental Analysis</p> <p>Frau Alina Elrich (Universität Paderborn)</p>
<p>Job Market Chances of Whistleblowers - Is There a Penalty for Whistleblowers on the Labor Market?</p> <p>Herr Behnud Mir Djawadi* (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Don't patronize me! An Experiment on Rejecting Paternalistic Help</p> <p>Herr Wendelin Schnedler* (Universität Paderborn)</p>

*Session chair

KORRUPTION & COMPLIANCE I

TITEL: **Experimental Evidence on Collusive Bribery and the Value of Corrupt Networks**

AUTOREN: Eugen Dimant, **Burkhard Hehenkamp**, Xinyu Li

ABSTRACT: We explore experimentally whether networking among officials works against the effectiveness of job rotation as a mean to reduce corruption.

TITEL: **The Microfoundations of Error Reporting – The Role of Error Severity**

AUTOREN: David Antons, **Luca Carduck-Eick**, Frederik Graff, Christine Harbring, Nicole Hartwich, Oliver Salge

ABSTRACT: This study aims at gaining insights into the error reporting behavior of humans regarding different error attributes. In this laboratory experiment the effect of one specific error attribute, namely the error severity, on error reporting as moderated by the organizational reporting culture, will be isolated. We follow the belief that the type of errors within task environments will have an impact on the error reporting process. We will vary error severity by comparing three settings in which the costs of error for the organization is either high, low or there are no costs at all. It appears that particularly less severe errors often escape managerial attention and fail to initiate a process of learning, for which the organizational benefits of error reporting appear limited. A positive reporting culture might reduce this expected underreporting. We employ a 3x2 design by varying the cultural environment in two settings for all three cost scenarios. In each setting groups of five Participants will be build out of 25 participants. One of those five participants will be the so called principal. The other four group members will have the role of normal workers. The organization is modelled through a team account. The workers have the chance to report self-made errors in their tasks directly to the principal. If one task is solved correctly a bonus goes to the team account. In the two cost settings a

fee will be withdrawn from it. Participants obtain a higher payment if they perform better in the group average, because the payoff will be the shared amount from the team account. Implementing this setup allows us to ceteris paribus control for other error attributes and, thus, to get an understanding of the reaction of the subject to the different error severities regarding the error reporting probability.

TITEL: **Job Market Chances of Whistleblowers - Is There a Penalty for Whistleblowers on the Labor Market?**

AUTOREN: **Behnud Mir Djawadi**, Petra Nieken

ABSTRACT: Empirical evidence demonstrates that whistleblowers experience various types of organizational retaliation in the aftermath of whistleblowing. Although this retaliation forces the whistleblower in many cases to leave the organization, almost no research exists that clarifies to what extent future employers are willing to hire employees who blew the whistle in their former organization. Our study therefore examines how whistleblowing affect the employee's reputation on the labor market. To empirically investigate our hypotheses we design a laboratory experiment in which student participants are paired up as employee-manager divisions and the employee can blow the whistle on a manager's fraudulent decision to withhold money earmarked for charity. In a second stage all divisions are newly matched and managers can express preferences whether they want to hire an employee who formerly blew the whistle or remained silent in their past division. We expect that in environments in which managers have incentives to commit future fraud, managers will tend to choose employees who were shown to be loyal to their former manager. Contrary, in environments where the manager will financially benefit from the employee's honesty, employees who blew the whistle in their former division will be preferred.

INDIVIDUELLE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN

TITEL: **Attraction Effect in Labor Supply Decisions**

AUTOREN: Corinna Michel, **Peter N.C. Mohr**

ABSTRACT: Many economic theories of decision making assume that individuals evaluate choice alternatives independently of each other. This means that the utility of an alternative does not change when another alternative is added to the choice set. However, there is a substantial amount of evidence showing that this independence assumption is frequently violated. Preferences between two consumer products, for example, change when a third asymmetrically dominated choice alternative is added. Here, we investigated in two experiments whether this so-called attraction effect can be generalized to labor supply decisions. In Experiment 1, participants (n=49) made a series of choices between three bundles of work and associated payment. Work was operationalized by building a certain number of Lego monsters (Mixels). Each choice set consisted of two core alternatives and one decoy that was asymmetrically dominated by one of the core alternatives. Importantly, choice sets were designed such that the decoy was dominated once by one core alternative and once by the other one. Results show that the dominating alternative (target) was chosen significantly more often ($p < 0.001$) compared to the non-dominating alternative (competitor). Prior research has shown that perceived meaning influences labor supply. As building Lego monsters (which are destroyed afterwards) usually has a low perceived meaning, we aimed at replicating our results for work that likely has a higher perceived meaning. In Experiment 2, work was therefore operationalized as follows. Participants (n=30) had to prepare letters for a research project. They were explicitly informed that the research project aims at investigating happiness in the context of labor. Specifically, these letters asked for wisps of hair. Participants had to form loops out of ribbons and fold the letters. Above that, the experimental design was similar to Experiment 1. Our results again show that the target alternative was chosen significantly more often ($p = 0.0126$) compared to the competitor. In sum, our results indicate that the attraction effect is present in labor supply decisions independent of perceived meaning of work.

