



HELMUT SCHMIDT
UNIVERSITÄT
Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg



ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE GfeW IN HAMBURG

GfeW

Gesellschaft für experimentelle
Wirtschaftsforschung e. V.

10 – 12 September 2025

Table of Contents

Foreword	1
Important Note (Entering the HSU)	2
Arrival	3
Site Plans	4
Important Locations	6
Program Overview	9
Keynotes & WLAN	10
Overview of the Parallel Sessions	11
List of Participants	17
Organizing Team	20
List of Abstracts	21

Foreword

Dear Participants of the GfeW Annual Conference 2025,

We are delighted to welcome you to this year's GfeW conference at the Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces (HSU) in Hamburg. Founded in Hamburg in 1972, the university was established by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Helmut Schmidt. The German Federal Armed Forces uses the university for the academic training of soldiers pursuing a career as officers in the military service.

Over the past ten years, the number of wars, civil wars, and interstate conflicts has risen sharply. Added to this are trade disputes and the general questioning of the rules-based international order. At the same time, global challenges such as combating climate change require more cooperative behavior. Against this backdrop, we have chosen "*Crises and Conflicts: Perspectives of Experimental Economic Research*" as the general theme of the conference. With Lydia Mechtenberg from the University of Hamburg and Hannes Rusch from the MPI for the Study of Crime, Security, and Law in Freiburg, we have been able to secure two renowned experts as keynote speakers who will provide answers to the question of what contribution experimental economic research can make (and what it cannot) to the analysis and solution of such problems.

In addition to the scientific program with around 100 participants and 75 presentations, the annual conference offers many opportunities for relaxed exchange and networking, including the welcome barbecue reception at the Offiziersheimgesellschaft (a DJ will provide dance music), the conference dinner at Hamburg's famous beachclub StrandPauli (there is a pool bar), and a harbor cruise (it's Hamburg Cruise Days!).

We are looking forward to an inspiring conference and wish all participants a pleasant stay at the HSU.

Best regards,

Stefan Traub and the Organizing Team

Important Note

Information on the Military Security Area (MSB)

Please note that the Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Armed Forces Hamburg (HSU) is a Bundeswehr facility. All Bundeswehr facilities are designated as military areas. In addition to barracks and training grounds, this also includes all other Bundeswehr facilities, installations, and ships, such as Bundeswehr hospitals, Bundeswehr universities, and office space rented by the Bundeswehr.

Special rules apply in military security areas – not only for visitors, but also for the troops themselves. Military security areas are closed to the public. This means that they may only be entered with **access authorization**. Security personnel and security forces such as the military police have legal powers of intervention in these areas in order to effectively protect members and equipment of the Bundeswehr and allied armed forces.

What do you need to bear in mind?

- Conference participants may only enter the HSU through the **main entrance gate** (security guard at Holstenhofweg 85).
- You will need an **ID card** or **passport** to enter the HSU.
- We will pass the list of participants to the security guard so that you can enter the campus by simply **showing your ID** to the security guard.

To speed up the process, especially at the beginning of the conference on Wednesday noon, several students in uniform will be waiting for you in the entrance area to help you pass through security

Arrival

Address for Visitors

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg
Holstenhofweg 85
22043 Hamburg (Germany)

How to get to the Conference Venue

By Car

BAB 24 Exit HH-Jenfeld, travel Schiffbeker Weg heading north until Rodigallee, turn left, follow Rodigallee to campus Holstenhofweg.

By Rail & Bus

From Hamburg Main Station with bus no. X35 (direction Sorenkoppel) to busstop "Universität der Bundeswehr" for campus Holstenhofweg.

Or:

From Hamburg Main Station with Underground U1 to Wandsbek Markt, change for bus no. X22, X11, 10, 162, or 263 to busstop "Universität der Bundeswehr" for campus Holstenhofweg.

By Airplane

From HAM Airport by suburban train S1 to Wandsbeker Chaussee, change for bus no. X22 (direction Jenfeld Zentrum) to busstop "Universität der Bundeswehr".


Or:

From HAM Airport by suburban train S1 to Wandsbeker Chaussee, change for Underground U1 to Wandsbek Markt, change for bus no. X22, X11, 10, 162, or 263 to busstop "Universität der Bundeswehr" for campus Holstenhofweg.

Site Plans

Campus Plan

The conference will take place in the main building (H1) of the Helmut Schmidt University (HSU), Holstenhofweg 85, 22043 Hamburg.



The only entrance for visitors is the main entrance gate at Holstenhofweg 85. Parking spaces for guests are very limited. Parking may be available on Holstenhofweg. **Bus stops** are located at the corner of Holstenhofweg and Rodigallee (approx. 300 meters away).


All events except for the welcome barbecue will take place on the ground floor of **building H1** (see map on the next page).

The **welcome barbecue** will take place at the Offiziersheimgesellschaft (OHG) at Rodigallee 98 (300 meters on foot).

The **buses** to the **conference dinner** and the **harbor cruise** will depart from the **rondeel** in front of the guardhouse at the entrance gate

Site Plans

Room Layout (Building H1, Level 0)



The **conference office** is located in seminar room 301/3.

Opening, keynotes, members' meeting, etc. will take place in Auditorium 5.

The **parallel sessions** will take place in the 30X seminar rooms and Auditoriums 3 & 4.

Coffee and **lunch breaks** will take place in the entrance area in front of the 30X seminar rooms.

Important Locations

Welcome Barbecue

The welcome barbecue will take place on Wednesday, 10.09.2025,
at the **Offiziersheimgesellschaft (OHG)** (Rodigallee 98).
It is a 300-meter walk (4 minutes) from the entrance gate of HSU to the
OHG building at the opposite.



Copyright: OHG

The OHG opens for us at 18.45 directly after the GfeW members' meeting. Food (meat, vegetarian, and vegan) and drinks will be served starting at 19.00. The last order will be taken at around 22.00.

DJ Fabian Rikker will provide musical entertainment. Dancing is permitted

Important Locations

Conference Dinner

The conference dinner will take place on Thursday, 11.09.2025,
at the beachclub **StrandPauli** (St. Pauli Hafenstraße 89).

