

JAHRES TAGUNG 2023

**UNIVERSITÄT
ERFURT**

Staatswissenschaftliche
Fakultät

20. bis 22. Sept
in Erfurt



GfeW

**Gesellschaft
für experimentelle
Wirtschaftsforschung**

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Vorwort	1
Wichtige Orte und Anfahrt	2
Anfahrt zum Konferenzort	2
Campusplan	3
Anfahrt zum Konferenzdinner	4
Anfahrt zum Get-together	5
Programmübersicht Ablaufplan	6
Keynotes & Abstracts	7
Übersicht Parallelsessions	8
Tagesplan Mittwoch	9
Tagesplan Donnerstag	10
Tagesplan Freitag	13
TeilnehmerInnenliste	15
Organisation	19

Vorwort

Liebe Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer der GfeW-Jahrestagung 2023,

es erfüllt uns mit großer Freude, Sie an der Universität Erfurt herzlich willkommen zu heißen! Die Universität Erfurt ist eine der ältesten staatlichen Universitäten Deutschlands und zugleich eine der jüngsten. Was zunächst paradox klingen mag, verweist auf eine lange und wechselhafte Geschichte. Die einstige Alma Mater Erfordensis gilt mit ihrem Gründungsprivileg von 1379 als die älteste Universität vor Heidelberg (1385) und Köln (1388). Jedoch wurde das spätmittelalterliche Bildungszentrum, an dem schon Martin Luther studierte, im Jahr 1816 geschlossen. Ihr Andenken blieb lebendig, dennoch sollten einige Jahre vergehen, bis die Universität 1994 wiedergegründet wurde. Die Universität Erfurt verbindet so jahrhundertealte Tradition mit lebendiger Gegenwart

Auch die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung hat hier eine mittlerweile über 20 Jahre zurückreichende Historie, beginnend mit dem 2001 gegründeten eLab bis hin zur Etablierung des Erfurt Laboratory for Empirical Research (ErfurtLab) als eigenständige Einrichtung im Jahr 2019. Im ErfurtLab stehen auf über 400 qm 15 Räume für Laborexperimente, Befragungen, Gruppeninterviews und andere Formen der Datenerhebung zur Verfügung. Flankierend vereint das Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB) interdisziplinär insbesondere auch jene ForscherInnen, die experimentell arbeiten.

Bei der diesjährigen Tagung freuen wir uns auf 64 spannende Fachvorträge aus allen Bereichen der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Wir dürfen darüber hinaus zwei herausragende GastrednerInnen begrüßen: Prof. Dr. Veronika Grimm von der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg und Prof. Dr. Simon Gächter von der University of Nottingham. Wir freuen uns auf die gemeinsamen Tage in Erfurt, und wünschen allen TeilnehmerInnen interessante Vorträge, lebhaft Diskussionen und Gespräche, und viel Spaß bei der Tagung.

Herzlichst,

Manfred Königstein, Özgür Güererk, Wasilios Hariskos, Oliver Himmler, Fabian Kleine und Thomas Lauer

GfeW

Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e. V.



Wichtige Orte und Anfahrt

Anfahrt zum Konferenzort

Alle vorgeschlagenen Tagungshotels befinden sich in der Erfurter Innenstadt und somit immer in der Nähe zu einer Straßenbahnhaltestelle.

Um von der Innenstadt die Universität zu erreichen, nehmen Sie bis zur **Haltestelle Universität**



Linie 3 Richtung **Europaplatz** oder **Linie 6** Richtung **Rieth**

Zentrale Haltestellen, von denen aus Sie mit den Linien 3 und 6 zur Universität kommen sind „Hauptbahnhof“, Fischmarkt“ und „Domplatz Nord“.

Darüber hinaus gelangen Sie mit allen anderen Straßenbahnlinien zum zentralen Innenstadt-Drehkreuz „Anger“, und von dort weiter mit den Linien 3 und 6 zur Universität.

Der Haupteingang der Universität befindet sich direkt gegenüber der Haltestelle "Universität".

Hinweis: bitte beachten Sie, dass der Mittwoch, 20.09., in Thüringen ein gesetzlicher Feiertag ist und Geschäfte geschlossen sind.

Wichtige Orte und Anfahrt

Campusplan



Die Tagungsräume sowie die Mensa sind mit Pfeilen markiert.

Wichtige Orte und Anfahrt

Anfahrt zum Get-Together

Von der Universität zum Restaurant **Faustus** gelangen Sie, indem Sie bei der Haltestelle „Universität“ in die **Linie 3** (Richtung Urbicher Kreuz) **und 6** (Richtung Steigerstraße) einsteigen und bis zur **Haltestelle „Fischmarkt“** fahren.

Get-Together im Restaurant Faustus



Die Haltestelle Fischmarkt erreichen Sie zudem noch mit der Straßenbahnlinie 2.



Wenigemarkt 5
99084 Erfurt

Das Restaurant Faustus erreichen Sie, indem Sie vor dem Gildehaus (siehe nächste Seite) nach rechts abbiegen und der Straße bis zum Benediktsplatz folgen. Dort können Sie die historische Krämerbrücke überqueren, an deren Ende sich nach dem Häuserdurchgang das Restaurant befindet.

Wichtige Orte und Anfahrt

Anfahrt zum Konferenzdinner

Von der Universität zum Ristorante **Pavarotti** gelangen Sie, indem Sie bei der Haltestelle „Universität“ in die **Linie 3** (Richtung Urbicher Kreuz) **und 6** (Richtung Steigerstraße) einsteigen und bis zur **Haltestelle „Fischmarkt“** fahren.

Konferenzdinner im Ristorante Pavarotti



Die Haltestelle Fischmarkt erreichen Sie zudem noch mit der Straßenbahnlinie 2.



Fischmarkt 13/16
99084 Erfurt

Dort ausgestiegen, befindet sich das Restaurant in Fahrtrichtung hinter Ihnen, im sogenannten „Gildehaus“. Es ist das sandsteinfarbene Haus rechts.

Programmübersicht

Mittwoch, 20. September

Ort

ab 13.00 Uhr	Registrierung	KIZ
13.30 – 13.45 Uhr	Eröffnung	KIZ/HS2
13.45 – 15.00 Uhr	Keynote Veronika Grimm	KIZ/HS2
15.00 – 15.30 Uhr	Kaffeepause	LG4/D08
15.30 – 17.00 Uhr	Parallelsession 1	LG4/D04-D07
17.30 – 18.15 Uhr	Mitgliedertreffen	KIZ/HS2
19.00 Uhr	Stadtführung vom Domplatz zum Faustus	
ab 20.00 Uhr	Get-together im Restaurant Faustus	

Donnerstag, 21. September

09.00 – 10.30 Uhr	Parallelsession 2	LG4/D04-D07
10.30 – 11.00 Uhr	Kaffeepause	LG4/D08
11.00 – 12.30 Uhr	Parallelsession 3	LG4/D04-D07
12.30 – 14.00 Uhr	Mittagspause	Mensa
	Forscherinnen-Netzwerktreffen	LG4/D01
14.00 – 15.30 Uhr	Parallelsession 4	LG4/D04-D07
15.30 – 16.00 Uhr	Kaffeepause	LG4/D08
16.00 – 16.45 Uhr	Verleihung Heinz-Sauermann-Preis	KIZ/HS2
18.30 – 19.45 Uhr	Keynote Simon Gächter im Rathausfestsaal	
ab 19.45 Uhr	Konferenzdinner im Ristorante Pavarotti	

Freitag, 22. September

09.00 – 10.30 Uhr	Parallelsession 5	LG4/D04-D07
10.30 – 11.00 Uhr	Kaffeepause	LG4/D08
11.00 – 12.30 Uhr	Parallelsession 6	LG4/D04-D07
anschließend	Verabschiedung	

Keynotes & Abstracts

Keynotes

Mittwoch, 20. September, 13.45 - 15.00 Uhr im KIZ / HS 2

Prof. Dr. Veronika Grimm, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen-Nürnberg

Titel wird noch bekanntgegeben

Donnerstag, 21. September, 18.30 – 19.45 Uhr im Rathausfestsaal

Prof. Dr. Simon Gächter, University of Nottingham

Titel: Why people follow rules

Abstracts

Aus Nachhaltigkeitsgründen haben wir im Programm der diesjährigen GfeW-Tagung keine Abstracts abgedruckt.

Indem Sie den QR-Code mit der Kamera ihres Smartphones einscannen, gelangen Sie direkt auf eine Website mit allen Abstracts. Sollten Sie die Abstracts in gedruckter Form benötigen, wenden Sie sich bitte an das Organisationsteam vor Ort.



<https://dfncloud.uni-erfurt.de/s/wtLBd7P4ae4Gcxg>

Übersicht Parallelsessions

Session	Zeit	LG4 / D04	LG4 / D05	LG4 / D06	LG4 / D07
Mittwoch, 20.09.					
1	15:45	Whistleblowing	Public Goods	Punishment	
Donnerstag, 21.09.					
2	09:00	Cheating and Honesty	Common Pool Resources and Externalities	Data Analysis and Research Methods	Decision Making
3	11:00	Social Norms and Reference Points	Cooperation and Prosociality I	Teamwork	Risk Preferences
4	14:00	Behavioral Design	Cooperation and Prosociality II	Artificial Intelligence	Markets and Competition
Freitag, 22.09.					
5	09:00	Feedback and Updating	Ethics and Fairness	Performance	Investment Behavior
6	11:00	Trust	Volunteering and Charity	Climate, Sustainability and Resources	

**Für die einzelnen Vorträge sind ca. 20 Minuten plus etwa 10 Minuten Diskussion eingeplant.
Die jeweils letzten Vortragenden einer Session achten bitte auf die Einhaltung der
Vortragszeiten.**

	D04	D05	D06
13:30	Eröffnung im KIZ/HS2		
13:45	Keynote Veronika Grimm im KIZ/HS2		
15:30	Kaffeepause im LG4/D08		
Session 1	Whistleblowing	Public Goods	Punishment
15:30	Plaß: Wrong beliefs about the social norm of whistleblowing? - Survey and experimental study	Keser: Public good provision under inequality in endowment and return from the public good	Werner: Who Should be Punished for Corruption? Experimental Evidence from Four Countries
16:00	Schäfers: I don't want to be disliked by my peers': How potential ostracism reduces internal whistleblowing	Kuntze: Efficiency concerns and the preference for the leadership position	Dannenberg: The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation
16:30	Burgstaller: Speaking Up Against Tax Evasion in a High-Evasion Environment? Why Whistleblowing May Not be the Solution in Collaborative Settings	Gallier: Little by little: Dynamic incentives and incremental contributions to a public good	Wolff: Rights, Duties, and Taboos: The Social Codex of Peer-Punishment
17:30	Mitgliederversammlung im KIZ/HS2		

	D04	D05	D06	D07
Session 2	Cheating and Honesty	Common pool resources and externalities	Data Analysis and Research Methods	Decision Making
09:00	Oelrich: The dark side of budgets: On the influence of dark triad traits on honesty in budgeting	Geschwind: Does scarcity induce hostility? An experimental investigation in a common-pool resource game with asymmetry	Greif-Winzrieth: FRISBEE: Framework for Integrating Sensor Data in Behavioral and Economic Experiments	Gorny: The Self-Defying Impact of Predictions on Actual Decisions
09:30	Seidel: Laundering the people instead of the money - an experimental study effect of mental money laundering Deception game	Händel: Impact of Externalities on Fishers Risk-Taking Decisions: Evidence from an Experimental Study at Lake Victoria	Bershadskyy: MTVE - Magdeburg Tool for Video Experiments	Draeger: Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief
10:00	Protte: Cheating in Human-Machine Interaction: The effect of the auditing entity and procedural ambiguity	Abellan: Markets, social responsibility and identity	Grossmann: Piloting Experiments Using Large Language Models	Ulke: The Phillips Curve - An Experimental Investigation of Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction
10:30	Kaffeepause im LG4/D08			

	D04	D05	D06	D07
Session 3	Social Norms and Reference Points	Cooperation and Prosociality I	Teamwork	Risk Preferences
11:00	Weingärtner: The effects of social norms and observability on food choice ENTFÄLLT	Rahal: Cognitive Processes Across the Globe: Webcam-based Eye-tracking Analysis of Ingroup Bias in 17 Societies	Petros: The Role of Self-Confidence in Teamwork: Experimental Evidence ENTFÄLLT	Bittner: Revalidating an Instrument for Measuring Risk Preferences
11:30	Läufer: Gender Norms and Greedy Work: An Experiment on the Division of Labor	Lumkowsky: Cooperation and Strategy Choice in the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma when Players can cheat	Klinkenberg: Creative Performance in Teams: The Effect of Workplace Settings and Self-Selection - an Experimental Study	Kurtis: Eliciting Risk Preferences for Optimal Insurance Design: An Experimental Study
12:00	Kassabali: Bunching in Higher Education: unintended effects of the ECTS?	Irlenbusch: „Fingleafing“ and Self-Serving Behavior		Unfried: Threat rigidity or prospect theory? – Top manager's risk preferences under threats and opportunities
12:30	Mittagspause / Forscherinnen-Netzwerktreffen im Raum LG4/D01			