ZEITPLAN DER GfEW TAGUNG 2018

MONTAG, 17. SEPTEMBER 2018

- ab 12:00 Uhr **Registrierung Gebäude O und Mittagessen in der Mensa**
- 13:30 Uhr **Eröffnung und Begrüßung** (Gebäude O)
- Prof. Dr. Johannes Blömer*
Vizepräsident für Forschung und wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs
der Universität Paderborn
- Prof. Dr. Caren Sureth-Sloane*
Dekanin der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität
Paderborn
- 14:00 Uhr **Parallel Session 1**
- 15:30 Uhr **Kaffeepause**
- 15:45 Uhr **Parallel Session 2**
- 17:15 Uhr **Keynote** (Raum O 2)
General 2x2 Games With Coupled Populations: An Experiment in
Continuous Time
- Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann*
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
- ab 19:30 Uhr **Empfang im Q-Gebäude der Universität**

DIENSTAG, 18. SEPTEMBER 2018

- 09:00 Uhr **Parallel Session 3**
- 10:30 Uhr **Kaffeepause**
- 11:00 Uhr **Parallel Session 4**
- 12:30 Uhr **Mittagessen in der Mensa** (Gebäude ME)

- 14:00 Uhr **Parallel Session 5**
- 16:00 Uhr **Kaffeepause**
- 16:30 Uhr **Keynote** (Raum O 2)
The New Data Science: On the Amalgamation of Statistics and
Machine Learning
- Prof. Dr. Eyke Hüllermeier*
Universität Paderborn
- 17:30 Uhr **GfEW - Mitgliederversammlung** (Raum O 2)
- ab 19:00 Uhr **Konferenzdinner** im Gasthaus Haxterpark
Haxterhöhe 2, 33100 Paderborn
Fußweg von der Universität ca. 15 Minuten

MITTWOCH, 19. SEPTEMBER 2018

- 09:00 Uhr **Parallel Session 6**
- 10:30 Uhr **Kaffeepause**
- 11:00 Uhr **Keynote** (Raum O 2)
Unethisches Verhalten - Einflussfaktoren und Anreize
- Prof. Dr. Martin Kocher*
Universität Wien
- 12:00 Uhr **Mittagsimbiss**

TITEL: **Using Insights from Behavioral Economics for the Design of Financial Incentives Based on Loss Aversion to Improve Medication Persistence - An Experimental Analysis**

AUTOREN: **Alina Elrich**, Behnud Mir Djawadi, René Fahr

ABSTRACT: Medication persistence continues to be a primary target of efforts to improve health outcomes for patients with chronic disease. We develop a financial incentive scheme based on the concept of loss aversion to improve medication persistence. In doing so, we abstract away from any medical treatment and design an economic laboratory experiment, which simulates the course of events inherent in medical treatments from an economic perspective. We incorporate loss aversion in our incentive scheme in the following way: subjects receive an upfront bonus, but are only allowed to keep it if they do not dropout of the experiment until the end. In order to exclude a mere bonus effect, we compare this incentive scheme with a rather conventional bonus. Here subjects get the bonus after being compliant until the end of the experiment. Additionally, we investigate with a control treatment whether loss aversion indeed is a reason for subjects' behavior.