The bus departure will be from the entrance gate of HSU at 17.30.



Bus departure (one-way) from HSU at 17.30. The beachclub opens for us at 18.30.
The dinner starts at 19.30. The event ends at 22.30.

In case of bad weather conditions, the entire pool bar area will be covered with a tent.

Important Locations

Harbor Cruise


The harbor cruise will take place on Friday, 12.09.2025, aboard the **"Sabine"** barge (embarking: Reederei Rieck, St. Pauli Landungsbrücken, Brücke 6-7, Höhe Alter Elbtunnel).

The bus departure will be from the entrance gate of HSU at 13.45.



Copyright: Barkassenvermietung Rieck

Departure from pier 7 sharp (!) at 15.00. Duration of the harbor tour: approx. 2 hours. Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages can be purchased on board at your own expense. You are welcome to bring your own food on board. Please note that the bus will wait until after the harbor tour, allowing you to leave your luggage on the bus.



Program Overview

Wednesday, September 10

		Location
from 12.00	Registration	Conference Office Seminar Room 301/303
13.30 – 13.45	Opening / Greetings	Auditorium 5
13.45 – 15.00	Keynote: How to Deal with Conflicts and Crises – An Experimental Perspective Prof. Dr. Dr. Lydia Mechtenberg Universität Hamburg	Auditorium 5
15.00 – 15.30	Coffee Break	Entrance Area
15.30 – 17.30	Parallel Session 1	Seminar Rooms & Auditoriums
17.45 – 18.45	Members' Meeting (in German)	Auditorium 5
18.45 – 22.00	Welcome Barbecue (musical entertainment by DJ Rikker)	Offizierheimgesellschaft (OHG), Rodigallee 98

Thursday, September 11

09.00 – 10.30	Parallel Session 2	Seminar Rooms & Auditoriums
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee Break	Entrance Area
11.00 – 12.30	Parallel Session 3	Seminar Rooms & Auditoriums
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	Seminar building
	Network Meeting for Female Researchers	Auditorium 5
14.00 – 15.30	Parallel Session 4	Seminar Rooms & Auditoriums
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee break	Entrance Area
16.00 – 17.15	Keynote: How Can Experimental Economics Inform Conflict Research? Dr. Dr. Hannes Rusch, MPI for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg	Auditorium 5
from 18.30	Conference Dinner at StrandPauli (participation only after prior registration)	St. Pauli Hafenstraße 89. Bus transfer: 17.30

Friday, September 12

09.00 – 11.00	Parallel Session 5	Seminar Rooms & Auditoriums
11.00 – 11.30	Coffee Break	Entrance Area
11.30 – 12.30	Plenary Meeting: Presentation of the Heinz Sauermann Prize and Lecture	Auditorium 5
12.30 – 13.30	Snack (Lunch Boxes)	Entrance Area
15.00 – 17.00	Harbor Cruise with the „Sabine“ Barge (participation only after prior registration)	St. Pauli Landungs- brücken 6-7. Bus transfer: 13.45

Keynotes & WLAN

Keynotes

Wednesday, September 10, 13.45 – 15.00, H1 Auditorium 5

Prof. Dr. Dr. Lydia Mechtenberg,

Full Professor of Political Economy, University of Hamburg

HOW TO DEAL WITH CONFLICTS AND CRISES -
AN EXPERIMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Thursday, September 11, 16.00 – 17.15, H1 Auditorium 5

Dr. Dr. Hannes Rusch,

Research Group Leader, Max Planck Institute for the Study of
Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg

HOW CAN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS INFORM
CONFLICT RESEARCH?

WLAN

FreeHSU

No encryption - open Internet for guests of the HSU.

One-time agreement to the terms of use required.

eduroam

WPA2 + IEEE 802.1x

The network for users from all educational and research institutions participating in Eduroam.

Here, you can use the user ID from your home institution to access the Internet. We support 802.1x with WPA2 encryption and PEAP or TTLS as authentication methods.

Overview of the Parallel Sessions

Session	Time/Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	Seminar Room 305	Seminar Room 308	Seminar Room 310
---------	-----------	--------------	--------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

Wednesday, 10.09.

1	15.30 – 17.30	Risk	Norms and Dishonesty	Markets and Innovations	Communication and Cooperation	
---	---------------	------	----------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------------	--

Thursday, 11.09.

2	09.00 – 10.30	Climate	Age and Gender	Trust and Cooperation	Conflict and Inequality	Special Session on Wargaming and Experiments
3	11.00 – 12.30	Knowledge and Beliefs	Public Goods	Fairness and Redistribution	Conflict and Cooperation	AI
4	14.00 – 15.30	Preferences and the Environment	Trust and AI	Reciprocity and Prosociality	Conflict and Social Cohesion	Experimental Methods

Friday, 12.09.

5	09.00 – 11.00	Health	Expectations	Effort and Incentives		
---	---------------	--------	--------------	-----------------------	--	--

Approx. 20 minutes and about 10 minutes of discussion are planned for the presentations. Presentation language is English. The last speaker of each session should act the session chair and observe the presentation times.

Wednesday, September 10 (Parallel Session 1)

Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	SR 305	SR 308
Time	Risk	Norms and Dishonesty	Markets and Innovations	Communication and Cooperation
15.30	Christoph Drobner Motivated Risk Assessments	Miguel Abellán Markets, Social Responsibility, and the Replacement Excuse	Florian Heine Exclusionary Pricing by State- Owned Enterprises - Experimental Evidence	Michelle Hörrmann Beyond Words: Non-verbal Cues in Virtual Collaborations
16.00	Frederic Janssen Breaking the Burning BEV Bias: Overcoming Availability and Spillover-induced Bias in Fire Risk Perception	Matthias Kasper Sanctions and Social Norms	Mario Mechtel Consumer Social Responsibility in Experimental Markets with(out) Sellers	Christoph Schütt Trust, Autonomy & Paternalism: An Experimental Study
16.30	Jan Krause Intelligence and Measurement Errors in Risky Decision- Making: Disentangling Risk Attitudes, Rationality, and Noise	Lilith Burgstaller The Effectiveness of List Experiments and the Role of Empirical Expectations	Janina Kraus Fake Reviews in Digital Markets: Fraudulent Behavior and Market (In-)Efficiency	Alexandra Seidel The More You Know? Consumption Behavior and the Communication of Economic Information
17.00	Kevin Grubiak The Effects of an Audience on the Gender Risk-taking Gap	Sven Simon Dishonesty in Complex Environments: Deliberate Lies, Short-cuts, or Accidental Mistakes?	Rika Stoczek The Influence of Prior Experience in the Context of a Technological Shock	Jan Philipp Krügel Money or Autonomy? Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment

Thursday, September 11 (Parallel Session 2)

Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	SR 305	SR 308	SR 310
Time	Climate	Age and Gender	Trust and Cooperation	Conflict and Inequality	Special Session on Wargaming and Experiments
09.00	Maria Krempf Future Thinking and Pro-Environmental Behavior	Benedikt Herrmann All Kind of Social Preferences in the Lab and in the Field	Jan Engelmann The Divergent Effects of Conflict on Established and Emerging Relationships	Christiane Buschinger Extreme Justifications Fuel Polarization	Philip Schäfer & Joseph Verbovszky Wargames are Experiments – Wargames as Experimental Methods in International Relations
09.30	Julian Benda Visible Tax Dividends and Support for Carbon Pricing: Evidence from Austria	Katharina Hartinger Banking for Boomers - A Field Experiment on Technology Adoption in Financial Services	Heike Hennig-Schmidt Interregional Trust in a Large Country – The Interplay of Regional Distance and Information. First Results of a Large-scale Online Experiment	Greta Kyriakidou-Schoolmann What Redistribution Preferences Do Right-wing Populist Voters Have? - A Classic Allocator Game vs. an Allocator Game Modified by an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI)	Klaus Beckmann Turning Warfare into a Science: Wargaming in the Laboratory
10.00	Philipp Biermann Perceptions on Climate Leadership: Evidence from a Survey-experiment in Germany	Stella Simons Get-What-You-Want: Gender Differences in Self-Set Salaries?	Andreas Nicklisch Goals or Outcomes: What Drives Conditional Cooperation?	Thomas Rittmannsberger Guns, Butter, and Redistribution: An Experimental Study of Inequality & Conflict	t.b.a.

Thursday, September 11 (Parallel Session 3)

Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	SR 305	SR 308	SR 310
Time	Knowledge and Beliefs	Public Goods	Fairness and Redistribution	Conflict and Cooperation	AI
11.00	Blanca Tena Estrada Market Acceptance in a Commodified Society: Are Economics Students Different?	Dmitri Bershadskyy Incurring Personal Costs for a Better Society: Kindness Behind Public Goods Contributions	Mathilde Bechdorf Beyond the Contract: Fairness, Observability, and Discretionary Effort	Stephan Geschwind Climate, Conflict, and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Farmer-Pastoralist Interaction	Florian Kirchoff Casting Out the Devil with Beelzebub? On the Interaction of Loss Aversion and Algorithm Aversion
11.30	Peter von Holten Wahres Wissen besteht darin, das Ausmaß der eigenen Unwissenheit zu kennen	Anna Esslinger Labor Supply Response to Benefit Salience Under Risk of Unemployment	Michael Keinprecht Loss Aversion Reduces Spectator Redistribution	Carlo Gallier Cooperation, Inequality, and Equity in the Endogenous Choice of Institutions to Provide Public Goods	Kai Heinrich Removing the Human in Human Resource: The Adverse Effect of AI Use in the Recruitment Process
12.00	Christoph Becker Revising Beliefs in Light of Unforeseen Events	Hendrik Harms How does the Number of Contribution Decisions Influence the Ratchet Effect?	Abdolkarim Sadrieh Universal Difference Aversion	Lennart Reddmann How Environmental Unpredictability Shapes Cooperation and Conflict Within and Between Groups	Holger Rau AI Hiring and the Willingness to Apply for Competitive Positions

Thursday, September 11 (Parallel Session 4)

Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	SR 305	SR 308	SR 310
Time	Preferences and the Environment	Trust and AI	Reciprocity and Prosociality	Conflict and Social Cohesion	Experimental Methods
14.00	Melanie Dunger Paying for a Good Conscience: Are Carbon Offsets Replacing Environmentally Friendly Behavior?	Hao Luo Do we Trust Humans or AI More? Experimental Evidence on Individual and Group Trusting Behavior	Benedicta Hermanns Risk and Prosociality: Can Experimental Decisions Predict Health Behavior?	Dirk Stierand Eroding Cement of Society? The Effect of Polarization on Trust and Solidarity in a Behavioral Experiment	Philipp Külpmann Purified Randomness? Testing Harsanyi's Idea in the Lab
14.30	Samuel Zumthrum Implicit and Explicit Preferences for Conventional and Organic Eggs	Stefanie Kühn Echoes of the Unseen Composer: Authenticity, Emotion and Engagement in the Age of Generative Music	Maximilian Kuntze How Sophisticated is Reciprocity? – Direct and Indirect Reciprocity with Social Cues	Katharina Werner The Impact of Digital Contact on Social Cohesion: A Controlled Experiment in a Post-Conflict Setting	Dominik Ulke Between Non-best Response and Limited Reasoning – Experimental Evidence on Inertia Using Process Data
15.00	René Fahr Environmentally Conscious Managers and Employee Engagement: An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Management's Environmental Attitudes on Employees' Work Effort	Jannik Greif The Sound of Trust - An Experimental Approach to the Strategic Use of Audio Deepfakes	Johann Graf Lambsdorff Reciprocity and In-Group Favouritism: Experimental Evidence on Drivers of Cooperation	Christian Koch News, Trust, and the Radical Right	Johannes Lohse Revealed Preferences for Policy Experiments

Friday, September 12 (Parallel Session 5)