	D04	D05	D06	D07
Session 4	Behavioral Design	Cooperation and Prosociality II	Artificial Intelligence	Markets and Competition
14:00	Behlen: Defaults and Effortful Tasks	Voß: Median Voting under Inequality: Still a Solution to Intergenerational Cooperation?	Graf Lambsdorff: Can we use GPT-4 as an examiner? An experimental competition between GPT-4 and humans on ranking open-text answers	Nax: New Avenues for Experimental Data
14:30	Timko: Transparent app design reduces excessive usage time and increases willingness to pay compared to common behavioural design: A framed field experiment	Fiedler: Understanding interdependent and strategic choice construction in social dilemma situations	Ostermaier: Lie against AI: Revealing private information through AI in an economic experiment	Kokot: Patient choice driven competition between physicians: performance disclosure and the quality of medical care
15:00	Wübelmann: At least you've tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard	Kraus: Economic Inequality and Cooperation: The Role of Homophily	Sachs: Algorithm aversion at first sight: Insights on people's tendency to eschew algorithm-based decisions	Rau: Umbrella Effects. An Experimental Study
15:30	Kaffeepause im LG4/D08			
16:00	Verleihung Heinz-Sauermann-Preis im KIZ/HS2			
18:30	Keynote Simon Gächter im Rathausfestsaal			

	D04	D05	D06	D07
Session 5	Feedback and Updating	Ethics and Fairness	Performance	Investment Behavior
09:00	Mir Djawadi: Social Proximity and Feedback-Giving Behavior - A study on how social interaction influences feedback-giving behavior on peer-to-peer platforms	Elrich: Der moderierende Effekt von Persönlichkeit auf die Effektivität von Verhaltensrichtlinien	Hiller: Deposit Contracts with a Performance-Based Refund: A Field Experiment	Woddow: Wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität und Anlegerverhalten - Auswirkungen der Haftungsverschärfung in Deutschland
09:30	Ndiaye: Peer Feedback in Clinical High-Volume Activities	Grubiak: Motivated beliefs and third party intervention	Simons: The Impact of Budget Restrictions and the Recommendation to Differentiate on Performance Appraisals - A Laboratory Experiment	Felser: Non-financial disclosures and moral licensing - Evidence from an eye tracking experiment.
10:00	Goerg: Motivated Belief Updating and Rationalization of Information	Panreck: Fairness Preferences of Child Labourers. Evidence from Bolivia.	Greif: A Laboratory Experiment on Using Different Financial-Incentivization Schemes in Software-Engineering Experimentation	
10:30	Kaffeepause im LG4/D08			

	D04	D05	D06
Session 6	Trust	Volunteering and Charity	Climate, Sustainability and Resources
11:00	Gürerk: Trust and Collaboration in Virtual Reality	Biermann: Cooperation and Solidarity after the reunification of Germany: Do behavioral differences between East and West Germans converge?	Cantner: Does information help to overcome resistance to carbon pricing? Evidence from a survey experiment
11:30	Walther: Honesty and Trust in Virtual Communication	Adena: Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nationwide field experiment on Facebook.	Frank: Exploring the Last Man Argument: Evidence on Society's Disposition towards Nature's Legal Rights
12:00	Kasper: Unfair institutions, rule compliance, and social trust	Apken: The effect of recognition and monetary compensation on volunteering retention - Evidence from a field experiment with digital volunteers	Lauer: Field evidence on the contested role of time preferences in resource management
	anschließend Verabschiedung		

TeilnehmerInnen

Name	Universität	Kontakt
Andres, Maximilian	Universität Potsdam	maximilian.andres@uni-potsdam.de
Abellan, Miguel	Leuphana Universität Lüneburg	miguel.abellan@leuphana.de
Adena, Maja	WZB Berlin	maja.adena@wzb.eu
Apken, Jeremy	Universität Vechta	Jeremy.Apken@uni-vechta.de
Behlen, Lars	Universität Erfurt / TH Nürnberg	lars.behlen@th-nuernberg.de
Bershadskyy, Dmitri	Otto-von-Guericke Universität, Magdeburg	dmitri.bershadskyy@ovgu.de
Biermann, Philipp	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	philipp.biermann@ovgu.de
Bittner, Anika	Technische Universität Hamburg	anika.bittner@tuhh.de
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	jeannette.brosig-koch@ovgu.de
Bruttel, Lisa	Universität Potsdam	lisa.bruttel@uni-potsdam.de
Burgstaller, Lilith	Walter Eucken Institut / Universität Freiburg	burgstaller@eucken.de
Cantner, Fabienne	TU München, Campus Straubing	fabienne.cantner@tum.de
Chwolka, Anne	Otto von Guericke Universität Magdeburg	chwolka@ovgu.de
Dannenberg, Astrid	Universität Kassel	dannenberg@uni-kassel.de
Draeger, Mathilde	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	mathilde.draeger@ovgu.de
Ehrich, Christina	Georg-August-Universität Göttingen	christina.ehrich@uni-goettingen.de
Elrich, Alina	Universität Paderborn	alina.elrich@uni-paderborn.de
Felser, Fabian	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	fabian.felser@ovgu.de
Fiedler, Susann	Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien	susann.fiedler@gmail.com
Frank, Björn	Universität Kassel	frank@uni-kassel.de
Gallier, Carlo	Free University of Bozen-Bolzano	carlo.gallier@unibz.it
Geschwind, Stephan	Universität Passau	stephan.geschwind@uni-passau.de

TeilnehmerInnen

Name	Universität	Kontakt
Giamattei, Marcus	Frankfurt School of Finance and Management	marcus.giamattei@uni-passau.de
Goerg, Sebastian	Technische Universität München	s.goerg@tum.de
Gorny, Paul M.	Karlsruher Institut für Technologie	paul.gorny@kit.edu
Graf Lambsdorff, Johann	Universität Passau	jlambsd@uni-passau.de
Greif, Jannik	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	jannik.greif@ovgu.de
Greif-Winzrieth, Anke	Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)	anke.greif-winzrieth@kit.edu
Grossmann, Max R. P.	Universität zu Köln & Mercatus Center, George Mason University	m.grossmann@uni-koeln.de
Grubiak, Kevin	Universität Passau	kevin.grubiak@uni-passau.de
Gürerk, Özgür	Universität zu Köln	guererk@wiso.uni-koeln.de
Hariskos, Wasilios	Universität Erfurt	wasilios.hariskos@uni-erfurt.de
Händel, Philipp	Universität Kassel	philipp.haendel@uni-kassel.de
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike	Universität Bonn	hschmidt@uni-bonn.de
Hiller, Maximilian	Universität Vechta	maximilian.hiller@uni-vechta.de
Himmler, Oliver	Universität Erfurt	oliver.himmler@uni-erfurt.de
Hofmann, Elisa	Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena	drelisahofmann@gmail.com
Irlenbusch, Bernd	Universität zu Köln	bernd.irlenbusch@uni-koeln.de
Irmscher, Florian	Universität Passau	florian.irmscher@uni-passau.de
Kasper, Matthias	Walter Eucken Institut	kasper@eucken.de
Kassaballi, Zouhier	Universität Erfurt	zouhier.kassaballi@uni-erfurt.de
Kerkhoff, Martin	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg	martin.kerkhoff@ovgu.de
Keser, Claudia	Georg-August-Universität Göttingen	ckeser@uni-goettingen.de
Kleine, Fabian	Universität Erfurt	fabian.kleine@uni-erfurt.de

TeilnehmerInnen

Name	Universität	Kontakt
Klinkenberg, Lisa	RWTH Aachen University	lisa.klinkenberg@org.rwth-aachen.de
Kokot, Johanna	Universität Hamburg	johanna.kokot@uni-hamburg.de
Königstein, Manfred	Universität Erfurt	manfred.koenigstein@uni-erfurt.de
Kraus, Janina	TU Clausthal	janina.kraus@tu-clausthal.de
Kuntze, Maximilian	Universität Vechta	maximilian.kuntze@uni-vechta.de
Kurtis, Melisa	Universität zu Köln	kurtis@wiso.uni-koeln.de
Lauer, Thomas	Universität Erfurt	thomas.lauer@uni-erfurt.de
Läufer, Aenne	Universität zu Köln	laeuf@wiso.uni-koeln.de
Lumkowsky, Marcel	Universität Kassel	marcel.lumkowsky@uni-kassel.de
Mir Djawadi, Behnud	Universität Paderborn	behnud.mir.djawadi@uni-paderborn.de
Mohrbacher, Moritz	Universität Erfurt	moritz.mohrbacher@uni-erfurt.de
Nax, Heinrich	ETH/UZH	hnax@ethz.ch
Ndiaye, Yero	Universität zu Köln	ndiaye@wiso.uni-koeln.de
Neuert, Josef	HS Fulda	Josef.neuert@w.hs-fulda.de
Nieber, Alexander	Radboud-Universität Nijmegen	alexander.nieber@ru.nl
Noeßelt, Lukas	TU Clausthal	lukasnoesselt@web.de
Oelrich, Sebastian	Technische Universität Dresden	sebastian.oelrich@tu-dresden.de
Ostermaier, Nina	Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg	nina.ostermaier@ovgu.de
Panreck, Sebastian	Universität Münster	sebastian.panreck@gmx.de
Petros, Fidel	WZB Berlin, TU Berlin / Verhalten auf Märkten	fidel.petros@wzb.eu
Plaß, Sabrina	Universität Paderborn	sabrina.plass@upb.de
Protte, Marius	Universität Paderborn	marius.protte@uni-paderborn.de
Radtke, Esther	TU Clausthal	esther.radtke@tu-clausthal.de

TeilnehmerInnen

Name	Universität	Kontakt
Rahal, Rima-Maria	Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods	rahal.rimamaria@gmail.com
Rau, Holger	Universität Duisburg-Essen & Universität Göttingen	holger.rau@uni-goettingen.de
Reske, Vivien	Georg-August-Universität Göttingen	vivien.reske@uni-goettingen.de
Sachs, Florian	Universität zu Köln	florian.sachs@uni-koeln.de
Schäfers, Sabrina	Universität Paderborn	sabrina.schaefers@uni-paderborn.de
Seidel, Alexandra	Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg	alexandra.seidel@ovgu.de
Siegling, Kim Michelle	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	kim.siegling@ovgu.de
Simons, Stella	RWTH Aachen University	stella.simons@org.rwth-aachen.de
Sturm, Bodo	HTWK Leipzig	bodo.sturm@htwk-leipzig.de
Timko, Christina	Ruhr-Universität Bochum	christina.timko@rub.de
Ulke, Dominik	Universität Passau	dominik.ulke@uni-passau.de
Unfried, Matthias	Nürnberg Institut für Marktentscheidungen e.V.	matthias.unfried@nim.org
Vater, Till Moritz	Maastricht University	till.vater@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Voß, Deborah	Universität Passau	deborah.voss@uni-passau.de
Walther, Sven	Karlsruher Institut für Technologie	sven.walther@kit.edu
Weingärtner, Eva	Universität Kassel	eva.weingaertner@uni-kassel.de
Werner, Julia	Universität Konstanz	julia.werner@uni-konstanz.de
Werner, Katharina	Universität Passau	katharina.werner@uni-passau.de
Winkelmann, Julia	Universität Paderborn	julia.winkelmann@uni-paderborn.de
Woddow, Christopher	Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg	Christopher.woddow@ovgu.de
Wolff, Irenaeus	TWI/Universität Konstanz	irenaeus.wolff@uni.kn
Wübbelmann, Cheyenne	Universität Vechta	cheyenne.wuebbelmann@uni-vechta.de
Zürn, Michael	Nuremberg Institute for Market Decisions	michael.zuern@nim.org

Organisation

Manfred Königstein

Professur für Angewandte
Mikroökonomie und Vorstand des
Center for Empirical Research in
Economics and Behavioral Sciences

Özgür Güererk

Universität Erfurt und Universität zu
Köln (Seminar für
Unternehmensentwicklung und
Wirtschaftsethik)

Wasilios Hariskos

Professur für Angewandte
Mikroökonomie und Geschäfts-führer
des Center for Empirical Research in
Economics and Behavioral Sciences

Oliver Himmler

Professur für Wirtschaftspolitik und
Finanzwissenschaft

Fabian Kleine

Professur für Quantitative Methoden
der empirischen Sozialforschung

Thomas Lauer

Wissenschaftlicher Geschäftsführer
des Erfurt Laboratory for Empirical
Research

Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an:

Thomas Lauer | +49 178 929 72 98 | thomas.lauer@uni-erfurt.de

Layout: [Karla Legner](#) und [Dennis Maghetiu](#)

Session 1 (Mittwoch 20.09., 15:45 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06
Whistleblowing	Public Goods	Punishment
<p>Wrong beliefs about the social norm of whistleblowing? - Survey and experimental study</p> <p>Frau Sabrina Plaß (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Public good provision under inequality in endowment and return from the public good</p> <p>Frau Prof. Dr. Claudia Keser (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)</p>	<p>Who Should be Punished for Corruption? Experimental Evidence from Four Countries</p> <p>Frau Dr. Katharina Werner (Universität Passau)</p>
<p>'I don't want to be disliked by my peers': How potential ostracism reduces internal whistleblowing</p> <p>Frau Sabrina Schäfers (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Efficiency concerns and the preference for the leadership position</p> <p>Herr Maximilian Kuntze (Universität Vechta)</p>	<p>The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation</p> <p>Frau Prof. Astrid Dannenberg (Universität Kassel)</p>
<p>Speaking Up Against Tax Evasion in a High-Evasion Environment? Why Whistleblowing May Not be the Solution in Collaborative Settings</p> <p>Frau Lilith Burgstaller (Walter Eucken Institut / Universität Freiburg)</p>	<p>Little by little: Dynamic incentives and incremental contributions to a public good</p> <p>Herr Carlo Gallier (Free University of Bozen-Bolzano)</p>	<p>Rights, Duties, and Taboos: The Social Codex of Peer-Punishment</p> <p>Herr Irenaeus Wolff (TWI / Universität Konstanz)</p>

Whistleblowing

TITEL: Wrong beliefs about the social norm of whistleblowing? - Survey and experimental study

AUTOR*INNEN: Behnud Mir Djawadi, **Sabrina Plaß**, Sabrina Schäfers

ABSTRACT: Internal whistleblowing is increasingly regarded as a social phenomenon and existing research shows that the decision to report observed wrongdoing is significantly influenced by social factors on the peer level. Therefore, individuals confronted with the decision to report a colleague's wrongdoing may personally support whistleblowing, while they perceive that most people in their reference network condemn it. This phenomenon is referred to as pluralistic ignorance, which describes a situation in which the majority of a group has a private opinion, but incorrectly believes that most others in the group have the contrary opinion, which leads them to act against their private beliefs. We transfer this phenomenon to the whistleblowing context and ask: do individuals have correct perceptions about their peers' personal normative beliefs about whistleblowing? And if perceptions are wrong, does correcting normative beliefs lead to more whistleblowing? We present data from a survey and a lab experiment that support the conjecture that the majority of the subjects have the personal normative belief that whistleblowing is the right thing to do when observing wrongdoing, while the majority of subjects also have normative expectations that others disapprove of whistleblowing.