According to this control treatment, we can assume that loss aversion is responsible for non-persistence. Our results, furthermore, indicate that, in contrast to a baseline treatment without any incentives, in both of the bonus treatments subjects are more persistent. However, an upfront bonus even leads to a higher persistence than a conventional bonus. With the methods of experimental economics, our study delivers the first proof of concept of a scalable process not requiring patient samples to test the effectiveness of an upfront bonus on persistence behaviour

TITEL: **Don't patronize me! An Experiment on Rejecting Paternalistic Help**

AUTOREN: Silvia Lübbecke, **Wendelin Schnedler**

ABSTRACT: We examine whether individuals are willing to pay in order to reject unrequired help—even if doing so does not help them

to control the outcome. We find that about a third of subjects reject. This share is economically important and significantly different from some error benchmark. Our design also allows to distinguish between different reasons why help may be rejected: the individual may signal autonomy or competence to the interfering party (paternalist) or preserve self-esteem. Tentative evidence suggests that all three reasons matter. In particular, 14% of subjects reject paternalistic help even if rejection cannot be used as a signal to the paternalist at all.

SESSION 4 (18.09.2018 um 11:00 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224
Fairness	Kooperation
<p>Do People try to prevent their own Behaviour from affecting other People? Self-commitment on Social Preferences in a Dictator Game with Role and Endowment Uncertainty</p> <p>Herr Janis Cloos (TU Clausthal)</p>	<p>Leadership - Sanctions, Cooperation and Happiness</p> <p>Herr Thomas Lauer (Universität zu Köln)</p>
<p>Fairness in Markets and Market Experiments</p> <p>Herr Dirk Engelmann (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)</p>	<p>Self-governance in Noisy Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence on Punishment with Costly Monitoring</p> <p>Herr Andreas Nicklisch (HTW Chur)</p>
<p>Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: A New Perspective</p> <p>Herr Philip Grech* (ETH Zürich)</p>	<p>Does Sequential Decision-making trigger Collective Investment in R&D Cooperation? Experimental Evidence on Knowledge Sharing in R&D in the Automotive Value Chain</p> <p>Herr Alexander Haering* (RWI Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Essen, Hochschule Fresenius)</p>

*Session chair

FAIRNESS

TITEL: **Do People try to prevent their own Behaviour from affecting other People? Self-commitment on Social Preferences in a Dictator Game with Role and Endowment Uncertainty**

AUTOREN: **Janis Cloos**, Matthias Greiff, Mathias Erlei

ABSTRACT: Empirical studies on strategic commitment behaviour mostly deal with problems of self-control that occur in connection with feared self-harming behaviour. So far it has not been investigated whether individuals apply self-commitment strategies if they want to prevent their own behaviour from affecting other people. Our aim is to test this assumption experimentally.

In a first experiment we carry out a dictator game with a small and a high endowment. Dictators can choose between a fair and a selfish division. We assume that players have concerns for their own reference dependent payoff, fairness and image concerns (guilt when deviating from the fair division). The suggested reference point is the mean payoff in the experimental session. By varying the endowment distribution across treatments, we manipulate this reference point. In line with our assumptions about the underlying motives, we expect that dictators with a small endowment (below the session mean) care less about fairness within the dictator's group.

In the projected second experiment, dictators have a commitment option. Before they know whether they are getting the small or the high endowment, they have an opportunity to commit themselves to one of the distributions. The commitment option generates monetary costs and a lack of information about the size of the endowment. However, we assume that some dictators will choose the commitment option to prevent themselves from choosing a distribution that was not originally preferred.

TITEL: **Fairness in Markets and Market Experiments**

AUTOREN: **Dirk Engelmann**, Jana Friedrichsen, Dorothea Kübler

ABSTRACT: Whether pro-social preferences identified in economic laboratories survive in natural market contexts is an important and contested issue. We investigate how fairness in a laboratory experiment framed explicitly as a market exchange relates to preferences for fair trade products before and after the market experiment. We find that the willingness to buy at a higher price when higher wages are paid to the worker correlates both with the choice for a fair trade product before the laboratory experiment and with the willingness to pay a positive fair trade premium, elicited at the end of the experiment. These results support the notion that fairness preferences as assessed in laboratory experiments capture preferences for fair behavior in comparable situations outside the laboratory.

TITEL: **Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: A New Perspective**

AUTOREN: **Philip Grech**, Heinrich Nax

ABSTRACT: Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their underlying strategic incentives. Assuming identical social preferences, we show that the two most widely used protocols generically generate strongly contrasting rational-choice predictions: intermediate payments arise in the one, extremal payments in the other. Our analysis is complemented by a tailor-made experiment rejecting both the existing implicit assumption that differences in giving are primarily due to differences in social preferences, as well as (perfectly) strategic rational-choice yielding a satisfactory alternative. Our findings suggest (boundedly) strategic considerations as an explanatory alternative, and cast doubt on conclusions that were drawn regarding social preferences amongst humans distinguished by social class, gender, generation, nationality, etc.