Room	Auditorium 3	Auditorium 4	SR 305
Time	Health	Expectations	Effort and Incentives
09.00	Julia von Hanxleden The Role of Intrinsic Motivation in Healthcare Quality: Insights from a new Experimental Task	Alexander Nieber Framing Effects in Expectation Formation	Lisa Klinkenberg Pay-for-Creativity: Fostering Creativity of Teams through Monetary Incentives
09.30	Johanna Kokot Reciprocity in Medical Treatment Decisions - A Theoretical Model and a Laboratory Experiment	Maik Sattelmaier Profit Tax Uncertainty and Investments: Experimental Evidence from German Firms	Lisa Pütz Omission and Commission in Tournaments: Testing Three Mechanisms to Reduce Sabotage
10.00	Juliane Henneke Health Status and Use of Physician Quality Information in the Outpatient Sector: Results from the KORA-Fit Study	Berivan Gürel Same Cues, Different Views: The Impact of Salient Financial Cues on Investor Decisions	Tibor Neugebauer Communication in Experimental Asset Markets
10.30	Sandra Eichardt The Effects of Advice-Giving on Medical Upcoding — A Laboratory Experiment	Özgür Gürerk Leader Legitimacy and Team Performance	Alexander Fauser Paying for Others' Vaccination: A Study on Social Responsibility

List of Participants

Miguel	Abellán	miguel.abellan@leuphana.de	LU Lüneburg
Susann	Adloff	susann.adloff@ifw-kiel.de	IfW Kiel
Mathilde	Bechdorf	mathilde.draeger@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Christoph	Becker	christoph.becker@awi.uni-heidelberg.de	Universität Heidelberg
Klaus	Beckmann	beckes@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Julian	Benda	julian.benda@uibk.ac.at	Universität Innsbruck
Dmitri	Bershadskyy	dmitri.bershadskyy@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg / Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien
Philipp	Biermann	philipp.biermann@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Anika	Bittner	anika.bittner@tuhh.de	TU Hamburg
Jeannette	Brosig-Koch	jeannette.brosig-koch@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Lilith	Burgstaller	burgstaller@eucken.de	Universität Freiburg / WEI
Christiane	Buschinger	buschinger@uni-mainz.de	JGU Mainz
Hana	Dadic	hana.dadic@unibe.ch	Universität Bern
Christoph	Drobner	christoph.drobner@outlook.de	TU München
Melanie	Dunger	mdunger@uni-bremen.de	Universität Bremen
Sandra	Eichardt	sandra.eichardt@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Jan B.	Engelmann	j.b.engelmann@uva.nl	University of Amsterdam
Anna	Esslinger	esslinger@eucken.de	Universität Freiburg / WEI
René	Fahr	rene.fahr@uni-paderborn.de	Universität Paderborn
Alexander	Fauser	a.fauser@uke.de	Universität Hamburg / HCHE
Björn	Frank	frank@uni-kassel.de	Universität Kassel
Carlo	Gallier	carlo.gallier@thi.de	Ingolstadt UAS
Stephan	Geschwind	stephan.geschwind@uni-passau.de	Universität Passau
Marcus	Giamattei	m.giamattei@fs.de	Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
Nissen	Gleuwitz	nissen.gleuwitz@leuphana.de	LU Lüneburg
Sebastian	Goerg	s.goerg@tum.de	TU München
Johann	Graf Lambsdorff	jlambsd@uni-passau.de	Universität Passau
Jannik	Greif	jannik.greif@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Thomas			
Kevin	Grubiak	Kevin.Grubiak@uni-passau.de	Universität Passau
Berivan	Gürel	berivan.guerel@uni-graz.at	Universität Graz
Özgür	Gürerk	oguererk@uni-koeln.de	Universität zu Köln
Hendrik	Harms	hendrik.harms@tuhh.de	TU Hamburg
Katharina	Hartinger	khartinger@uni-mainz.de	JGU Mainz

Florian	Heine	f.a.heine@vu.nl	Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Timo	Heinrich	timo.heinrich@tuhh.de	TU Hamburg
Kai	Heinrich	kai.heinrich@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Juliane	Hennecke	juliane.hennecke@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Heike	Hennig-Schmidt	hschmidt@uni-bonn.de	University of Bonn
Benedicta	Hermanns	benedicta.hermanns@tuhh.de	TU Hamburg
Benedikt	Herrmann	Benedikt.herrmann@ec.europa.eu	Joint Research Centre
Sönke	Hoffmann	sohoffma@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Michelle	Hörrmann	michelle.hoerrmann@kit.edu	Karlsruher Institut für Technologie
Florian	Irmscher	florian.irmscher@uni-passau.de	Universität Passau
Frederic	Janssen	frederic.janssen@uni-hildesheim.de	Universität Hildesheim
Matthias	Kasper	kasper@eucken.de	Walter Eucken Institut
Michael	Keinprecht	michael.keinprecht@wu.ac.at	Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien
Florian	Kirchhoff	fl.kirchhoff@ostfalia.de	Ostfalia HaW
Lisa	Klinkenberg	klinkenberg.lisa@outlook.de	RWTH Aachen
Christian	Koch	chris.koch@univie.ac.at	Universität Wien
Johanna	Kokot	johanna.kokot@uni-hamburg.de	Universität Hamburg
Janina	Kraus	janina.kraus@leuphana.de	LU Lüneburg
Jan	Krause	jan.krause@economics.uni-kiel.de	Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Maria	Krempl	makrempl@uni-mainz.de	JGU Mainz
Jan Philipp	Krügel	jan.kruegel@uni-hamburg.de	Universität Hamburg
Stefanie	Kühn	stefanie.kuehn@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Philipp	Külpmann	philipp.kulpmann@uni-corvinus.hu	Corvinus University of Budapest
Tim	Kuhn	tim.kuhn@hamvoba.de	Stiftungsberatung Hamburger Volksbank Stiftung und Hamburger Volksbank
Maximilian	Kuntze	maximilian.kuntze@uni-vechta.de	Universität Vechta
Greta	Kyriakidou-Schoolmann	greta.kyriakidou-schoolmann@tu-clausthal.de	TU Clausthal
Thomas	Lauer	thomas.lauer@uni-erfurt.de	Universität Erfurt
Johannes	Lohse	johannes.lohse@leuphana.de	LU Lüneburg
Hao	Luo	hao.luo@uni-goettingen.de	University of Göttingen
Mario	Mechtel	mario.mechtel@leuphana.de	LU Lüneburg
Lydia	Mechtenberg	lydia.mechtenberg@uni-hamburg.de	Universität Hamburg
Christine	Meemann	meemannc@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Tibor	Neugebauer	tibor.neugebauer@uni.lu	Universitat Luxemburg
Andreas	Nicklisch	Andreas.Nicklisch@fhgr.ch	UAS of the Grisons, Chur
Alexander	Nieber	alexander.nieber@uni-hohenheim.de	Universität Hohenheim
Fabian	Paetzel	fabian.paetzel@tu-clausthal.de	TU Clausthal
Lisa	Pütz	lisa.puetz@hrm.rwth-aachen.de	RWTH Aachen University