TITEL: I don't want to be disliked by my peers': How potential ostracism reduces internal whistleblowing

AUTOR*INNEN: Behnud Mir Djawadi, Sabrina Plaß, **Sabrina Schäfers**

ABSTRACT: Organizations increasingly provide a "friendly" environment for internal whistleblowing. If the act of whistleblowing, however, is perceived as a hostile action against a work colleague, affecting co-workers' ties and violating group norms, any effort in providing whistleblowing support may be offset. The question arises, then, whether potential whistleblowers form the normative expectation that co-workers will disapprove of, and ostracize them, for revealing any wrongdoing and are therefore discouraged from reporting. To examine this research question, we design a controlled behavioural experiment that simulates organizational behaviour and allows us to observe both actual wrongdoing and whistleblowing behaviour. The results show that in a "friendly" environment, the potential of being ostracized leads to a whistleblowing rate that is similarly low as if the outcome of whistleblowing was completely uncertain and possibly to the detriment of the whistleblower. This highlights the role by peers and the corresponding norms in the whistleblowing decision process.

TITEL: Speaking Up Against Tax Evasion in a High-Evasion Environment? Why Whistleblowing May Not be the Solution in Collaborative Settings

AUTOR*INNEN: Lilith Burgstaller; Katharina Pfeil

ABSTRACT: Does whistleblowing deter rule violations when such violations are believed to be common? We examine this question in an online experiment about collaborative tax evasion. In the first treatment, subjects can blow the whistle on their partner. In the second treatment, we introduce a high-evasion environment in addition to whistleblowing by framing the social norm such that evasion is expected to be common. In the control treatment, whistleblowing is not possible, and the norm environment is unspecified, i.e., we give no information about others' behavior. Our findings show that whistleblowing does not significantly deter collaborative tax evasion. Collaborative tax evasion significantly increases in a high-evasion environment compared to an unspecified norm environment, even when whistleblowing is possible. This finding underlines that the norm environment is crucial for evasion and corroborates that whistleblowing is ineffective when both partners benefit from collaborative evasion. We offer several explanations for these findings.

Public Goods

TITEL: Public good provision under inequality in endowment and return from the public good

AUTOR*INNEN: Claudia Keser, Hartmut Kliemt, Stefan Sperlich

ABSTRACT: In a laboratory experiment, we investigate voluntary contributions to the funding of a public good under a two-dimensional inequality. In three treatments of the 25-period game, we vary the distribution of endowments among four players, who differ from each other in their returns from the public good (i.e., their MPCRs).

We observe no significant difference in average group contribution, when introducing an inequality in endowments such that the player with the highest MPCR gets the lowest endowment, but we find a significantly higher average group contribution in the case that the richest player has the highest MPCR. At the same time, the latter scenario significantly increases inequality in the sense that the gini coefficient of the participants' total payoffs in the experiment is higher than the gini coefficient of their endowments.

While in experiments with endowment heterogeneity but symmetric interest in the public good we observe a "fair-share rule", which implies that (on the aggregate) players tend to contribute the same share of their respective endowments, we do not expect this rule to necessarily apply in all of our treatments. For a better understanding of the potentially conflicting interests related to endowment and MPCR differences, we construct a "cooperation interest" index (CI) based on how profitable the full cooperation solution is

compared to the dominant-strategy solution. Assuming that a player with a higher CI considers it as fair to contribute a higher proportion of their endowment than a player with a lower CI, we can derive hypotheses regarding the ordering of the relative contributions of the different player types in each of the three treatments. The asymmetries in the scenario where the richest player has the highest MPCR are constructed such that all players have the same CI. Our experiment confirms all predictions.

TITEL: Efficiency concerns and the preference for the leadership position

AUTOR*INNEN: Gerald Eisenkopf, Maximilian Alex Kuntze

ABSTRACT: Recent meta-analyses indicate that leading by example in social dilemmas yields higher aggregate contributions but leaves the leader worse off than the followers. This paper investigates the willingness-to-pay of participants to become leader and whether participants take the possibility into account, that their group may end up without a leader. We compare bids in Vickrey auctions and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM) which both elicit – in theory with standard preferences– the same private valuation. However, in the BDM case, groups may end up without a leader, which implies an expected welfare loss if people have social preferences. We also study two additional treatments, that vary both mechanisms, such that groups with a Vickrey auction may end up without a leader, while groups with the BDM mechanism get a leader for sure.

TITEL: Little by little: Dynamic incentives and incremental contributions to a public good

AUTOR*INNEN: Carlo Gallier, Axel Ockenfels, Bodo Sturm

ABSTRACT: Dynamic incentive schemes are widely used to address free-riding incentives in social dilemma situations, where actions by purely rational and self-interested agents do not align with common group interest. Typically, these schemes create path dependencies by using agents' current actions as a benchmark for future obligations. The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is a prominent example. The agreement prescribes that parties' climate ambitions must ratchet-up and increase over time. However, such dynamic incentive schemes often backfire. In social dilemmas they can impede cooperation because the established path dependencies increase agents' risk of being free ridden and, thus, create incentives to strategically restrict cooperation. To address these unintended consequences, we minimize the risk to which agents expose themselves to the risk of being free ridden by changing the structure of the decision problem in a repeated public goods game with dynamic incentives. The incentive scheme prescribes how agents can adjust their contributions to a public good over the course of the game: up- and downwards or only not downwards. The structure of the game is either dynamic or static. In the dynamic game, agents can make many small, sequential,

and contingent contributions to the public good per round compared to the static game, where they make a single contribution decision per round. We find that contributions are significantly higher in the dynamic than in the static game, both in case agents can adjust contribution up- and downwards or only not downwards. We show with the help of numerical simulation studies that the interplay between two simple behavioral patterns explains our main results: First, some participants are willing to lead by example and contribute to the public good early on; second, participants show asymmetries in their conditional cooperative behavior that imply that the negative effect being free ridden exceeds the positive effect that cooperative participants have on their group members.

Punishment

TITEL: Who Should be Punished for Corruption? Experimental Evidence from Four Countries

AUTOR*INNEN: Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Kevin Grubiak, Katharina Werner

ABSTRACT: There has been debate on whether officials or businesspersons should be punished for corruption. We experimentally test these two options in a novel game that incorporates harassment bribery and collusive bribery. The design introduces realism into a gift exchange between an Estimator (businessperson) and an Auditor (public official) and allows us to assess not only the extent of bribery but also the welfare effects. The Estimator can make a large transfer (bribe) in the hope of avoiding unfair treatment (harassment bribery) or obtaining an undeserved benefit (collusive bribery). We collect data from 586 participants in Colombia, Germany, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom. In the baseline, only businesspersons are punished. In the treatment, only public officials are punished. This induces businesspersons to more often offer bribes and reduces the officials' willingness to accept them. We do not find an increase in favoritism in the form of a type I error (granting the prize to undeserving Estimators). As hypothesized, the treatment increases whistleblowing among Estimators who were withheld the prize and increases the likelihood of awarding the prize to deserving Estimators. We thus find mild evidence that punishing officials lowers harassment in the form of type II errors (withholding the prize from deserving Estimators). This is also corroborated by post-treatment data, which shows significant evidence that Estimators believe that harassment went down. Overall, we find that punishing only officials and not businesspersons is a justifiable policy option. This finding is robust across the four countries.

TITEL: The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation

AUTOR*INNEN: Christoph Bühren, Astrid Dannenberg, Philipp Händel

ABSTRACT: We use an experiment to study the demand for complete and incomplete formal punishment institutions and their ability to promote cooperation. Complete punishment institutions are implemented by the whole group and bind everyone. Incomplete punishment institutions are implemented by a subgroup and bind only the members of this subgroup. We distinguish between strictly and potentially incomplete punishment institutions: In the former, only one subgroup can bind itself while the remaining individuals are unbound. In the latter, several subgroups can bind themselves independently and separately in different institutions, potentially binding everyone. Theoretically, the demand for such formal punishment institutions should depend only on the benefits of cooperation within the group or subgroup bound by the institution. However, the experimental results show that, in the case of incomplete punishment institutions, the benefit of cooperation has a much smaller impact on demand than theory predicts. Instead, individuals' cooperativeness and the behavior of the other subgroup become important determinants. This leads to more cooperation than predicted when benefits are low, but less cooperation than predicted when benefits are high.

TITEL: Rights, Duties, and Taboos: The Social Codex of Peer-Punishment

AUTOR*INNEN: Urs Fischbacher, Moath Hussien, **Irenaeus Wolff**

ABSTRACT: Zusammenarbeit ist ein zentraler Bestandteil des menschlichen Lebens, lässt sich aber ohne zusätzliche Institutionen nur schwer herstellen und aufrechterhalten. Die Bestrafung durch Peers kann die Zusammenarbeit fördern, wenn Trittbrettfahrer bestraft und Kooperierende verschont werden. Die Bestrafung durch Peers kann jedoch auch der Zusammenarbeit schaden, wenn die Bestrafung in einer dysfunktionalen Weise eingesetzt wird. In einem Experiment untersuchen wir, wie Menschen die Angemessenheit verschiedener Formen von Bestrafung einschätzen, einschließlich von Bestrafung zweiter Ordnung und Gegenbestrafung. Indem wir die Angemessenheit von Bestrafung und Nichtbestrafung bewerten, können wir unterscheiden, wann Bestrafung ein Recht, wann sie eine Pflicht und wann sie ein Tabu ist. Wir stellen fest, dass Menschen Bestrafung im Allgemeinen eher als Pflicht oder Tabu ansehen und nicht als eine Wahlmöglichkeit, und dass die Angemessenheit des Bestrafungsverhaltens - über alle verschiedenen Formen der Bestrafung hinweg - von drei "Geboten" bestimmt wird: 1. Bestrafe keine kooperativen Personen. 2. Wenn du ein Trittbrettfahrer bist, bestrafe nicht. 3. Bestrafe diejenigen, die gegen Regel 1 oder 2 verstoßen.

Session 2 (Donnerstag 21.09., 09:00 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06	D07
Cheating and Honesty	Common pool resources and externalities	Data Analysis and Research Methods	Decision Making
<p>The dark side of budgets: On the influence of dark triad traits on honesty in budgeting</p> <p>Herr Dr. Sebastian Oelrich (Technische Universität Dresden)</p>	<p>Does scarcity induce hostility? An experimental investigation in a common-pool resource game with asymmetry</p> <p>Herr Stephan Geschwind (Universität Passau)</p>	<p>FrISBEE: Framework for Integrating Sensor Data in Behavioral and Economic Experiments</p> <p>Frau Anke Greif-Winzrieth (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie)</p>	<p>The Self-Defying Impact of Predictions on Actual Decisions</p> <p>Herr Dr. Paul M. Gorny (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie)</p>
<p>Laundering the people instead of the money - an experimental study effect of mental money laundering Deception game</p> <p>Frau Alexandra Seidel (Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg)</p>	<p>Impact of Externalities on Fishers Risk-Taking Decisions: Evidence from an Experimental Study at Lake Victoria</p> <p>Herr Philipp Händel (Universität Kassel)</p>	<p>MTVE - Magdeburg Tool for Video Experiments</p> <p>Herr Dr. Dmitri Bershadskyy (Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg)</p>	<p>Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief</p> <p>Frau Mathilde Draeger (Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg)</p>
<p>Cheating in Human-Machine Interaction: The effect of the auditing entity and procedural ambiguity</p> <p>Herr Marius Protte (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Markets, social responsibility and identity</p> <p>Herr M. Sc. Miguel Abellan (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)</p>	<p>Piloting Experiments Using Large Language Models</p> <p>Herr Max R. P. Grossmann (Universität zu Köln / Mercatus Center, George Mason University)</p>	<p>The Phillips Curve - An Experimental Investigation of Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction</p> <p>Herr Dominik Ulke (Universität Passau)</p>

Cheating and Honesty

TITEL: The dark side of budgets: On the influence of dark triad traits on honesty in budgeting

AUTOR*INNEN: Tobias Voigtländer, **Sebastian Oelrich**, Thomas Günther

ABSTRACT: Granting budgets for business units remains an essential part of corporate planning and control, performance measurement, and a basis for operational and strategic decision-making. Given persistent information asymmetries, division managers regularly have opportunities to cut or build in 'slack,' i.e., misreporting and inflating their budget requirements for private and/or professional gain. Despite these concerns, early research shows that managers are relatively honest when reporting their budgeting needs. Recent research in psychology and accounting however highlights the adverse effects of personality traits such as the Dark Triad (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) on accounting practices. In this paper, we look at the effect of Dark Triad traits on honesty in budgeting using two experiments and qualitative interviews. First, we replicate a seminal experiment on honesty in budgeting, then introduce the role of Dark Triad traits. Our preliminary results suggest that people report relatively honest, but honesty is strongly reduced when managers exhibit high Dark Triad traits. In a second experiment, we draw on the levers of control framework to examine different approaches that potentially reduce dishonest reporting by Dark Triad managers. Preliminary results suggest that boundary system controls are particularly effective in reducing dishonesty among Dark Triad managers, while belief, diagnostic, and interactive controls mostly reduce dishonesty among managers with low Dark Triad traits, only. Lastly, we interviewed seven experienced managers from a multinational manufacturing firm to shed additional lights on our findings regarding practical issues with honesty in budgeting, personality traits, and our proposed interventions.