KOOPERATION

TITEL: **Leadership - Sanctions, Cooperation and Happiness**

AUTOREN: **Thomas Lauer**, Nicolas Meier

ABSTRACT: One of the fundamental functions of leadership in groups or organizations is the use of sanctions to foster and preserve cooperation among the group members. These sanctions can either be the punishment of uncooperative behavior or a reward for cooperative actions. We study whether individuals prefer to follow a leader who can only punish undesirable behavior, or if they chose to be in a group where the leader can only reward. We find that individuals have an initial preference for the rewarded group but are disappointed by the outcomes and their fellow group members behavior. Over time more and more chose to follow the punishing leader. At all times those who are in the punishment team do not only cooperate to a larger extend but are also more satisfied with their working environment

TITEL: **Self-governance in Noisy Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence on Punishment with Costly Monitoring**

AUTOREN: **Andreas Nicklisch**, Louis Putterman, Christian Thöni

ABSTRACT: Recent experimental studies question whether societies can “selfgovernance” social dilemmas in a decentralized way. One important problem are decentralized punishment opportunities under imperfect monitoring of others’ behavior. As a consequence “misdirected” punishment increases massively, while cooperation decreases significantly. Our experiment shows that the majority of our experimental participants are willing to pay a modest cost to improve their information. Almost no subjects take up the chance to buy a partial improvement in information at lower price. Rather subjects choose to monitor perfectly or do not improve their monitoring at all. Little punishment takes place with imperfect information. Only those subjects who improve their monitoring punish non-cooperative behavior subsequently, leading to a substantial and significant improvement in

terms of efficiency when participants improve in information at their own cost.

TITEL: **Does Sequential Decision-making trigger Collective Investment in R&D Cooperation? Experimental Evidence on Knowledge Sharing in R&D in the Automotive Value Chain**

AUTOREN: Buchmann, T., **Haering, A.**, Kudic, M., Rothgang, M.

ABSTRACT: We conduct a laboratory experiment to gain in-depth insights on the factors that drive collective research and development (R&D) efforts among firms located along the automotive value chain. These firms frequently face new market challenges that force actors to jointly find new technological solutions. Empirical observations from preceding investigations inform the framing of our experiment. Accordingly, we employ a public good experiment and analyze the influence of sequential decision-making (i) on the willingness to engage in cooperation and (ii) on economic welfare. We use a linear value chain setting with three suppliers and one OEM and assume that OEMs have the power to punish. Our results indicate that the contribution significantly increases in the situation with sequential decision-making and that sequential decisions increase the overall welfare even in case of unequally distributed R&D budgets

SESSION 5 (18.09.2018 um 14:00 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224
Korruption & Compliance II	Migration
Why do the Rich cheat more? An Experiment on Tax Morale	Alea iacta est: Post-traumatic-stress-disorder and Dishonesty among Syrian Refugees
Frau Susanna Grundmann (Universität Passau)	Frau Elisa Fraile Aranda (Universität Hamburg)
The Influence of Incidental Emotions on Tax Compliance Behavior	Punishment Patterns, Trust, and Traumatization among Syrian Civil War Victims : A Lab in the Field Experiment
Herr Martin Fochmann (Universität zu Köln)	Frau Lamis Saleh (Universität Hamburg)
The Influence of Penalties on Corrupt Behavior in the Context of Pharmaceutical Prescriptions - An Experiment	Reciprocity as an Effective Device to foster the Social Integration of Refugees: Evidence from a Laboratory, a Field, and a Survey Experiment
Frau Vanessa Nina Hilleringmann (Universität Paderborn)	Frau Vanessa Mertins (Universität Vechta)
Principal-Agent Cheating Game	Costs, Needs, and Integration Efforts Shape Helping Behavior Toward Refugees
Frau Elina Khachatryan* (Universität Kassel)	Herr Hannes Rusch* (Philipps-Universität Marburg & TU München)

*Session chair

KORRUPTION & COMPLIANCE II

TITEL: **Why do the Rich cheat more? An Experiment on Tax Morale**

AUTOREN: **Susanna Grundmann**

ABSTRACT: Recent research has shown that the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes honestly decreases for subjects who earn more. This study aims at identifying the factors driving this loss of tax morale. Building on a design by Grundmann & Lambsdorff (2017), I study how luck, different levels of entitlement and responsibility for one's income drive the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes honestly. Concretely, this study aims at clarifying whether tax morale suffers if subjects feel a sense of entitlement created by actual or imagined responsibility for own income or whether it suffices that subjects receive a wage that is high enough to compensate the moral costs of cheating. To this end, treatments will vary whether income is determined by luck, effort or a combination of both.