Holger	Rau	holger.rau@uni-goettingen.de	Universität Duisburg-Essen
Lennart	Reddmann	l.reddmann@csl.mpg.de	MPI for the Study of Crime, Security and Law
Vivien	Reske	vivien.reske@uni-kassel.de	Universität Kassel
Thomas	Rittmannsberger	thomas.rittmannsberger@tum.de	TUM School of Management
Hannes	Rusch	h.rusch@csl.mpg.de	MPI for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, Freiburg
Abdolkarim	Sadrieh	sadrieh@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Maik	Sattelmaier	maik.sattelmaier@uni-mannheim.de	Universität Mannheim
Philip Jan	Schäfer	schaefep@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Iris	Schneider	iris.schneider@tu-dresden.de	TU Dresden
Christoph	Schütt	schuettc@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Julia	Schwarz	j.schwarz@economics.uni-kiel.de	CAU Kiel
Michael	Seebauer	seebauer@coll.mpg.de	MPI zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern
Alexandra	Seidel	alexandra.seidel@ovgu.de	OvGU Magdeburg
Sven A.	Simon	sven.simon@tax.mpg.de	MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
Stella	Simons	stella.simons@org.rwth-aachen.de	RWTH Aachen University
Mey-Ling	Sommer	sommerme@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Martin	Sterner	martin.sterner@tuhh.de	TU Hamburg
Dirk	Stierand	dirk.stierand@uni-oldenburg.de	CvOU Oldenburg
Rika	Stoczek	stoczek@inec.uni-hannover.de	LU Hannover
Blanca	Tena Estrada	blanca.tena@uni-kassel.de	Universität Kassel
Stefan	Traub	traubs@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Dominik	Ulke	dominik.ulke@uni-passau.de	Universität Passau
Joseph	Verbovszky	joseph.verbovszky@hsu-hh.de	HSU Hamburg
Anna	Veri	veri@economics.uni-kiel.de	CAU Kiel
Julia	von Hanxleden	julia.von.hanxleden@uni-hamburg.de	Universität Hamburg
Peter	von Holten	p.vonholten@ostfalia.de	GAU Göttingen
Katharina	Werner	katharina.werner@uni-koeln.de	Universität zu Köln
Julia	Winkelmann	julia.winkelmann@uni-paderborn.de	Universität Paderborn
Isabell	Zipperle	isabell.zipperle@uni-mainz.de	JGU Mainz
Samuel	Zumthurm	samuel.zumthurm@agroscope.admin.ch	Universität Bern / Agroscope

Organizing Team

Local Organizing Team

Christine Meemann, Katrin Peemöller, Christoph Schütt, Mey-Ling Sommer,
Stefan Traub

Nils Zimerman (Veranstaltungsbüro HSU)

Program Committee

Jan Philipp Krügel (Universität Hamburg), Christine Meemann,
Christoph Schütt, Mey-Ling Sommer

Volunteers

Xenia Breiderhoff, Daniela Da Silva, Pauline Halm, Benjamin Hossein, Jennifer
Hübner, Sophia Köhler, Michelle Koenen, Ali Raza, Fabian Rikker, Ana Soliz de
Stange, Maximilian Tegtmeier, Xuyen Tran, Christin Wedra, Yury Zaytsev

If you have any questions, please contact:

gfew-hsu-2025@hsu-hh.de

List of Abstracts

Wednesday, September 10

Parallel Session 1, 15.30 - 17.30

Risk (Auditorium 3)

Motivated Risk Assessments
(Christoph Drobner)

Abstract

Do people form risk assessments to justify their actions? We investigate this question in a field experiment studying the dynamics of risk assessments for visiting a café during the Covid-19 pandemic. By randomly varying the incentive for a visit, we find that participants with a high incentive visit cafés more often and downplay the risk compared to those participants with a low incentive. Importantly, the downplaying happens in anticipation of the visit and without new information, suggesting that the assessment update justifies engagement in risky behavior. This finding is inconsistent with Bayesian updating but consistent with the notion of motivated reasoning.

Breaking the Burning BEV Bias: Overcoming Availability
and Spillover-induced Bias in Fire Risk Perception
(Frederic Janssen)

Abstract

The road transport sector accounts for 16.1% of global greenhouse gas emissions, making the adoption of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) a key climate change mitigation strategy. However, consumer uptake is hindered by several consumer biases. Previous literature has focused on range anxiety and compatibility with driving behaviour. Although safety concerns, particularly the belief that BEVs are more fire-prone than internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs), pose major barriers, the underlying mechanisms and mitigation strategies remain poorly understood. Contrary to what many consumers seem to think, our findings suggest that BEVs are approximately 2.4 times less likely to catch fire than ICEVs. To shed light on this issue, we compare the real-world fire risks of BEVs and ICEVs across countries with high BEV adoption, using ICEVs as the perceived reference point in consumer risk assessments. Next, we conduct a randomised controlled trial (RCT) incorporating a stated choice design to measure the perceived fire risk of BEVs relative to ICEVs. It is hypothesised that consumers overestimate the fire risk of BEVs, driven more by media exposure than actual incident rates. To empirically test this hypothesis, we use a media recall task in the baseline treatment and introduce an over-representation treatment. In the second treatment, we examine whether spillover effects from battery fire incidents involving consumer goods contribute to this over-estimation. Finally, an information-based nudge is employed to mitigate misperceptions. As part of our ongoing work, we are currently programming the RCT using oTree and plan to launch data collection in the coming months.