TITEL: Laundering the people instead of the money - an experimental study effect of mental money laundering

AUTOR*INNEN: Alexandra Seidel

ABSTRACT: Since the introduction of mental accounting, there have been numerous studies finding that the source of money might influence the way this money is spent. This includes cleaning unethically earned money by laundering it, if given the possibility. This study investigates whether participants donate a different amount of money when the person they lied to in a deception game is present or absent.

TITEL: Cheating in Human-Machine Interaction: The effect of the auditing entity and procedural ambiguity

AUTOR*INNEN: Marius Protte, Behnud Mir Djawadi

ABSTRACT: Individuals are known to have different attitudes towards humans and machine entities (e.g. algorithms, artificial intelligence) in terms of perceived trustworthiness, error-proneness, and decision discretion. While individuals have already been shown to cheat machines more than other humans, the inverse situation of machines (and humans) functioning as auditors to human cheating behavior is yet to be investigated. We conduct a 2 x 2 experiment to test the effect of the auditing entity (e.g. whether the auditor is a human being or a machine) and the extent of procedural ambiguity on human cheating behavior. We adapt the classic dice rolling task by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a card draw with a large but finite number of lottery tickets and add an audit procedure in which participants may be audited and financially punished for cheating by either a human or a rule-based algorithm. In both cases, the audit process follows the same rules with an inspection and a potential punishment depending on the size of the reported number, the magnitude of a potential cheat and a probabilistic tolerance that the auditing entity may grant. Secondly, we manipulate participants' knowledge of the audit criteria, with them being either fully transparent or fully unknown, besides the auditing entity. We further control for participants' affinity for technology interaction, ethical preferences, knowledge on algorithmic systems and perception on the error-proneness of their auditing entity. We are currently collecting the data and will present the first results at the conference. In either way, our findings have implications for the design of tax and operational auditing processes, algorithmically supported jurisdiction, insurance claims processing, as well as automated judge-advisor applications in general.

Common pool resources and externalities

TITEL: Does scarcity induce hostility? An experimental investigation in a common-pool resource game with asymmetry

AUTOR*INNEN: Stephan Geschwind, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Katharina Werner

ABSTRACT: Conflict over increasingly scarce resources such as freshwater, energy, arable land or wildlife is perceived to be one of the major security threats of a world facing climate change. The literature identifies asymmetry in access to resources as conducive to scarcity-induced conflict. We measure this in a novel experimental design. In a 2x2 treatment design, we vary Asymmetry/Symmetry and Scarcity/Abundance. We manipulate the perceived availability of the resource to induce high or low appropriations in the first round of a dynamic common-pool resource game. We measure conflict in a second stage of each round

in a joy-of-destruction game. Our model assumes that participants negatively reciprocate unkind appropriation decisions and bad states of the pool in their destruction. We expect a higher depletion in Asymmetry: The advantaged insufficiently lower their appropriations after the first round due to status-quo and self-serving biases. In the presence of these biases, the disadvantaged engage in higher destruction. We expect Scarcity to exacerbate these results. Our findings shed light on the failure of developed countries to stop overappropriation and understand the risks of escalating conflict.

TITEL: Impact of Externalities on Fishers Risk-Taking Decisions: Evidence from an Experimental Study at Lake Victoria

AUTOR*INNEN: Philipp Händel, Dorothy Birungi

ABSTRACT: Risk decisions often affect not only the decision maker, but others as well. For example, when resource users use illegal methods, they not only take a risk for themselves, but also potentially affect the income of other resource users through potential destruction of the resource. In an experimental study with fishers along the Ugandan coast of Lake Victoria, we examine how different types of externalities affect individual risk-taking. For this, fishers make a financially relevant risk decision in which a high risk either has no effect on the income of a second fisher, has a possible positive or negative effect on the income of the other fisher, has a possible negative or no effect on the income of the other fisher, or has a certain negative effect on the income of the other fisher. The results suggest that fishers take fewer risks when risky decisions have a certain negative impact on another fisher's income than when there is no such impact. The other treatments show no significant differences in risk taking. Thus, we show that the certainty of a negative externality plays an important role in how that externality affects the risk-taking of Lake Victoria fishers.

TITEL: Markets, social responsibility and identity

AUTOR*INNEN: Miguel Abellan, Mario Mechtel, Fabian Paetzel, Christoph Schütt

ABSTRACT: Although the welfare-enhancing aspects of competitive markets are well known to economists since centuries, the controversial debate on the moral side-effects of competition remains open since the very beginning of modern economic thought. In the last decade, a rapidly growing experimental literature provides evidence on the factors that might account for moral failure in markets. We contribute to this literature and study whether consumer social responsibility in markets (i.e., the willingness to sacrifice monetary gains in order to prevent a negative trade externality) depends on the (degree of) identification of consumers with the harmed party. Building on the market paradigm in Bartling et al. (2015, 2019), we develop a stylized market experiment consisting of two sellers, one buyer and one third party not involved in the market transaction but potentially harmed by it. There are two products in this market: (1) a low-cost product that causes a

negative externality on the third party; (2) a “socially responsible” product with higher production costs but no negative externality on the third party. In a two-stage procedure, we first elicit the consumer willingness to pay for both types of product. In a second stage, we record market interactions in 24 consecutive market rounds in which the sellers first choose one type of product and the price for it. The buyer chooses then between buying one of the two products or no product at all. Within two ingroup/outgroup settings, we analyze whether changing the identity of the third party affects the market share of the “socially responsible” product. The experiment consists of three treatments: (1) a control treatment without reference to social identity; (2) an ingroup treatment in which the buyer and the third party share the social identity; (3) an outgroup treatment in which the buyer and the third party have a different social identity. The first experiment is simultaneously conducted in two German universities. Social identity therein is induced by the affiliation of the participants to the respective university. In a follow-up study, social identity is induced by means of the minimal group paradigm. Against prediction, our results suggest that prices, not identity, are the decisive determinant of social responsibility in markets. As long as the price premium for the “socially responsible” is excessively high, consumers buy the low-cost product with a negative externality on the third party, regardless of the identity of the latter.

Data Analysis and Research Methods

TITEL: FrISBEE: Framework for Integrating Sensor Data in Behavioral and Economic Experiments

AUTOR*INNEN: Paul M. Gorny, Anke Greif-Winzrieth, Petra Nieken, Fabian A. Wuest, Niklas Busse

ABSTRACT: Behavioral economists traditionally employ experiments to gather data on choice behavior, strategic decision-making, and psychological and economic constructs with incentivized tasks and survey measures. However, modern trackers for physiological measures, such as heart rate and eye trackers, can free the way for more direct and objective measurements of the processes underlying these constructs. Recent advances in sensor technology have made real-time recording and visualization of such data technologically and financially feasible. Nevertheless, the integration of sensor data into experiments implemented in standard experimental software such as oTree comes with significant challenges such as the need to merge different data streams, handle large amounts of data, and ensure privacy. We introduce FrISBEE, a Framework for Integrating Sensor Data in Behavioral and Economic Experiments that comes with client software connecting to sensors and to the experiment server and a module that can easily be integrated into oTree code. Using the WebSocket protocol, data is transferred to the experiment server and written to a database separate from the oTree database, but data can be queried at any time, enabling live utilization of the data within an experiment. Data is exported in the standard

way provided by oTree. Our setup allows the Python process of oTree to run without interruptions when high-frequency data is written, e.g., during apps using live methods such as auctions or slider tasks.

TITEL: MTVE - Magdeburg Tool for Video Experiments

AUTOR*INNEN: Dmitri Bershadskyy, Sunil Ghadwal, Jannik Greif

ABSTRACT: MTVE is a software tool (citeware) that can be applied in laboratory and online experiments to implement video communication. The tool enables researchers to gather video data from these experiments in a way that these videos can be later used for automatic analysis through machine learning techniques. The browser-based tool comes with an easy user interface and can be easily integrated into z-Tree, oTree (and other experimental or survey tools). It provides the experimenters control over several communication parameters (e.g., number of participants, duration, resolution), produces high-quality video data, and circumvents the Cocktail Party Problem by producing separate audio files. Using some of the recommended Voice-to-Text AI, the experimenters can transcribe individual files. MTVE can merge these individual transcriptions into one conversation.

TITEL: Piloting Experiments Using Large Language Models

AUTOR*INNEN: Christoph Engel, Max R. P. Grossmann, Axel Ockenfels

ABSTRACT: This project explores the potential use of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's GPT as a novel experimental testbed for research in economics and psychology. The study aims to leverage these advanced AI models, which have been trained on extensive volumes of human-authored texts, to pretest experimental designs and compare a vast array of intricate details, a task often infeasible with human subjects due to time and resource constraints. The applicability of this approach is demonstrated using a 2x2 prisoner's dilemma, under various framing conditions. The study has so far investigated interactions between different versions of GPT (3.5 turbo and 4), across ten unique frames, demonstrating LLM's profound and sustained behavioral tendencies. The next phase will involve LLM-human interactions, with GPT acting as the first mover and human participants as second movers. Three frames that have elicited substantial differences between the two GPT versions will be chosen for this exploration. This project not only allows scientists to conduct AI-based experiments using a new software framework but also paves the way for detailed experiments of Human-AI interactions, employing platforms like oTree. Ultimately, it intends to augment, not replace, human subject experimentation, thereby enriching the methodologies available for research in experimental economics. [Disclosure: Abstract partially generated using GPT-4.]

Decision Making

TITEL: The Self-Defying Impact of Predictions on Actual Decisions

AUTOR*INNEN: Paul M. Gorny, Eva Groos, Christina Strobel

ABSTRACT: In a world with an increasing number of AI tools predicting individual decisions, are we becoming passive actors following a predetermined path? Typically, the belief is that individuals can make their own decisions that cannot be perfectly anticipated externally (either by an AI or another human). It is unclear how people react to that belief being challenged. We investigate whether the awareness of one's own decision being predicted affects decision-making. A mechanism that could drive such an effect is reactance, i.e., an adverse reaction to a perceived reduction in individual freedom (or in this case more fundamentally 'free will'). We want to examine the impact of decision prediction awareness on decision-making and investigate the role of reactance in driving this effect. In a pilot experiment on dictator game decisions, we find evidence that awareness of one's own decisions being predicted changes actual decisions away from the prediction. However, this is only the case if decision predictions originate directly from an AI, but not if a human was 'in the loop' deciding on whether the prediction was provided or not. We present an experimental design to disentangle these effects more clearly. Our project hints at important implications for incorporating human reactions to decision predictions when judging the prediction accuracy of such tools used, e.g., in consumer choice and financial decisions.

TITEL: Feeling Unheard - The Rise of System Disbelief

AUTOR*INNEN: Mathilde Draeger, Karim Sadrieh

ABSTRACT: Individuals in a group, who repeatedly experience that their group's policy selection system does not decide in their favor, may feel unheard and increasingly develop system disbelief. System disbelief (i.e. discontent with the performance of the group's policy selection system) may be detrimental to the performance and the welfare of groups in several ways. It may dramatically reduce the psychological well-being of group members, leading to a substantial decrease of their willingness to provide work effort, financial contributions, or cooperative coordination. In extreme cases, system disbelief may lead to anti-social behavior (e.g. arbitrary destruction) and foster the willingness to engage in subversion (e.g. sabotage) or insurgence (e.g. coordinated rebellion). Studying the individual characteristics and the environmental parameters that give rise to system disbelief in a laboratory experiment, our study contributes to understanding the dynamics of discontent with group decision processes and the ensuing destructive behaviors. Thus, our study may provide insights valuable for the design of group decision processes that are welfare enhancing by increasing the resilience towards system disbelief.

TITEL: The Phillips Curve - An Experimental Investigation of Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction

AUTOR*INNEN: Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Florian Irmscher, **Dominik Ulke**

ABSTRACT: Wie reagieren Wirtschaftssubjekte in komplexen Märkten, wenn sie mit einem Schock konfrontiert sind, von dem sie nicht wissen, ob er aggregierter oder idiosynkratischer Natur ist? Die Phillips-Kurve konstatiert einen kurzfristigen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Produktion und Inflation. Gemäß der mikrofundierten Forschung (Lucas, 1972) gilt dies aber nur bei unvollständigen Informationen. Bei vollständiger Information wirke ein Schock nur auf die Preise und nicht die Produktion. Demgegenüber verweist neuere Forschung zu rational-inattention und higher-order-beliefs darauf, dass auch bei vollständiger Information die Phillips-Kurve positiv geneigt ist. Wir führen ein Experiment, basierend auf Davis & Korenok (2011) und Lambsdorff & Giamattei (2015), mit vertikaler Phillips-Kurve durch, in dem Teilnehmer in einem monopolistischen Markt strategisch interagieren und mit einem aggregierten positiven Schock konfrontiert sind. Vorläufige Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass es sowohl bei vollständiger, als auch bei unvollständiger Information zu einem Anstieg der Produktion kommt (entgegen Lucas). Bei der Anpassung zeigt sich außerdem ein über beide treatments hinweg konstant niedriges Niveau der higher-order-beliefs unterhalb von level-1.