TITEL: **The Influence of Incidental Emotions on Tax Compliance Behavior**

AUTOREN: **Martin Hechtner Fochmann**, Peter Frank Mohr

ABSTRACT: We study how incidental emotions (i.e., emotions not related to the actual choice problem) influence tax compliance behavior. To induce incidental emotions, we use positive and aversive pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS). We observe that tax compliance level is higher in our aversive emotion condition than in our positive emotion condition

TITEL: **The Influence of Penalties on Corrupt Behavior in the Context of Pharmaceutical Prescriptions - An Experiment**

AUTOREN: **Vanessa Nina Hilleringmann**, Britta Hoyer

ABSTRACT: Under the new German anti-corruption law both physicians and pharmaceutical companies can be punished for corruption, whereas previously only physicians were liable for punishment. We designed and tested two different treatments. In the treatments we varied the punishment structures according to the change in legislation, with an additional baseline treatment with no punishment. We find that if the potential for punishment is introduced, it only affects the behavior of the newly liable party. However, the potential for punishment significantly decreases the number of successful corrupt acts. Overall, the new German anti-corruption law should thus be a step in the right direction to fight corruption in the health sector.

TITEL: **Principal-Agent Cheating Game**

AUTOREN: Astrid Dannenberg, **Elina Khachatryan**

ABSTRACT: Our experimental game investigates situations where one person has influence over another person, who could cheat on their behalf. To investigate these situations, we conduct one-shot two-stage laboratory experiments. In the first stage of the experimental treatments, principals can attempt to influence the agents' actions, either monetarily or verbally (by sending an anonymous written message). In the second stage of the game, agents perform the Fischbacher and Foellmi-Heusi "die-in-the-cup" task. The reported die roll determines the principal's payoff. Not surprisingly, we find that agents are least likely to cheat for their principals in the control treatments, where principals have no influence over the agents. We distinguish between competitive and non-competitive payment schemes for the principal. Interestingly, although competition affects the amount of pressure principals attempt to exert over their agents, the agents do not per se seem to internalize the competitive pressure faced by their principals.

MIGRATION

TITEL: **Alea iacta est: Post-traumatic-stress-disorder and Dishonesty among Syrian Refugees**

AUTOREN: Nora El-Bialy, **Elisa Fraile**, Andreas Nicklisch, Lamis Saleh, Stefan Voigt

ABSTRACT: We conduct a modified die experiment, in which participants are asked to repeatedly report their guess regarding the number of dots of an electronic die. Matches of guesses and die throws are monetarily incentivized, while nobody except the participants themselves know their guesses before the die is rolled. Whether matches are correctly reported by the participants is thus impossible to observe for anybody. We report the results of experiments among Syrian refugees in Germany and Jordan, and Syrians in Syria. Participants do lie, though not maximally. These results are in line with previous evidence suggesting that people tend to balance the competing motivations for full honesty and income-maximizing by being partly dishonest. A closer analysis reveals the importance of traumatic experiences during the flight and asylum process of refugees that influence dishonesty. When Syrians are forced to leave their country and reside in Jordan or Germany, they show behaviour suggesting that they lower their expectations regarding the social norm concerning the number of acceptable lies. Higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder as well as more time spent in Germany lead to higher levels of "honesty". Results further indicate that income and age play an important role in determining the level of self-reported number of matches.

TITEL: **Punishment Patterns, Trust, and Traumatization among Syrian Civil War Victims : A Lab in the Field Experiment**

AUTOREN: Nora El-Bialy, Elisa Fraile, Andreas Nicklisch, **Lamis Saleh**, Stefan Voigt

ABSTRACT: The civil war in Syria has been raging since 2011 and has led to the internal displacement of roughly half of Syria's population.

We ask whether individual traumatization levels affect the ways people interact with each other. Drawing on a modified ultimatum as well as a modified prisoners' dilemma game, we are specifically interested in people's punishment behavior. We find that internally displaced people suffer from higher traumatization levels, are less likely to cooperate, but more likely to punish cooperators, i.e. behave as anti-social punishers. This is bad news for Syria, as it is likely to become an obstacle for post-civil war development prospects.