Intelligence and Measurement Errors in Risky Decision-Making:
Disentangling Risk Attitudes, Rationality, and Noise
(Jan Krause)

Abstract

Although it is often assumed that more intelligent individuals are less risk-averse, empirical evidence on the relationship between intelligence and risk preferences remains mixed. We argue that this inconsistency reflects a narrow focus on risk attitudes and propose a broader conceptualization based on three distinct mechanisms: risk attitudes, normative rationality (i.e., deviations from Expected Utility), and decision noise. To examine how intelligence relates to each component, we conduct two incentivized experiments (N = 369). We combine a validated measure of fluid intelligence with structurally estimated risk preferences under Cumulative Prospect Theory, thereby addressing common sources of measurement error in both constructs. The experimental design covers the gain, loss, and mixed domains, allowing us to test whether effects differ systematically across contexts. Our results show no association between intelligence and either normative rationality or risk attitudes. However, we find a consistent negative relationship between intelligence and decision noise. These findings suggest that intelligence improves the internal consistency of choices under risk but does not affect individuals' underlying preferences. Our findings highlight how construct validity, an often overlooked source of measurement error, can obscure the relationship between intelligence and economic decision-making.

The Effects of an Audience on the Gender Risk-Taking Gap
(Kevin Grubiak)

Abstract

Women remain underrepresented in leadership positions, partly due to gender differences in risk-taking behavior. While these differences are well-documented, recent research highlights the importance of social context - particularly the presence of an audience - in shaping risk preferences. We investigate how the presence of an audience moderates gender differences in risky decision-making using data from the German version of the TV quiz show The Chase, which underwent a natural experiment during the COVID-19 pandemic when its live audience was removed. Preliminary results indicate that female contestants are less likely to choose high-risk options than their male counterparts, and this gender gap widens in the presence of a live audience. To address limitations of the field setting, we propose a complementary lab experiment that manipulates audience conditions in a controlled environment. This dual approach aims to disentangle social image concerns from intrinsic preferences, offering new insights into how public scrutiny influences the gender risk-taking gap in high-stakes decisions.

Norms and Dishonesty (Auditorium 4)

Markets, Social Responsibility, and the Replacement Excuse
(Miguel Abellán)

Abstract

We experimentally study whether the replacement excuse - commonly expressed as "If I don't, somebody else will" - undermines consumer social responsibility. Specifically, we explore whether consumers are more likely to buy a product with a negative externality on a third party if other

consumers in the market can make the same purchase, thereby causing the harm to the third party anyway. We find strong evidence that the replacement excuse negatively affects consumer social responsibility. In our baseline condition (B), where only one single buyer is present and this excuse absent, consumers refrain from buying in over 40% of cases. In contrast, overall purchase frequencies rise significantly in the replacement treatment conditions with two and four buyers (R2 and R4). Most notably, the purchase frequency by the first buyer is significantly higher in R2 and R4 compared to B. Purchases by the first buyer increase by over 21% from B to R2, and by 27% from B to R4. The similar behavior of the first buyer in R2 and R4 suggests that the presence of one additional buyer is sufficient for the replacement excuse to take effect and erode social responsibility. A non-incentivized elicitation of social norms reveals a striking discrepancy between actual behavior and social expectations: most participants buy the product despite considering such behavior as socially inappropriate. Our results challenge the robustness of previous findings and show that as soon as consumers are no longer pivotal in determining the overall market outcome, their behavior changes remarkably – for the worse.

Sanctions and Social Norms (Matthias Kasper)

Abstract

How do legal sanctions shape social norms—beyond deterrence? While laws and social norms often co-evolve, legal sanctions may exert an expressive influence by altering social perceptions of right and wrong. Building on recent work showing that legality alone affects perceived social appropriateness (Lane et al., AER 2023), our study isolates the causal effect of sanctions on social norms. We conduct two online experiments using representative German samples. Participants assess the appropriateness of various behaviors that either fall below or just exceed sanction thresholds, while holding externalities constant. Using a two-step incentivized norm elicitation method (Krupka-Weber, 2013), we find systematic shifts in both personal and social norms at sanction cutoffs—even in the absence of changes in legal status or harm. Our results suggest that sanctions do more than deter—they carry normative weight. Sanctions influence how people judge others' behavior, amplifying the expressive function of law. A larger-scale follow-up study is planned for 2025 to further test these mechanisms across a broader set of domains.

The Effectiveness of List Experiments and the Role of Empirical Expectations (Lilith Burgstaller)

Abstract

As eliciting the true prevalence of tax evasion is challenging, a growing share of the literature relies on list experiments to measure the prevalence of collaborative tax evasion (Kirchner et al. (2013) Doerr & Necker (2021) Burgstaller & Feld (2025)). Despite their frequent use, the effectiveness of list experiments in eliciting the prevalence of sensitive behavior more accurately than direct questions is contested. From a meta-analysis, Ehler et al. (2021) conclude that list experiments work best when applied to “moderately sensitive behavior”. However, it is unclear what constitutes such behavior. In a previous survey, we observed that the estimated prevalence rates of collaborative tax evasion are nearly identical and statistically indistinguishable when measured through a list experiment and a direct question (18% and 20%, respectively) (Burgstaller & Feld, 2025). This implies that either neither estimate is accurate, or both are. While the former would call into question the validity of the list experiment, the latter would imply that respondents do not feel the need to conceal their experience with collaborative tax evasion and are therefore willing to answer both questions truthfully. This interpretation is supported by the finding that