Session 3 (Donnerstag 21.09., 11:00 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06	D07
Social Norms and Reference Points	Cooperation and Prosociality I	Teamwork	Risk Preferences
<p>The effects of social norms and observability on food choice</p> <p>Frau Eva Weingärtner (Universität Kassel)</p> <p>ENTFÄLLT</p>	<p>Cognitive Processes Across the Globe: Webcam-based Eye-tracking Analysis of Ingroup Bias in 17 Societies</p> <p>Frau Rima-Maria Rahal (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)</p>	<p>The Role of Self-Confidence in Teamwork: Experimental Evidence</p> <p>Herr Fidel Petros (WZB Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin)</p> <p>ENTFÄLLT</p>	<p>Revalidating an Instrument for Measuring Risk Preferences</p> <p>Frau Anika Bittner (Technische Universität Hamburg)</p>
<p>Gender Norms and Greedy Work: An Experiment on the Division of Labor</p> <p>Frau Aenne Läufer (Universität zu Köln)</p>	<p>Cooperation and Strategy Choice in the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma when Players can cheat</p> <p>Herr Marcel Lumkowsky (Universität Kassel)</p>	<p>Creative Performance in Teams: The Effect of Workplace Settings and Self-Selection - an Experimental Study</p> <p>Frau Lisa Klinkenberg (RWTH Aachen University)</p>	<p>Eliciting Risk Preferences for Optimal Insurance Design: An Experimental Study</p> <p>Frau Melisa Kurtis (Universität zu Köln)</p>
<p>Bunching in Higher Education: unintended effects of the ECTS?</p> <p>Herr Zouhier Kassaballi (Universität Erfurt)</p>	<p>„Fingleafing“ and Self-Serving Behavior</p> <p>Herr Bernd Irlenbusch (Universität zu Köln)</p>		<p>Threat rigidity or prospect theory? – Top manager's risk preferences under threats and opportunities</p> <p>Herr Dr. Matthias Unfried (Nürnberg Institut für Marktentscheidungen e.V.)</p>

Social Norms and Reference Points

TITEL: The effects of social norms and observability on food choice

AUTOR*INNEN: Astrid Dannenberg, Charlotte Klatt, **Eva Weingärtner**

ABSTRACT: People often adapt their behavior to the behavior of other people. We test with the help of an experiment whether this also applies to the choice of food and whether the sensitivity regarding others' behavior increases when the food choice is observable. Participants in the experiment are first-year students who are confronted with different statements about the diets of students already enrolled and studying at the university. Participants then choose between vouchers for vegan, vegetarian, or meat-based foods, with variation as to whether or not this choice is observable. The results show that the overall effects of social norms with and without observability are small and statistically insignificant. This is because women and men respond differently to the interventions: Women are much more responsive to social norms than men, especially when their food choice can be observed by others. We discuss how our findings fit with dietary trends and what policy implications they have

TITEL: Gender Norms and Greedy Work: An Experiment on the Division of Labor

AUTOR*INNEN: **Aenne Läufer**, Axel Ockenfels

ABSTRACT: According to Goldin (2021), the more likely selection of men into "greedy jobs" is one of the underlying reasons for the observed gender gaps in earnings and promotions. Greedy jobs are characterized by wages that non-linearly reward flexible and long hours. Using a two-stage real-effort experiment in which at most one group member can take a greedy job, we model the negotiation between a male and a female subject over who takes the greedy job. We analyze whether gender, productivity, or a combination of both serves as the focal point in the bargaining process. We find that when the female subject is more productive than the male subject, groups are more likely to choose an inefficient division of labor compared to situations in which the male subject is more productive than the female subject. By examining the interplay between gender norms and monetary incentives, we provide insights into the potential mechanisms contributing to gender inequality in the labor market.

TITEL: Bunching in Higher Education: unintended effects of the ECTS?

AUTOR*INNEN: Raphael Brade, Oliver Himmler, Robert Jäckle, **Zouhier Kassaballi**

ABSTRACT: The institutional structure of study programs and official recommendations on how students should organize their studies likely influence student behavior. We examine

the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), which is used by virtually all European institutions of higher education. Specifically, we investigate whether the ECTS leads to bunching at 30 credits per semester, as its study structure is aimed at a “typical student” obtaining 30 credits. This may promote bunching, as it creates (i) a kink in the cost of obtaining credits beyond 30, and (ii) a reference point at 30 credits. Using data from administrative student-level data and nationally representative education panels, we find significant bunching at 30 attempted and obtained credits per semester. The missing mass above 30 credits suggests that a substantial share of students is held back by the rigid features of ECTS, increasing time-to-degree and causing potentially large individual and societal costs. In a companion field experiment, we tested whether an informational intervention encouraging students to go beyond 30 credits can change behavior, and decrease the magnitude of bunching. We find no significant effects of this simple intervention on behavior, suggesting that changing the actual institutional setup may be necessary to sufficiently alter the ECTS cost structure and reference point influence.

Cooperation and Prosociality I

TITEL: Cognitive Processes Across the Globe: Webcam-based Eye-tracking Analysis of Ingroup Bias in 17 Societies

AUTOR*INNEN: Rima-Maria Rahal, Frederik Schulze Spüntrup

ABSTRACT: Whether and to what degree culture modifies cognition has been an area of research often limited by possibilities to gather relevant data across societies. In this project, we leverage the possibilities of webcam-based eye-tracking to study cultural variations of cognitive processes underlying ingroup favoritism. We aim to sample 100 participants each from 17 societies using Prolific and MTRUK. Participants are assigned to an ingroup based on a color perception task, complete a group reinforcement stage and then make decisions to allocate points between themselves and random matched players in a repeated decomposed dictator game, where they face either an in- or an outgroup member. During this task, we record eye-gaze with participants’ webcams. We expect that ingroup favoritism in choices depends on culture, such that in more collectivist societies, decision makers make more prosocial decisions and are biased towards more prosociality when facing an in- rather than an outgroup member. This behavioral ingroup favoritism effect is expected to be mirrored in gaze data: in more collectivist societies, decision makers facing an in- rather than an outgroup member show higher fixation counts and longer dwell times, attend to a higher number of available information and fixate less on their own outcomes, while these differences diminish in more individualistic societies. We additionally predict that in more collectivist societies, decision makers are more likely to seek out information about others’ group membership, both in terms of visual attendance during the decomposed dictator game, and explicitly in a final dictator game task where participants are asked to explicitly

state if they prefer to learn about the matched players' group membership. Further, we explore the relation of other individual- and country-level predictors previously related to ingroup favoritism with eye-gaze.

TITEL: Cooperation and Strategy Choice in the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma when Players can cheat

AUTOR*INNEN: Prof. Dr. Astrid Dannenberg, **Marcel Lumkowsky**

ABSTRACT: We study behavior in an experimental infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when players are able to cheat by signaling cooperation while actually playing defection. Players in this game decide whether to cheat or play honestly while nature decides if a cheating attempt succeeds or fails. We test how the possibility to cheat affects strategy choice and cooperation compared to the classic version of the game where players are unable to cheat. We also test how the probability that a cheating attempt succeeds or fails and the co-player's ability to discover failed cheating attempts change behavior.

TITEL: „Figleafing“ and Self-Serving Behavior

AUTOR*INNEN: Arno Appfelstaedt, **Bernd Irlenbusch**, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Gari Walkowitz

ABSTRACT: Decisions that appear to be self-serving are often accompanied by claims that responsibility for the outcome lies with an unbiased entity or procedure—for instance a consultancy or an advisor—to whom the decision maker has delegated her authority. In many cases, these claims are non-verifiable, arousing suspicion that they are nothing more than a “fig leaf” for selfish behaviors. We address this suspicion using a controlled lab experiment in which subjects can lie about whether they delegated the choice between a self-serving and a prosocial allocation of money to an unbiased coin. We find that “figleafing” is common and that the option to do so strongly discourages prosocial behavior. Using a theoretical model, we argue that social image concerns are the main reason why we observe these effects and why people delegate—as well as falsely claim to delegate—the decision to the coin. We find support for this theory in three further treatments. Finally, we shed light on possible remedies to figleafing. Our results have relevance for the design of decision-making processes that aim to regulate the ethical behavior of corporations, politicians and consumers.

Teamwork

TITEL: The Role of Self-Confidence in Teamwork: Experimental Evidence

AUTOR*INNEN: Adrian Bruhin, Luis Pedro Santos Pinto, **Fidel Petros**

ABSTRACT: Teamwork has become increasingly important in modern organizations and the labor market. Yet, little is known about the role of self-confidence in teamwork. This paper presents evidence from a laboratory experiment using a team effort task. Effort and ability are complements and there are synergies between teammates' efforts. We exogenously manipulate subjects' self-confidence about their ability using easy and hard general knowledge quizzes. We find that overconfidence leads to more effort, less free riding, and higher team revenue. These findings suggest that organizations could improve team performance by hiring overconfident workers.

TITEL: Creative Performance in Teams: The Effect of Workplace Settings and Self-Selection - an Experimental Study

AUTOR*INNEN: Christian Grund, Christine Harbring, **Lisa Klinkenberg**

ABSTRACT: The organization of work and the characteristics of tasks have considerably changed over recent years. The developments include (i) an increased relevance of virtual teams and (ii) a higher demand for creative work in organizations. One crucial challenge regarding effective team collaboration can be seen in the initial stage of a team. We argue that this is supposed to be relevant in the virtual case and for creative work in particular. Therefore, our research focuses on the creative performance in newly-formed teams and whether there is a difference between work settings, i.e. on-site and virtual teams, and if the sequence of settings is of importance. We also address the question of whether the individuals' ability to decide where to work matters for the creative performance of teams and who decides for what reasons to work in a virtual setting.

We aim to answer those questions by conducting an experiment in the lab and online to model an on-site and a virtual work setting. To simulate a creative team task, we implemented the "Unusual- Uses Task (UUT)" in a dyadic team setting. To analyze the UUT in a team setting, we conducted a pre-test experiment where we compared the creative performance of individuals with those of fixed dyadic teams. We then conducted an experiment with four treatments of dyadic teams, in which we also vary the work setting over two sessions between virtual and lab. Additionally to those four treatments, we implemented two treatments where participants (endogenously) decide on the work setting in advance.

Risk Preferences

TITEL: Revalidating an Instrument for Measuring Risk Preferences

AUTOR*INNEN: Alexander Haering, Timo Heinrich, Thomas Mayrhofer, **Anika Bittner**

ABSTRACT: This paper replicates the validation of risk measurement from the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al. 2018) and tests whether the validation holds across countries. Since unincentivized instruments for measuring preferences are widely used in economics and beyond, their comprehensive validation is important. We use the data from Haering et al. (2020) to replicate the validation of risk measurement for China, Germany and the United States. A binary choice task serves as our incentivized experimental measure for risk aversion. We use this measure to validate the instruments suggested by Falk et al. (2023), a general question on risk as qualitative measurement and the staircase risk method. We find that the results of Falk et al. 2016/21 can be replicated, but the degree of validation differs between countries. While the results for Germany and the China are as strong as in the validation study, the results for USA are weaker.

TITEL: Eliciting Risk Preferences for Optimal Insurance Design: An Experimental Study

AUTOR*INNEN: **Melisa Kurtis**

ABSTRACT: Understanding the risk preferences of potential customers is crucial for optimal insurance design. However, while behavior and decisions can be observed empirically, underlying preferences remain unaccounted for. Although extensive experimental literature exists on risk preference measures for portfolio selection and lotteries, there is a noticeable gap in direct measures of risk preferences in insurance decision-making. Using a laboratory experiment, we directly measure risk preferences from insurance choices and classify them into first- and second-order risk aversion. Our research contributes in three ways: First, it verifies the assumption of non-expected utility preferences in recent optimal insurance mechanisms, shedding light on model assumptions and theoretical research. Second, it examines the generalizability of risk preferences between lottery and insurance settings, assessing if lottery choices can reliably predict risk preferences in an insurance context. Third, it tests an optimal mechanism based on non-expected utility preferences, evaluating its fit to population preferences and practical implementability. By providing insights into risk preferences and offering a test bed for new theoretical advancements, this research aims to inform insurers and contribute to the field of optimal insurance design.

TITEL: Threat rigidity or prospect theory? – Top manager's risk preferences under threats and opportunities

AUTOR*INNEN: Elena Fresinger, **Matthias Unfried**, Michael Zürn

ABSTRACT: In managerial decision making, most decisions are risky and uncertain, in particular in the area of strategic innovation. Amongst others, especially the innovation of a company's business model is a management decision with major implications for the survival of companies as an innovation changes the core business logic (Bucherer et al., 2012, p. 184). Decisions to innovate a firm's business model are usually triggered by an event, such as an opportunity or a threat (e.g. Saebi et al., 2017). In research on business model innovation (BMI), two distinct lines of argumentation occur: Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and Threat-Rigidity perspective (Staw et al., 1981). In line with Prospect Theory, scholars have shown that firms performing poorly are more likely to exhibit risk-taking rather than risk-averse behavior (Bowman, 1982, 1984), because they typically have less to lose and therefore are more open for risks (Bromiley, 2010). Conversely, companies facing a potential opportunity are typically more risk averse as they are on the edge of losing what they already have (Bromiley, 2010). Supporting threat-rigidity theory, scholars argue that organizations facing external threats tend to react more cautious and rather choose to stick more closely to the established way (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Shimizu, 2007).

Yet, not only the perception of a present event influences BMI decisions, but also prior experience (e.g. Saebi et al., 2017). For instance, the house money effect (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) describes decision makers' tendency to be more risk seeking in the presence of prior gains and more risk averse after prior losses. Crucially, prior experiences might also shape reactions to current events. Specifically, we hypothesize that prior gains lead to decisions in line with Prospect Theory (i.e., more risk-taking innovation) while prior losses lead to decisions in line with Threat Rigidity (i.e., more risk-averse adherence to the status quo).