TITEL: **Reciprocity as an Effective Device to foster the Social Integration of Refugees: Evidence from a Laboratory, a Field, and a Survey Experiment**

AUTOREN: Sabrina Jeworrek, Bernd Josef Leisen, **Vanessa Mertins**

ABSTRACT: Finding ways how to best support the integration of asylum seekers is critical, for the sake of the refugees themselves and host countries alike. Nonetheless, the integration process can be very challenging for everyone involved. It is not only government which is looking to support refugees since refugees themselves and the citizens of the host countries also have a role to play. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that only a minority of natives is willing to engage actively, although this source of mutual support can be critical. Accordingly, political decision makers and economic researchers alike may ask how to motivate a larger share of host country's society to actively support the integration process. We build upon the observation that most people are homines reciprocans, and that gift-exchange is often critical for successful social and economic interactions. This paper examines the idea that a population's willingness to support refugees increases as a reciprocal response after being informed about refugees' contributions to society using the example of volunteer activities. We run a laboratory, a survey and a natural field experiment to test under which conditions natives are willing to support newcomers personally and to contribute financially toward integration.

TITEL: **Costs, Needs, and Integration Efforts Shape Helping Behavior Toward Refugees**

AUTOREN: Robert Böhm, Maik Theelen, **Hannes Rusch**, Paul van Lange

ABSTRACT: Recent political instabilities and conflicts around the world have drastically increased the number of people seeking refuge. The challenges associated with the large number of arriving refugees have revealed a deep divide among the citizens of host countries: one group welcomes refugees, whereas another rejects them. Our research aim is to identify factors that help us understand host citizens' (un)willingness to help refugees. We devise an economic game that captures the basic structural properties of the refugee situation. We use it to investigate both economic and psychological determinants of citizens' prosocial behavior toward refugees. In three controlled laboratory studies, we find that helping refugees becomes less likely when it is individually costly to the citizens. At the same time, helping becomes more likely with the refugees' neediness: helping increases when it prevents a loss rather than generates a gain for the refugees. Moreover, particularly citizens with higher degrees of prosocial orientation are willing to provide help at a personal cost. When refugees have to exert a minimum level of effort to be eligible for support by the citizens, these mandatory "integration efforts" further increase prosocial citizens' willingness to help. Our results underscore that economic factors play a key role in shaping individual refugee helping behavior but also show that psychological factors modulate how individuals respond to them. Moreover, our economic game is a useful complement to correlational survey measures and can be used for pretesting policy measures aimed at promoting prosocial behavior toward refugees.

SESSION 6 (19.09.2018 um 09:00 Uhr)

Raum O 1 258	Raum O 1 224	Raum O 2
Communication & Machine Learning	Religion	Macht & Geschlechterunterschiede
On a Deeper Understanding of Communication in Experiments: Classification of Natural Language Messages Employing Machine Learning	On the Potential of Religious Institutions to Promote Sustainable Behavior: Experimental Evidence from the German Catholic Convention	Gender Differences in Avoiding Decision Making for Others
Herr Benjamin Wegener (Hochschule Ostwestfalen-Lippe)	Herr Christoph Feldhaus (Westfälische Wilhelmsuniversität Münster)	Herr Torben Kölpin (Universität Vechta)
Content and Facial Expressions in Public Good Games – Stopping Free-riding until the End	Does Contact help to Re-establish Cooperation and Trust after a Violent Conflict? Testing Different Types of Contact in a Lab-in-the-field Experiment	Better a Woman than a Skilled Man? A Field Experiment on Gender Based Discrimination in the Child-care Market
Herr Dmitri Bershadskyy (Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Halle)	Frau Katharina Werner* (Universität Passau)	Herr Christian Walter* (Universität Vechta)
Asymmetrische Information und strategische Kommunikation		
Frau Christine Grimm* (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien)		

COMMUNICATION & MACHINE LEARNING

TITEL: **On a Deeper Understanding of Communication in Experiments: Classification of Natural Language Messages Employing Machine Learning**

AUTOREN: **Benjamin Wegener**, Eva Tebbe, Christian Faupel, Korbinian von Blanckenburg

ABSTRACT: Communication has shown to be crucial for decision-making in very different contexts. For example, experimental research has repeatedly demonstrated that between-subject communication is a powerful driver of collusion in various market games. Yet, in the beginnings of experimental research, only little was known about the specific way in which between-subject communication affects individual decision-making. Therefore, recently, the role and analysis of natural language communication has gained attention in experimental research. One important question is whether certain types of communication affect decisions differently than others. In this regard, Houser and Xiao (2011) present an approach for the classification of natural language messages, using a coordination game with external evaluators. This objective classification procedure allows to infer deeper insights from communication data. The primary limitation of this approach is its application to large data sets. Hence, we present a new approach based on the coordination game by Houser and Xiao, combining their procedure with a machine learning text analysis component. Thus, we are able to analyse larger data sets, based on a small training data set classified beforehand by human evaluators. Data reported by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) is used in order to test our approach. We are able to substantially replicate the classification results of the original classification given by Charness and Dufwenberg themselves.