participants in our survey believed on average that 44% of households have experience with collaborative tax evasion. This suggests that respondents perceive collaborative tax evasion as widespread which shapes their empirical expectation, i.e., their belief about what others do (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009). The goal of our online experiment is to examine whether the empirical expectation that a sensitive behavior is common helps account for why a list experiment returns a similar prevalence rate as a direct question. To obtain a true prevalence rate, we focus on the prevalence of lying. For this, we implement a mind game (Greene & Paxton, 2009; Abeler et al., 2019) in a survey-experimental setting. The mind game works as follows: Participants are asked to privately think of a number between one and six and memorize it. The computer then rolls a dice and displays the result to the participants. Participants then report if the number they saw was the number they had memorized and receive a bonus payment if this is the case. Since the probability of a dice roll returning the number that an individual memorized is known (16.67%), the fraction of liars can be estimated from the fraction of individuals that report to have thought of the number the dice returned. To study the effect of an empirical expectation of lying, we randomly assign participants to one of two conditions: Control and Expectation. After observing whether the computer returned the number they had memorized and before reporting the outcome, subjects in Expectation are informed that in a previous version of the mind game, 71% of participants cheated to receive the bonus payment (the fractions are obtained from Bucciol & Piovesan (2011), the treatment setup follows Robert & Arnab (2013)). Subjects in Control do not receive any additional information. We ask whether the dice roll returned the number they had memorized in two ways: Through a list experiment and a direct question. We randomize the order of the direct question and the list experiment. For our main analysis, we compare the results from the list experiment and the direct question to the known fraction of cheaters from the cheating game. This allows us to test the validity of the list experiment without having to rely on the more-is-better assumption. In addition to the two main outcomes, we elicit individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and assess the control group's belief about the fraction of cheaters in the cheating game. In this way we can measure the extent of belief updating resulting from our intervention in the treatment group. Data collection for this project will begin in July 2025 such that results can be presented at the GfEW 2025.

Dishonesty in Complex Environments: Deliberate Lies, Short-cuts, or Accidental Mistakes? (Sven Simon)

Abstract

This paper studies how and why complexity affects dishonest reporting behavior. Compliance with complex reporting standards can be challenging and may lead to accidental mistakes but can also enable systematic self-serving dishonesty. Our experiment disentangles these two causes of non-compliance. Causal identification relies on varying complexity in two distinct regimes: (i) a reporting task, in which subjects have a financial incentive to dishonestly inflate their reports and (ii) an accuracy task, in which subjects are paid to calculate factually correct reports. We find three main results: First, complexity significantly increases the number of factually incorrect reports. Second, complexity leads to more honest errors, but also to a pronounced dishonesty shift. Complexity increases the proportion of intentional lies by 68%. Third, we identify two mechanisms of this dishonesty shift. Considering who cheats in complex environments, we find evidence that individuals with stronger audit and social-image concerns are more dishonest, because they can plausibly claim to have made honest mistakes. With respect to how individuals cheat under complexity, we unveil that some individuals take a shortcut and avoid the compliance costs of complexity altogether just to make a self-serving but potentially dishonest report.

Markets and Innovations (SR 305)

Exclusionary Pricing by State-Owned Enterprises - Experimental Evidence (Florian Heine)

Abstract

State ownership is increasingly being positioned by policymakers to accelerate sustainability transitions. This may create or strengthen dominant State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and SOEs have been flagged in the theoretical literature as being prone to abuse of dominance by means of exclusionary pricing (also referred to as 'predatory pricing'). At the same time, the price level at which incumbent pricing (should) be considered exclusionary and unlawful remains subject to debate in both theoretical and experimental literatures. We design an experimental duopoly market with a dominant incumbent and a non-dominant entrant, where in 3 treatments we compare outcomes in a private market to outcomes in mixed markets, where the dominant firm is an SOE. We observe for exclusionary pricing below marginal cost, below break-even point, and above break-even point. We find strong evidence for exclusionary pricing in both private and mixed markets. This finding is remarkable given the professed rarity of exclusionary pricing in previous experimental research. Furthermore, we find both more and more severe exclusionary pricing in the treatments where the dominant incumbent is an SOE. We record the highest percentage of exclusionary pricing when the SOE is not fully profit driven but also concerned with social welfare. These findings suggest more elaborate monitoring of SOE's competition law compliance is appropriate when creating or strengthening dominant SOEs.

Consumer social responsibility in experimental markets with(out) sellers (Mario Mechtel)

Abstract

We study consumer social responsibility - consumers' willingness to forgo personal gain in order to avoid causing negative externalities. While experimental market studies typically model both supply and demand, a separate literature examines buyer decisions in hypothetical market scenarios. Our study makes a methodological contribution by testing whether the presence of sellers influences socially responsible consumer behavior. Specifically, we ask: Do we need sellers when the primary interest lies in understanding responsible consumption? Results from our experiment indicate that consumer decisions are unaffected by the absence/presence of sellers. Since full market experiments are substantially more complex to implement than consumer choice experiments, our findings suggest that the latter provide a valid and practical tool for studying the determinants of consumer social responsibility.

Fake Reviews in Digital Markets: Fraudulent Behavior and Market (In-)Efficiency (Janina Kraus)

Abstract

Feedback systems are a cornerstone of online markets: they create trust, reduce risks and increase cooperation, thereby increasing efficiency. However, the increasing prevalence of fake reviews threatens to undermine these benefits. Fake reviews lead to market inefficiencies and reduce reliability and trust. In an experimental study, we systematically investigate (i) how fake

reviews affect the efficiency of both the reputation system and market efficiency (welfare) and (ii) how competition affects the usage of fake reviews and market efficiency. In addition, we investigate (iii) how new market entrants and smaller sellers differ in their usage of fake reviews from larger sellers. Our analysis focuses on fraudulent behavior and market inefficiency between treatments and the dynamics of fake review usage. We find that fake reviews reduce market efficiency. However, on markets with more competition, sellers are not more likely to use fake reviews compared to markets with less competition. Comparing different seller types within treatments, we find that small sellers buy fake reviews more often than large sellers. When entering a market, new entrants are more likely to use fake reviews than established sellers. Our paper contributes to the literature on fake reviews by providing causal evidence on the impact of fake reviews on market efficiency and of the role of competition on the prevalence of fake reviews.