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper using an experimental approach to study behavior of top managers' threat rigidity and to test the moderating role of past successes and failures on BMI. We conducted a series of incentivized scenario-based experiments where participants were asked to make decisions on BMI. More specifically, we presented a business scenario which provided information on the past performance of the company. Afterwards, participants were asked to act as a manager of the company and decide whether the business model should be innovated in the face of a current event. We experimentally varied both, past firm performance (previous gains vs. previous losses) and the current event (opportunity vs. threat). The decision on the BMI is presented as a lottery with the innovation being the risky choice while the status quo was associated with a certain payoff. In the opportunity conditions, the expected value of the alternatives was positive while in the threat conditions, their expected value was negative.

In the first experiment (N = 402) we used a general population sample from the US recruited on Prolific. In the second experiment (N = 398) the participants were again recruited on Prolific in the US, however, filtering for management experience.

In the main experiment, the sample consisted of 400 top managers (C-level and C-1-level) from Forbes 2000 companies with revenues above \$500 million.

While our data support prospect theory in experiment 1 ($p = 0.009$) and 2 ($p = 0.01$), i.e., a higher share of risky decisions under losses rather than under profits, we find the opposite for top managers which supports threat rigidity theory rather than prospect theory ($p < 0.001$). In all tree experiments, however, we did not find indication for the house money effect. On the contrary, we found a significant opposite effect.

Session 4 (Donnerstag 21.09., 14:00 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06	D07
Behavioral Design	Cooperation and Prosociality II	Artificial Intelligence	Markets and Competition
<p>Defaults and Effortful Tasks</p> <p>Herr Lars Behlen (Universität Erfurt / TH Nürnberg)</p>	<p>Median Voting under Inequality: Still a Solution to Intergenerational Cooperation?</p> <p>Frau Deborah Voß (Universität Passau)</p>	<p>Can we use GPT-4 as an examiner? An experimental competition between GPT-4 and humans on ranking open-text answers</p> <p>Herr Prof. Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff (Universität Passau)</p>	<p>New Avenues for Experimental Data</p> <p>Herr Heinrich Nax (ETH/UZH)</p>
<p>Transparent app design reduces excessive usage time and increases willingness to pay compared to common behavioural design: A framed field experiment</p> <p>Frau Dr. Christina Timko (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)</p>	<p>Understanding interdependent and strategic choice construction in social dilemma situations</p> <p>Frau Susann Fiedler (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien)</p>	<p>Lie against AI: Revealing private information through AI in an economic experiment</p> <p>Frau Nina Ostermaier (Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg)</p>	<p>Patient choice driven competition between physicians: performance disclosure and the quality of medical care</p> <p>Frau Prof. Dr. Johanna Kokot (Universität Hamburg)</p>
<p>At least you've tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard</p> <p>Frau Cheyenne Wübbelmann (Universität Vechta)</p>	<p>Economic Inequality and Cooperation: The Role of Homophily</p> <p>Frau Dr. Janina Kraus (TU Clausthal)</p>	<p>Algorithm aversion at first sight: Insights on people's tendency to eschew algorithm-based decisions</p> <p>Herr Jun.-Prof. Dr. Florian Sachs (Universität zu Köln)</p>	<p>Umbrella Effects. An Experimental Study</p> <p>Herr Prof. Dr. Holger Rau (Universität Duisburg-Essen / Universität Göttingen)</p>

Behavioral Design

TITEL: Defaults and Effortful Tasks

AUTOR*INNEN: Lars Behlen, Oliver Himmler, Robert Jäckle

ABSTRACT: Nothing is known about the effectiveness of defaults when moving the target outcomes requires substantial effort. We conduct two field experiments to investigate how defaults fare in such situations: we change the university exam sign-up procedure in two study programs to "opt-out" (a) for a single exam, and (b) for many exams. Both interventions increase task uptake (exam sign-up). Concerning the outcomes which require effort, we find no effects for many exams. For a single exam, the opt-out increases task completion (exam participation) in the study program where the default arguably entails stronger endorsement. Within this program, the effects on successful task completion (exam passing) are heterogeneous: treated students who in the past were willing to communicate with the university (responsive individuals) invest more effort into exam preparation and are more likely to pass the exam than their control counterparts. For non-responsive individuals, we find increased sign-ups but no effects on the target outcomes. Defaults can thus be effective and may be an attractive policy option even when the target outcome requires substantial effort provision. It is, however crucial that the interventions target the appropriate individuals.

TITEL: Transparent app design reduces excessive usage time and increases willingness to pay compared to common behavioural design: A framed field experiment

AUTOR*INNEN: Christina Timko, Maja Adena

ABSTRACT: Smartphone app designers often use behavioral design to influence users, increase sales, and boost advertising revenue. Behavioral design relies on elements ranging from app appearance to black-box algorithms and personalization. It commonly exploits behavioral biases, such as the lack of self-control. Consumers are seldom aware of such design and usually have no control over it. Aiming to protect consumers, the recently enacted European Digital Services Act requires app design to be more transparent and adjustable. In a framed field experiment, we document that behavioral design increases app usage time, especially in the case of vulnerable users. An app version that adds transparency and offers protection features helps to overcome temptation. The higher willingness to pay for the transparent version shows that the positive effects of app transparency and increased consumer protection might not only materialize on the demand side but may also challenge current practices on the supply side. Keywords: smartphone app, filtering algorithm, transparency, consumer protection, field experiment.

TITEL: At least you've tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard

AUTOR*INNEN: Maximilian Hiller, Vanessa Mertins, Devin Kwasniok, **Cheyenne Wübbelmann**

ABSTRACT: Previous studies have demonstrated the positive impact of deposit contracts on behavior when accepted. These studies also revealed a low take-up rate upon the commitment device. This might be because within a deposit contract, participants lose everything if they fail to reach the goal, even if it was just missed by one percent. Most studies try to increase take-up rates by offering a reward for goal achievement. Nevertheless, in those designs, participants still lose everything for not reaching 100% of the goal. To overcome this issue, we conducted a field experiment where we included the range between goal failure and goal achievement in the pay-off by using interim goals. 388 participants were randomly assigned to either a control group or one of the four treatment groups. Each participant faced an individually calculated daily step goal to achieve over a 20-day intervention period. Treatments differed both in their endpoint and in the amount of penalties. Within the first treatment, no penalty was present, while in the second respectively third treatment, penalties were present up to a goal achievement of 50% respectively 75% of goal achievement. The last treatment represented a classic deposit contract with a reward, so the penalty was present up to a goal achievement of 100%. Furthermore, participants were allowed to decide daily whether they wanted to accept the challenge the following day. Primary outcomes were number of successful days and repeated take-up rates. Contrary to our expectations, lowest frequency of repeated take-up occurred in the treatment without the risk of losing money, where only a reward was given. As predicted, the treatment with the highest endpoint showed the most successful days. Best combination of repeated take-up and successful days can be found in the treatment with a penalty endpoint of 50% goal achievement, which shows the effectiveness and attractiveness of deposit contracts, which do not force participants to reach the total of 100% goal achievement.

Cooperation and Prosociality II

TITEL: Median Voting under Inequality: Still a Solution to Intergenerational Cooperation?

AUTOR*INNEN: Deborah Voß

ABSTRACT: While the current generation fully bears the cost of climate change mitigation, its benefits are predominantly accrued on the side of future generations. Inequality between the individuals of the current generation may run counter the individual willingness to bear these costs. This might severely impede the intergenerational cooperation needed to sustain the environment over time. Prior findings in the field of experimental economics point out

median voting as a measure to increase cooperation across generations. The question of whether this is still the case under inequality within generations has not been answered yet. To do so, I introduce different levels of marginal utility of resource exploitation among the individuals of each generation in an intergenerational goods game. My results show that also in this setting, median voting significantly facilitates cooperative outcomes across generations as compared to a baseline scenario of unregulated choice. An analysis on the individual level indicates that voting works primarily by enforcing favorable median choices rather than by influencing individual behavior. This hints towards the inevitable role of formal institutions for achieving climate change mitigation.

TITEL: Understanding interdependent and strategic choice construction in social dilemma situations

AUTOR*INNEN: Susann Fiedler

ABSTRACT: Cooperation is one of the fundamentals of human societies. Be it the stranger making an effort to return a lost wallet to its rightful owner or a co-worker pitching in her fair share in a joint project. Actions like that create an environment that makes living together a pleasant experience. Hence, understanding how decisions determining the welfare of oneself and others are made is important for facilitating this behavior by building institutions that maximize the rate of cooperation in a society. To shed new light on this decision-making process I will present recent evidence from a set of process tracing experiments utilizing eye-tracking and economic games. Experiments will focus on the role of social preferences in the choice construction process and will identify mechanisms (i.e., search and processing depth, information weighting, and ignorance) that guide choice behavior.

TITEL: Economic Inequality and Cooperation: The Role of Homophily

AUTOR*INNEN: Janina Kraus, Stefan Traub

ABSTRACT: This paper examines experimentally whether and how homophily affects cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma when groups are heterogenous. The homophily principle holds that contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people. Inequality in

acquired payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma conveys information about a partner's choices (values) in past games. Aggregated payoffs (wealth) can also be used to identify a partner who has used the same strategy in the past. Wealth homophily can lead to cooperation even among defectors, a phenomenon which is known as positive assortment. In 4 treatments, subjects first play 5 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma and then receive information about the other players' actual decisions, cumulative payoffs, or normative

evaluation of the PD. They then use the strategy method to determine whether they would cooperate with the opponent.

Artificial Intelligence

TITEL: Can we use GPT-4 as an examiner? An experimental competition between GPT-4 and humans on ranking open-text answers

AUTOR*INNEN: Abdullah Al Zubaer, Stephan Geschwind, Michael Granitzer, **Johann Graf Lambsdorff**, Deborah Voß

ABSTRACT: We explore the performance of GPT-4 in ranking answers to open text tasks. We formulate questions encompassing macroeconomic and institutional economic content and collect answers from large cohorts of students. Subsequently, we run a fair competition between GPT and three human experts, employing their expertise to rank the quality of the answers. In a baseline, we determine the interrater reliability among the human subjects. In the three treatments, we substitute one of the three humans for GPT-4. We observe that on average the interrater reliability is not lower in the treatments. Humans fail to outcompete GPT-4. We run checks on potential biases. We let GPT-4 generate its own answers and pool them with the student answers. We do not find that GPT favours self-generated answers. These findings suggest a broad range of potential applications for GPT in university education. Another potential application might be to use GPT-4 as a cost-effective tool for coding open text submitted by laboratory participants. Whether GPT-4 achieves a similar performance on intercoder-reliability, however, requires further research.

TITEL: Lie against AI: Revealing private information through AI in an economic experiment

AUTOR*INNEN: Dmitri Bershadskeyy, Laslo Dinges, Marc-André Fiedler, Ayoub Al-Hamadi, **Nina Ostermaier**, Joachim Weimann

ABSTRACT: Replicating the experiment of Belot & van de Ven (2017), we examine lying behavior in the presence of asymmetric information in a buyer-seller game. In our design, sellers have monetary incentives to sometimes misreport their private information about the colour of a card assigned to them. Adapting the original study, we investigate the ability of buyers to detect lies via video conference instead of in-person communication. Results indicate that sellers lie and buyers have limited ability to detect such lies. Further, the obtained video communication is used for training a lie detection algorithm. Additional treatments investigate the willingness of buyers to invest in revealing the private information of sellers using different methods, including the self-developed lie detection algorithm.

TITEL: Algorithm aversion at first sight: Insights on people's tendency to eschew algorithm-based decisions

AUTOR*INNEN: Florian E. Sachs, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Kai Heinrich

ABSTRACT: As digitalization progresses, an increasing number of human decisions can be substituted or aided by corresponding algorithms, which often exhibit superior performance compared to humans. Nevertheless, despite knowing that the algorithm can outperform humans, users tend to avoid its utilization, a phenomenon referred to as algorithm aversion. Prior research has identified numerous potential factors attributed to human, machine, or task properties, yet the influence of the initial human-computer interaction remains to be elucidated. Given that attitudes towards the algorithm develop gradually and are susceptible to change during interactions, manipulating the interaction and measuring reactions can aid in understanding potential strategies to mitigate aversion and encourage appreciation. In order to explain possible reasons for algorithm aversion or appreciation, we conduct an incentivized online experiment that centers on the impact of the sequence in which information regarding the quality of the algorithmic system is presented.

Markets and Competition

TITEL: New Avenues for Experimental Data

AUTOR*INNEN: Heinrich Nax

ABSTRACT: We present new approaches to using experimental data. In particular, we will highlight how the use of experimental trading data permits--at least in principle--to make inferences about the underlying efficiency properties of market outcomes, which is something that is far less straightforward with observational data. Our goal is to build an online efficiency predictor that uses as input the trading data from an experiment and as output makes inferences about the underlying market structure (e.g. equilibrium price and gains of trade). This predictor will be trained based on experimental data, but function without information regarding induced values.

TITEL: Patient choice driven competition between physicians: performance disclosure and the quality of medical care

AUTOR*INNEN: Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Johanna Kokot

ABSTRACT: Improving healthcare quality through provider competition is a popular healthcare reform strategy. However, its effectiveness can be limited by asymmetric information between patients and physicians or by patients' reluctance to switch their physician. This study aims to investigate the impact of different types of information on patients' choice of a physician and physicians' treatment behavior. Our theory-guided laboratory experiment varies whether patients receive information either about their own physician's medical treatment decision (FLEX-PRIVATE), or also about other patients' choice of a physician (FLEX-COMMUNITY), or about all physicians' medical treatment (FLEX-PUBLIC). In addition, we test three control conditions in which patients either always choose the physician offering the best quality of care (FIX100), only switch to the physician with the best quality of care at a 20 percent rate (FIX20), or do not switch their physician at all (FIX0). The results of the experiment reveal that providing more information to patients increases their average switching rate and, accordingly, increases physicians' average quality of care. Even in case that patients are informed only about the quality of care provided by the own physician, average treatment quality is higher than in case without an opportunity to switch the physician.