TITEL: **Content and Facial Expressions in Public Good Games – Stopping Free-riding until the End**

AUTOREN: **Dmitri Bershadskyy**, Ehsan Othman, Frerk Saxen

ABSTRACT: Using a public good experiment with pre-play face-to-face communication (FFC) this paper investigates two channels over which FFC influences contributions of the subjects. Firstly, the contents of the FFC are investigated by categorizing specific strategic information and using simple meta-data. Secondly, a machine-learning approach to analyze facial expressions of the subjects during their communications is implemented. These approaches constitute the first of their kind, analyzing content and facial expressions in FFC while directly linking them to the behavior of the subjects in a public good game. The length of the FFC quantified in the number of words is further a good measure to predict cooperation behavior towards the end of the game. Although both approaches are conducted independently the results are aligned: verbally agreeing to fully contribute to the public good until the very end and communicating effectively reduces the commonly observed end-game behavior. The length of the FFC quantified in number of words is further a good measure to predict cooperation behavior towards the end of the game. The results of facial expressions analysis support this hypothesis, yet are not significant. However, the current results are promising, and indicate that the beginning of pre-play communication is less important than the rest to predict contribution behavior. The groups which at the end of the communication phase stared in to the empty space instead of actively communicating with each other were correctly classified as less successful groups.

TITEL: **Asymmetrische Information und strategische Kommunikation**

AUTOREN: Ben Greiner, **Christine Grimm**

ABSTRACT: Information ist bei Interaktionen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern häufig asymmetrisch verteilt. Die Effizienzverluste, die dadurch auftreten, können durch die Bereitstellung der Informa-

tion überwunden werden. Mit Hilfe des Ultimatum Spiels untersuchen wir, wie sich verschiedene strategische Formen der Kommunikation auf Effizienz und Auszahlungen auswirken, wobei wir variieren, ob falsche Informationen kommuniziert werden können oder nicht. Wir replizieren frühere Ergebnisse eines Effizienzverlustes durch asymmetrische Information und zeigen, dass diese Verluste sich sowohl auf der informierten als auch der uninformierten Seite realisieren. Kommunikation führt zu besseren Ergebnissen, wobei es eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt, ob Falschinformationen kommuniziert werden können. Auszahlungen verbessern sich vorrangig auf Seiten des Angebotstellers, unabhängig davon ob es sich um den informierten oder uninformierten Teilnehmer handelt.

RELIGION

TITEL: **On the Potential of Religious Institutions to Promote Sustainable Behavior: Experimental Evidence from the German Catholic Convention**

AUTOREN: **Christoph Feldhaus**, Marvin Gleue, Andreas Löschel

ABSTRACT: We conduct a field experiment framed as a survey executed with guests of the German Catholic Convention (Katholikentag) in Münster, Germany in May 2018. We aim at investigating potential effects of both people's religious identity and of religious authorities' signals concerning climate protection on participants' willingness to donate for a carbon-offsetting fund.

In a 2*2 design, participants were first either asked questions regarding their religion (Religious priming) or regarding their job and private life (Non-religious priming). Then, they learned about a carbon-offsetting fund and the possibility to give a donation for it. When taking their decision, they, second, got to know that the donation would be matched 1:1 by either a catholic institution (Religious authority) or an unspecified institution (No religious authority).

In total, we collected 840 observations. Our results suggest that having the donation matched by a religious institution significantly and substantially increases donations by about 60%. Rendering participants'

religious identity salient has no effect on our behavioral measure. Our findings suggest that religious authorities' signals regarding the Catholic mission of living sustainably likely reduces the present corresponding uncertainty. Previous studies indicate mixed results with regard to the relation of religiosity and sustainable behavior. Our study indicates that this might be due to a lack of certainty with respect to this mission. Hence, religious institutions might have a huge impact on people's actual sustainable behavior when they clearly signal what they expect from believers.