TITEL: Umbrella Effects. An Experimental Study

AUTOR*INNEN: Lisa Bruttel, **Holger Rau**

ABSTRACT: This paper uses an experiment to study the formation of partial cartels, i.e., cartels where only some of the firms in a market enter a collusive agreement. We compare a treatment in which communication among the firms is only possible if they unanimously agree to communicate with another treatment where partial cartels are possible. In the latter treatment, fewer firms choose to communicate, but given the number of firms willing to communicate, prices are higher, in particular when $n-1$ firms agree to communicate. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for umbrella effects: the firms not participating in the communication typically set a price slightly below the cartel's price.

Session 5 (Freitag 22.09., 09:00 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06	D07
Feedback and Updating	Ethics and Fairness	Performance	Investment Behavior
<p>Social Proximity and Feedback-Giving Behavior - A study on how social interaction influences feedback-giving behavior on peer-to-peer platforms</p> <p>Herr Dr. Behnud Mir Djawadi (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Der moderierende Effekt von Persönlichkeit auf die Effektivität von Verhaltensrichtlinien</p> <p>Frau Alina Elrich (Universität Paderborn)</p>	<p>Deposit Contracts with a Performance-Based Refund: A Field Experiment</p> <p>Herr Maximilian Hiller (Universität Vechta)</p>	<p>Wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität und Anlegerverhalten - Auswirkungen der Haftungsverschärfung in Deutschland</p> <p>Herr Christopher Woddow (Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg)</p>
<p>Peer Feedback in Clinical High-Volume Activities</p> <p>Herr Yado Ndiaye (Universität zu Köln)</p>	<p>Motivated beliefs and third party intervention</p> <p>Herr Dr. Kevin Grubiak (Universität Passau)</p>	<p>The Impact of Budget Restrictions and the Recommendation to Differentiate on Performance Appraisals - A Laboratory Experiment</p> <p>Frau Stella Simons (RWTH Aachen University)</p>	<p>Non-financial disclosures and moral licensing - Evidence from an eye tracking experiment</p> <p>Herr Fabian Felser (Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg)</p>
<p>Motivated Belief Updating and Rationalization of Information</p> <p>Herr Prof. Dr. Sebastian Goerg (Technische Universität München)</p>	<p>Fairness Preferences of Child Labourers. Evidence from Bolivia.</p> <p>Herr Sebastian Panreck (Universität Münster)</p>	<p>A Laboratory Experiment on Using Different Financial-Incentivization Schemes in Software-Engineering Experimentation</p> <p>Herr Jannik Greif (Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg)</p>	

Feedback and Updating

TITEL: Social Proximity and Feedback-Giving Behavior - A study on how social interaction influences feedback-giving behavior on peer-to-peer platforms

AUTOR*INNEN: Behnud Mir Djawadi, Lisa Wester

ABSTRACT: Many reputation systems generate implausible rating distributions in such a way that they cannot be assumed to mirror true quality – a phenomenon which is particularly pronounced on peer-to-peer platforms such as Airbnb, Uber or BlaBlaCar. Research suggests diverse reasons for the observance of highly positively skewed ratings, such as non- or under-reporting of negative experience due to fear of retaliation or herding behavior. Yet, the examination of influence of social interactions – characteristic for sharing economy platforms – on feedback-giving behavior has not been done yet. We propose that feedback giving differs depending on the availability of personal information and social proximity between transaction partners. It is expected that disclosing personal information per se leads to better feedback than having no information at hand. Second, it is hypothesized that socially proximate interaction partners receive better feedback than socially distant interaction partners. To answer our hypotheses, we design an experiment that simulates a sharing economy market framework where a provider offers a service and is in turn remunerated and evaluated by a customer taking up the offered service. Since a crucial feature of the sharing economy is the potential for collective action taken by both sides to enhance experience, the quality of the service is modelled as a function of the joint effort exerted by providers and customers. Whereas these elements are static across treatments, the extent of personal information presented to transaction partners varies. The first sessions started two weeks ago and will continue until the end of July so that first findings can be presented at the conference.

TITEL: Peer Feedback in Clinical High-Volume Activities

AUTOR*INNEN: Katharina Huesmann, Christian Waibel, Daniel Wiesen, Yero Ndiaye

ABSTRACT: Peer feedback has been strongly advocated by medical professional societies as a key nonmonetary strategy to improve the quality of care. Currently, if provided at all, clinical leaders often give feedback on key quality indicators in a rather pragmatic way. Systematic evidence on the design of peer feedback is scarce. We study how physicians' medical service provision is causally affected by peer feedback. Using a behavioral experiment that mimics high volume activity in a clinical setting, we systematically analyze how different non-anonymous ranking designs that vary in their granularity affect physician effort provision. We analyze how the heterogeneity in physicians' abilities explains the responses to the different ranking designs. Using a theoretical model of status concerns, we derive behavioral predictions. In preliminary results with medical students, we report three

main findings. First, peer feedback in the form of rankings enhances physician performance overall compared to a non-ranking baseline. Overall, the effects tend to be stronger the more detailed or specific the ranking is. Second, the ranking design affects physician performance, and the impact of the ranking design depends on the physicians' abilities. For an individual physician, increased granularity particularly motivates within their ability range and may be less motivating outside. Finally, our results indicate that ranks at the lower and upper ends of a ranking are significant. Currently, the experiments are conducted with physicians.

TITEL: Motivated Belief Updating and Rationalization of Information

AUTOR*INNEN: Christoph Drobner, **Sebastian Goerg**

ABSTRACT: We study belief updating about relative performance in an ego-relevant task. Manipulating the perceived ego-relevance of the task, we show that subjects update their beliefs optimistically because they derive direct utility flows from holding positive beliefs. This finding provides a behavioral explanation why and how overconfidence can evolve in the presence of objective information. Moreover, we document that subjects, who received more bad signals, downplay the ego-relevance of the task. Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects use two alternative strategies to protect their ego when presented with objective information.

Ethics and Fairness

TITEL: Der moderierende Effekt von Persönlichkeit auf die Effektivität von Verhaltensrichtlinien

AUTOR*INNEN: Alina Elrich

ABSTRACT: Mit einem Laborexperiment untersuche ich, ob die Effektivität zweier unterschiedlicher Arten von Verhaltensrichtlinien von der Persönlichkeit der Zielperson abhängig ist. Obwohl Verhaltensrichtlinien in Organisationen als Kernelement von Compliance Programmen gelten, gibt es bis jetzt keine klaren Empfehlungen dazu, wie solche Richtlinien gestaltet sein müssen, um möglichst effektiv gegen unethisches Verhalten am Arbeitsplatz zu sein. Mit Bezug auf die aktuelle Gestaltungsweise von Verhaltensrichtlinien in Unternehmen unterscheide ich zwischen zwei konträren Arten: kurze, auf die Integrität der Mitarbeiter abzielende Verhaltensrichtlinien (prinzipienbasiert) und lange Dokumente mit detaillierten Standards und Regeln (regelbasiert). Da bislang nicht gefunden wurde, ob eine dieser beiden Arten Fehlverhalten eher reduziert, schaue ich mir an, ob Persönlichkeitseigenschaften, die in der Literatur grundsätzlich als Prädiktoren für Fehlverhalten am Arbeitsplatz gelten, die Effektivität der beiden Richtlinien-Arten moderieren.

Mit den Ergebnissen einer vorangegangenen Szenario-Studie untersuche ich, ob der Einsatz von an die Persönlichkeit angepassten Verhaltensrichtlinien Fehlverhalten am Arbeitsplatz reduziert. Nach einem Persönlichkeitstest werden die Teilnehmer zu einem weiteren Experiment eingeladen, bei dem in einem erweiterten kontextbezogenen dictator game zwischen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer der Arbeitnehmer die Möglichkeit hat, seinen Nutzen auf Kosten des Arbeitgebers zu erhöhen. Zuvor unterschreiben die Arbeitnehmer entweder die an ihre Persönlichkeit angepasste oder entgegengesetzte Art von Verhaltensrichtlinien.

TITEL: Motivated beliefs and third party intervention

AUTOR*INNEN: Kevin Grubiak

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the relevance of belief distortions in a context where third party bystanders can prevent future norm transgressions. For this purpose, we design a game in which a third party player can invest own resources to protect a passive player's endowment from being appropriated by a dictator. The game features uncertainty regarding the required amount of protection. Our treatments privately manipulate the costs of providing protection (either low or high). We hypothesise that third parties will report conveniently biased, i.e., less cynical beliefs about the likely behaviour of dictators the costlier it is for them to provide protection. Our data only provides moderate support. What we do find however is that third parties, more generally and irrespective of the assigned cost condition, underestimate the selfishness of dictators

TITEL: Fairness Preferences of Child Labourers. Evidence from Bolivia

AUTOR*INNEN: Sebastian Panreck

ABSTRACT: The question of how market integration affects fairness preferences has long been of public and academic interest. While market integration is often suspected of undermining fairness preferences, behavioural economic studies show the opposite. However, more research is needed to make clear statements on this puzzle. Thus, this paper will investigate how child labour influences fairness preferences. To answer this question, a survey-based study using the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure by Murphy et al. (2011) is conducted in two public secondary schools in Bolivia (regions El Alto and Santa Cruz). The results show a positive effect between child labour and (prosocial) fairness preferences, although there are differences in intensity between the two regions studied.

Performance

TITEL: Deposit Contracts with a Performance-Based Refund: A Field Experiment

AUTOR*INNEN: Maximilian Hiller, Vanessa Mertins

ABSTRACT: In a typical commitment contract, a deposit is either fully lost or fully refunded. The intermediate range is irrelevant for the payoff. Thus, the pure attempt to achieve a goal or certain behavior, which is a positive in and of itself, is rarely rewarded economically. To tackle this issue, we designed an opt-in deposit contract with a performance-based refund and tested it in a field experiment. Instead of a “win-or-lose-it-all”-payoff, we implemented a piece rate. For each percentage point that a participant receives for moving closer to reaching their individual calculated goal, they receive one percentage point of their deposit back. Only if a participant reaches their goal by 100%, the full deposit is refunded, and an additional bonus is paid out. This procedure does not penalize participants disproportionately like common mechanisms or reward them if they fail to achieve their goals. An intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis shows that the piece rate design benefits the participants when observing the average treatment effect. About 90% of the active piece rate contracts were successful. In direct comparison to a standard deposit contract (21%), the repeated take-up rate for the piece rate contract (about 50%) is way higher but in absolute terms rather moderate when comparing to comparable studies.

TITEL: The Impact of Budget Restrictions and the Recommendation to Differentiate on Performance Appraisals – A Laboratory Experiment

AUTOR*INNEN: Christine Harbring, Stella Simons

ABSTRACT: In organizations, performance appraisals are often the basis for promotion or salary decisions. Though, performance appraisals tend to be prone to evaluation biases, e.g. leniency and centrality bias. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that differentiated (and less lenient) performance appraisals lead to a higher performance. An obvious solution is a forced distribution system which has severe drawbacks (see e.g. Berger et al. (2013)). Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of alternative mechanisms. In a lab experiment, we investigate how a budget restriction and the recommendation to differentiate impact the supervisors’ rating behavior, and consequently, the workers’ performance. Moreover, we investigate the increase of the budget restriction and the combination of a budget and a recommendation to differentiate which could be the most common setting in organizations.

TITEL: A Laboratory Experiment on Using Different Financial-Incentivization Schemes in Software-Engineering Experimentation

AUTOR*INNEN: Jacob Krüger, Gül Çalıklı, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Robert Heyer, Sarah Zabel, Siegmar Otto, **Jannik Greif**

ABSTRACT: In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of financial incentives in the context of empirical software engineering. While software engineering describes the complete software process from designing to evaluating software, empirical studies in software engineering often leave aside the role of financial incentives on participants' behavior. To investigate how financial incentives can or cannot be useful for software engineering experimentation, we conducted a real effort experiment using a 3x1 between-subject design by varying the incentive schemes. The real effort task consists of a search and sort algorithm displayed as source code. Participants with prior programming experience had to identify logical errors that prevent the code from executing correctly. To obtain a deeper understanding of the search and evaluation processes, we gathered eye-tracking data. Preliminary results indicate that participants' performance differs dependent on the incentive scheme and therefore shed light on behavioural adjustments due to financial incentives in the context of software engineering.

Investment Behavior

TITEL: Wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität und Anlegerverhalten - Auswirkungen der Haftungsverschärfung in Deutschland

AUTOR*INNEN: Anne Chwolka, **Christopher Woddow**

ABSTRACT: Das Vertrauen von Anlegern in die Verlässlichkeit und Normenkonformität der von den Unternehmen veröffentlichten Jahresabschlussinformationen ist von besonderer Bedeutung für die Stabilität des Finanzmarktes. Der Wirecard-Bilanzskandal im Jahr 2020 hat die Anleger erheblich verunsichert. Um das Vertrauen in den Finanzmarkt in Deutschland wiederherzustellen und dauerhaft zu stärken, hat der Gesetzgeber u.a. mit dem „Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarktintegrität (FISG)“ reagiert, und hierbei insbesondere die Haftung von Wirtschaftsprüfern deutlich angehoben. Dabei ist fraglich, ob diese Regelung tatsächlich den intendierten Effekt erzielt, oder sich sogar eher negativ auf das Vertrauen der Anleger auswirken könnte. Aus theoretischer Sicht erscheint eine Haftungserhöhung zunächst grundsätzlich sinnvoll, weil sie c.p. für den einzelnen Wirtschaftsprüfer einen erhöhten Anreiz zur sorgfältigeren Prüfung und damit eine höhere Verlässlichkeit des Jahresabschlusses impliziert. Allerdings ist unklar, inwieweit der Anreiz bei gleichzeitiger Versicherung der Haftungssumme bestehen bleibt. Da mit einer Haftungserhöhung auch andere ungewollte Effekte, z.B. Erhöhung der Prüfungsgebühren, einhergehen und die

tatsächliche Auswirkung unklar ist, könnte sie wohlfahrtsökonomisch eine ineffiziente Lösung darstellen.

Zur Untersuchung, welche Effekte auftreten, sollen Experimente mit nicht-institutionellen Anlegern durchgeführt werden. Wir verwenden dafür zwei Experimente mit 1 x 3 Within-Subjects-Designs. Die Probanden erhalten eine Unternehmensbilanz und sollen in jeweils sich ändernden regulatorischen Umgebungen darüber eine Entscheidung treffen, entweder Wertpapiere des dargestellten Unternehmens zu kaufen oder eine risikolose Anlage mit geringerer Rendite zu tätigen. Die sich ändernden regulatorischen Umgebungen werden im ersten Experiment durch folgende Haftungsregeln abgebildet: Haftungsregeln vor dem FISG, Haftungsregeln nach dem FISG, Haftungsregeln nach dem FISG mit Versicherungsmöglichkeit des Prüfers.

Im zweiten Experiment werden folgende Haftungsregeln abgebildet: Keine Haftung des Prüfers, Haftungsregeln nach dem FISG, Haftungsregeln nach dem FISG mit Versicherungsmöglichkeit des Prüfers. Wir vermuten, dass die mögliche Veränderung der Anlageentscheidung in Abhängigkeit von den Informationen über die regulatorischen Gegebenheiten auch von den Kenntnissen der Anleger über die Haftung von Wirtschaftsprüfern abhängt. Wir nehmen an, dass die höhere Haftung bei Anlegern mit Haftungskenntnissen zu einer höheren wahrgenommenen Prüfungsqualität, einem höheren Vertrauen in den Jahresabschluss und einer erhöhten Anlagebereitschaft in das Unternehmen führt. Bei Anlegern ohne Haftungskenntnisse erwarten wir dagegen aufgrund der Erkenntnisse in der Literatur über das Auseinanderfallen der durch die Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommenen und den tatsächlichen Aufgaben der Jahresabschlussprüfung, dass der Hinweis auf die Prüferhaftung Gegenteiliges bewirkt. Die Erläuterung der Haftungsregeln könnten diese unkundigen Anleger erst dafür sensibilisieren, dass der Prüfer Fehler machen kann und dadurch die wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität, ihr Vertrauen in den Jahresabschluss und ihre Anlagebereitschaft verringern. Bei Miteinbeziehung einer Versicherung gehen wir davon aus, dass Anleger die Versicherung mit einem geringeren Anreiz zur sorgfältigen Prüfung des Wirtschaftsprüfers in Verbindung bringen, wodurch die wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität sinkt.

Wir leisten damit einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Wahrnehmung einer Haftungserhöhung aus Investorenperspektive. Praktische Relevanz erhält der Beitrag durch die Würdigung der Wirksamkeit des beschlossenen Gesetzes auf die intendierte Wirkung. Das ist vor allem für künftige Reformen in diesem Bereich von Bedeutung.

TITEL: Non-financial disclosures and moral licensing – Evidence from an eye tracking experiment.

AUTOR*INNEN: Sebastian Oelrich, Max-Frederik Neubert, Thomas Günther, **Fabian Felser**

ABSTRACT: Moral licensing is broadly understood as a psychological phenomenon in which individuals that behaved 'good' in the past behave 'bad' without losing their positive self-perception. Recent research in psychology has shown that moral licensing applies not only to self-perceptions but also to perceptions of others. We test whether this also applies to investment contexts: As sustainability becomes more prevalent in voluntary and mandatory non-financial disclosures, investors account for this information when making investment decisions. Moral licensing may then lead to investment behavior that rewards firms that report about past sustainable behavior despite current low sustainability performance.

We conduct an experiment with MBA students with corporate reporting and investment knowledge at two German universities (n=93). Participants are confronted with firms' annual statements and make investment decisions. We manipulate between subjects the availability of past sustainability performance (low - high) in addition to the presence of negative current period sustainability performance. In addition to traditional approaches to elicit decisions, preferences, and perceptions, we use eye-tracking technology (Pupil Labs Core) to directly measure the perception and understanding of the value of non-financial and sustainability performance. We present preliminary results that support our hypothesis that investors fall prey to what we term 'moral license investment' and what companies may strategically use as 'moral license reporting.' We discuss policy implications and future research directions. (This project was funded in part by a GfeW research grant.)

Session 6 (Freitag 22.09., 11:00 Uhr)

D04	D05	D06
Trust	Volunteering and Charity	Climate, Sustainability and Resources
<p>Unfair institutions, rule compliance, and social trust</p> <p>Herr Matthias Kasper (Walter Eucken Institut)</p>	<p>Cooperation and Solidarity after the reunification of Germany: Do behavioral differences between East and West Germans converge?</p> <p>Herr Dr. Philipp Biermann (Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg)</p>	<p>Does information help to overcome resistance to carbon pricing? Evidence from a survey experiment</p> <p>Frau Fabienne Cantner (Technische Universität München, Campus Straubing)</p>
<p>Honesty and Trust in Virtual Communication</p> <p>Herr Sven Walther (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie)</p>	<p>Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nationwide field experiment on Facebook.</p> <p>Frau Dr. Maja Adena (WZB Berlin)</p>	<p>Exploring the Last Man Argument: Evidence on Society's Disposition towards Nature's Legal Rights</p> <p>Herr Prof. Dr. Björn Frank (Universität Kassel)</p>
<p>Trust and Collaboration in Virtual Reality</p> <p>Herr Dr. Özgür Güererk (Universität zu Köln)</p>	<p>The effect of recognition and monetary compensation on volunteering retention - Evidence from a field experiment with digital volunteers</p> <p>Herr Jeremy Apken (Universität Vechta)</p>	<p>Field evidence on the contested role of time preferences in resource management</p> <p>Herr Thomas Lauer (Universität Erfurt)</p>

Trust

TITEL: Unfair institutions, rule compliance, and social trust

AUTOR*INNEN: Simon Columbus, Lars Feld, **Matthias Kasper**, Matthew Rablen

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the effects of group membership and rule enforcement on public good contributions, personal and social norms, and social trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1, 038) we find that the mere assignment of group labels, the introduction of a contribution rule, as well as unfair rule enforcement meaningfully affect economically relevant outcomes. Specifically, we find that the contribution rule induces a strong social norm, even when it is not enforced. However, biased rule enforcement reduces rule compliance. We also find that social heterogeneity induces ingroup favouritism in trust and lowers average trust. Finally, we find consistent evidence of peer effects: higher levels of peer compliance lead to higher compliance levels, more positive norms, and more social trust. Our study contributes to the literature on behavioural responses to institutional design and strengthens the case for random rule enforcement.

TITEL: Honesty and Trust in Virtual Communication

AUTOR*INNEN: **Sven Walther**, Petra Nieken

ABSTRACT: The Covid-19 pandemic led to a trend toward remote work and increased virtual communication. Particularly in organizations, virtual communication has become an essential tool for people to interact with one another. These communication channels provide a different level of social presence, which is known to affect moral behavior, than face-to-face communication. This raises the question of whether people prefer more anonymous communication channels when intending to be dishonest. To investigate this question, we conducted a controlled experiment using a sender-receiver deception game. In this experiment, the sender has the option of using either a text or video communication channel to send an honest or dishonest message to the receiver. In our setup, the sender and the receiver did not know each other, and the likelihood that they would meet after the experiment was negligible. Our results show a tendency for senders to prefer the more anonymous text communication channel when they chose to lie to the receiver. Our findings have important implications for various contexts and for strategies to prevent dishonest behavior. For instance, if certain communication channels tend to facilitate dishonesty, organizations can prioritize the usage of specific communication channels in situations where honest behavior is crucial.

TITEL: Trust and Collaboration in Virtual Reality

AUTOR*INNEN: Lucas Braun, **Özgür Gürerk**, Bernd Irlenbusch

ABSTRACT: We investigate whether a virtual handshake, simulated using haptic feedback technology, can increase trust in business relationships that take place in virtual environments. We focus on the use of vision-based hand tracking in combination with haptic feedback gloves to provide a sense of touch and physical interaction in virtual reality, and its potential to enhance trust and collaboration between individuals. Through a series of experiments, conducted using virtual reality headsets, and controls in a conventional lab, we examine the effects of virtual handshakes on trust in a variant of the Moonlighting game (Abbink et al., 2000), where a handshake is used to seal a non-binding contract. The results of the study provide insights into the potential of haptic feedback technology to improve trust and collaboration and have implications for the future of virtual business interactions.

Volunteering and Charity

TITEL: Cooperation and Solidarity after the reunification of Germany: Do behavioral differences between East and West Germans converge?

AUTOR*INNEN: **Philipp Biermann**, Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Joachim Weimann

ABSTRACT: We study whether the differences in behavioral patterns between East and West Germany show convergence given that they are still existent almost 30 years after reunification. Using a quantitative survey approach and focusing on volunteering and charitable giving, we show that there is no evidence for convergence in these behavioral patterns. The results are in line with the persistence of differences in social behavior reported in laboratory studies within the framework of a large scale representative survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel. Our results suggest that social behavioral norms did not change over the observation period. This confirms the theoretical indication that for social behavioral norms to change, there is the need for coordination at the societal level.

TITEL: Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nationwide field experiment on Facebook

AUTOR*INNEN: **Maja Adena**, Anselm Hager

ABSTRACT: Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? Using the Facebook advertising tool, we implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning almost 8,000 postal codes to Save the Children fundraising videos or to a pure control. We studied changes in the volume and frequency of donations to Save the Children and other charities by postal code. Our design circumvents many shortcomings inherent in

studies based on click-through data, especially substitution and measurement issues. We found that (i) video fundraising increased donation frequency and value to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found non-negligible crowding out of donations to other similar charities or projects. Finally, we demonstrated that click data are an inappropriate proxy for donations.

TITEL: The effect of recognition and monetary compensation on volunteering retention - Evidence from a field experiment with digital volunteers

AUTOR*INNEN: Jeremy Apken, Bernd Josef Leisen, Vanessa Mertins

ABSTRACT: Micro-volunteering, a sub-form of episodic volunteering, has gained traction in the online context. Micro-volunteering involves short-duration, non-committal volunteer activities that can be performed digitally from home, typically taking less than 30 minutes. While individuals may be highly motivated to engage in one-time or episodic volunteering activities, the willingness to volunteer repeatedly and regularly decreases. This presents a challenge in motivating volunteers in micro-volunteering to maintain regular engagement, particularly in the absence of commitment devices and increased non-commitment. After all, the general issue is how to motivate volunteers to continue their engagement after their first time donation. To circumvent the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation by (monetary) extrinsic incentives, we investigate the effect of expense allowance and public recognition as well as their joint impact on persons further volunteering behavior.

We conducted a field experiment involving digital volunteers in elderly care settings as part of the ViVerA (virtual events in elderly care) research project. Our study focused on two dependent variables: (a) volunteers' subsequent willingness to engage in further volunteering within the same nonprofit organization (NPO), and (b) their monetary donations using the dictator game setting, where participants received an expense allowance that they could choose to donate to the NPO partially or fully. Preliminary results indicate positive effects of public recognition, expense allowance and their combination on volunteers' willingness to continue in episodic volunteering (in our study ≥ 1 time donations) compared to the baseline. The effects on time donations were somewhat stronger than those on money donations. In both monetary treatment groups, a high percentage of volunteers chose to donate a portion of their expense allowance as well as high donation amounts.

Climate, Sustainability and Resources

TITEL: Does information help to overcome resistance to carbon pricing? Evidence from a survey experiment

AUTOR*INNEN: Fabienne Cantner, Geske Rolvering

ABSTRACT: We document people's attitudes toward climate change and carbon pricing and study whether information affect their policy views shortly before the introduction of the German carbon price. Using a survey experiment, we show that despite high climate change awareness, support for the carbon price is low. We also show that providing information about the efficiency of carbon pricing or emission levels and carbon prices outside Germany changes people's views. Informing about distributional implications of carbon pricing is not effective. Further evidence suggests that the effectiveness of the information interventions increases with trust in the government and climate change awareness.

TITEL: Exploring the Last Man Argument: Evidence on Society's Disposition towards Nature's Legal Rights

AUTOR*INNEN: Björn Frank, Blanca Tena

ABSTRACT: Routley's (1973) thought experiment "The Last Man Argument" becomes an actual experiment. We ask a representative sample of the German population to imagine being the last human alive and to potentially enjoy destroying the last remaining oak tree. Using a between- subject design, we vary the motives for doing for (and in one treatment the object of destruction). This thought experiment is unique in removing all possible extrinsic motives for preserving nature, thus providing clean evidence for humans' belief in nature's intrinsic value, making a case for nature's rights. Most men, and markedly more women, refrain from destroying the oak. This gender difference only disappears when the scenario concerns the destruction of the Brandenburg Gate.

TITEL: Field evidence on the contested role of time preferences in resource management

AUTOR*INNEN: Suparee Boonmanunt, Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach, Arne Weiss

ABSTRACT: Planting mangroves is a conservation activity pursuing the long-term goal of sustaining the basis for fishing activities. The decision to engage in mangrove planting requires trading off the short-run costs of planting with its long-run benefits. We report a lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers in which we elicit short- and long-run time preferences prior to mangrove-seed planting. We show that less present biased

participants plant more seeds, while planting is unrelated to individuals' long-run discounting.

**UNIVERSITÄT
ERFURT**

Staatswissenschaftliche
Fakultät

Wir freuen uns auf Sie!

Gfew

Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e. V.