TITEL: **Does Contact help to Re-establish Cooperation and Trust after a Violent Conflict? Testing Different Types of Contact in a Lab-in-the-field Experiment**

AUTOREN: **Katharina Werner**, Swee Hoon Chuah

ABSTRACT: After violent conflicts, encounter programs are commonly used and assumed to re-establish cooperation across groups by fostering forgiveness, mutual understanding and trust. Such encounters often combine different types of contact between group members, ranging from pure meetings over talking about emotions or motives to joint projects with a common goal. Although the programs require a lot of resources, the efficacy of contact after conflict lacks empirical support.

We run lab-in-the-field experiments with 1500 students at a purely Muslim and a purely Christian university in the aftermath of a violent conflict between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, and in a different region with a similar religious and ethnic composition, but no history of conflict. In three treatments, we test different types of contact interventions where contact is exogenously induced between groups of three Muslims and three Christians: Free communication without any given topic, talking about the history of conflict and related emotions or working on a joint task with a common goal. A subsequent Multilevel Public Goods Game measures cooperation within and across the religious groups of three players. A Trust Game with a counterpart of a different religion, who was not part of the intervention, measures whether the interventions also translate into trust towards

other out-group members with whom subjects did not have contact.

The results suggest that contact is more efficient in the peaceful region and that the efficacy depends on subjects' individual conflict exposure. Free communication and a joint task enhance cooperation between groups, but only free communication increases trust toward other out-group members. Different forms of contact affect attitudes like animosity, forgiveness and empathy differently.

MACHT & GESCHLECHTERUNTERSCHIEDE

TITEL: Gender Differences in Avoiding Decision Making for Others

AUTOREN: Torben Kölpin, Vanessa Mertins

ABSTRACT: Leadership is closely linked to acceptance of responsibility and decision-making for others. This involves that decision-makers may consider the consequences of available options for both, their own welfare and others'. In this context, several experimental studies have investigated gender differences in risky decision-making and suggest that men are more willing to be a decision-maker than women are. In these studies, the choice to decline decision-making power has neither a positive nor a negative consequence for the participant. Real world settings, however, are usually characterized by leadership involving at least some positive monetary outcome. The aim of our studies is to investigate whether women are not only less willing than men to accept leadership responsibility, but whether they are more likely to choose not to be a decision maker even if this choice involves monetary consequences. We conducted a laboratory experiment to analyze gender differences in the willingness-to-accept (WTA) to make risky decision for a group. First results show differences between males and females. Women show a higher WTA than men, furthermore, women are less willing to make the group decision compared to men.

TITEL: Better a Woman than a Skilled Man? A Field Experiment on Gender Based Discrimination in the Childcare Market

AUTOREN: Bernd Josef Leisen, Vanessa Mertins, Christian Walter

ABSTRACT: Childcare and early childhood education is still dominated by women. However recent studies indicate that educational capabilities are rather learnable instead of innate and a social paradigm shift increases the importance of more men in childcare on the political agenda. Although several recruiting campaigns have been initiated to attract more men in early education to supply the increasing demand for childcare, it is still unclear if men as suppliers have equivalent opportunities on the childcare market. Therefore this paper has two major purposes. First, we identify the prevalence and magnitude of gender based discrimination in the market for private childcare and babysitting services and second we investigate if (a) a relevant apprenticeship (b) other parents' recommendations or (c) own parenthood as a positive signal for occupational aptitude are capable of raising the reputation of male childcare providers. To approach both to this date open questions, we conducted an online field experiment using a written approach. Five fictitious applicants (male & female baseline plus (a) – (c)), four with a typical male and one with a typical female name, applied for a total of 626 private childcare and babysitting jobs throughout Germany. We measure response rates and analyze the content of the feedbacks received.

The results show striking evidence for gender based discrimination. Male applications received significantly fewer responses, fewer positive messages and fewer opportunities to get in contact with parents than female counterparts (anything else held constant). Interestingly, the three occupational aptitude treatments sent out for the male applicant did not lead to significant differences in parental response behavior. Therefore, none of the tested signals for occupational aptitude could reduce discrimination against male childcare providers. We interpret this finding as an indicator for preference based discrimination. Regarding the political aspirations in terms of increasing the currently small share of male child care workers, we submit that parents' distinct preference for female workers and the anticipation thereof by prospective male child care workers may constitute a major obstacle for attraction and self-selection of men into childcare and early childhood markets.

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