The Influence of Prior Experience in the Context of a Technological Shock (Rika Stoczek)

Abstract

The ability to adapt to changing technological conditions is fundamental to long-term growth and innovation. Our study examines how an initial starting point shapes path dependencies and creative outcomes when technological conditions change. We run a two-stage online experiment in which ideators each generate one idea with limited technology and one with full technology. In a between-subjects design, ideators in the full-technology stage either receive no starting point, their own limited-technology idea, or another ideator's limited-technology idea as a starting point. No starting point is ever provided in the limited-technology stage. By comparing idea performance and similarity to the starting point across these three conditions, we isolate (1) how exposure to a starting point guides creative adaptation when new technologies become available, and (2) whether self-generated versus externally provided starting points have distinct effects. Our findings shed light on how personal experience and knowledge impact path dependencies and performance outcomes under a technological shock.

Communication and Cooperation (SR 308)

Beyond Words: Non-Verbal Cues in Virtual Collaborations (Michelle Hörrmann)

Abstract

Virtual communication has become commonplace, especially for geographically dispersed teams collaborating on joint projects despite lacking prior relationships. These teams will likely encounter coordination failures, resulting in low overall cooperation rates. However, non-verbal cues transmitted during communication might help to mitigate this problem. Our study investigates whether and how non-verbal cues in virtual team meetings can foster collaboration. We implemented a weakest-link game in a controlled large-scale online experiment on Prolific. Before playing the weakest-link game, team members participated in a non-game-related virtual team meeting to get acquainted. We systematically varied the availability and amount of non-verbal cues between our treatments during this meeting phase. We expected these cues to be crucial in overcoming strategic uncertainty and fostering group cohesion. Depending on the treatment, the virtual team meeting was an audio-only meeting, an audio meeting with selfies, or a video meeting. We observe significantly higher cooperation in the audio-only and the video

meeting than in the audio meeting enriched with selfies. Static non-verbal cues, thus, had a negative effect on team cooperation. We find that the audio-only and the video meeting led to similar team cooperation and that coordination did not differ between treatments. Our findings shed light on how virtual teams can enhance their collaboration by leveraging the power of non-verbal cues. By understanding the impact of non-verbal cues, organizations can foster stronger connections and achieve more successful outcomes.

Trust, Autonomy & Paternalism: An Experimental Study (Christoph Schütt)

Abstract

Paternalism has been the subject of normative discussions in philosophy, economics, and social sciences for centuries. This discussion is primarily concerned with the extent to which the state or an individual may interfere with another person's freedom of choice. From a positive point of view, this raises three important questions. First, whether individuals are genuinely inclined to intervene in someone else's freedom of choice. Second, whether such paternalistic interventions are accepted by those affected. And finally, third, whether certain factors influence attitudes towards paternalistic interventions. The aim of this study is to investigate one specific factor, i.e., the role of trust. Using an online experiment, we study the extent to which trust plays a role i) in the willingness to accept a paternalistic intervention and ii) in the willingness to paternalistically intervene in another person's freedom of choice.

The More You Know? Consumption Behavior and the Communication of Economic Information (Alexandra Seidel)

Abstract

Splitting available income between saving and consumption is one of the most central economic decisions households have to make. We use a laboratory experiment to shed more light on this decision. Based on a buffer stock saving model, we study the impact of information about the likelihood of future income shocks and different framings of the source of this shock on consumption. Overall, the model performs quite well in predicting the average consumption level in our experiment. Surprisingly, providing additional information about the likelihood of future income shocks tends to even increase the deviation from the optimal consumption path, if at all. Looking at individual behavioral patterns reveals that there is a significant share of participants who reveal a high correlation between their individual consumption and current income, which contradicts the theoretical prediction. Providing additional information about the likelihood of future income shocks reduces the share of rule-of-thumb consumers.

Money or Autonomy? Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment (Jan Philipp Krügel)

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether motivation to work is more likely to be increased by an unconditional monetary gift or by freedom of choice as a non-monetary gift. In our experiment, participants are either assigned to work on one of three real-effort tasks or they are able to choose their preferred task themselves. Furthermore, they either receive an unconditional monetary gift or not. We examine whether both gifts have an effect on effort provision not just within the actual working time (mandatory part), but also on voluntary additional work (voluntary part). Our

findings show that both gifts have no significant effect on voluntary additional work compared to our control treatment. In the mandatory part, a crowding-out effect of motivation occurs if participants receive the monetary gift. This applies in particular if the employer assigns the participants' preferred task. We interpret this negative reaction as an aversion to a controlling (or even paternalistic) behavior on the part of the employer, especially when the employer tries to compensate for this behavior with money. The freedom of choice gift, on the other hand, significantly increases output. However, this can only be attributed to the instrumental component of the gift and not to the intrinsic value.

Thursday, September 11
Parallel Session 2, 9.00 - 10.30

Climate (Auditorium 3)

Future Thinking and Pro-Environmental Behavior
(Maria Krempf)

Abstract

Given the abstractness of the future and the long-time lags between actions and consequences, pro-environmental decision-making is often perceived as complex. We study if and how future thinking – the ability to visually pre-experience personal and detailed future scenarios – affects pro-environmental behavior. To do so, we combine observational data collected via a tailored survey module in the household survey of the German Federal Bank with a laboratory experiment. Crucially, we develop a generative AI tool (“FT tool”) that allows participants to visualize a personal future scenario in the context of climate change to facilitate the mental pre-experiencing process. Then, we test whether future thinking affects incentivized donations to pro-environmental causes and participation in the university’s sustainability day by reducing the perceived distance to the future and allowing for the retrieval of more building blocks in their mental simulation. Results from a pre-study show positive effects of future thinking on (non-incentivized) donations even when interacting with a beta version of the FT tool. Sessions of the main experiment will begin in June 2025.

Visible Tax Dividends and Support for Carbon Pricing: Evidence from Austria
(Julian Benda)

Abstract

Despite scientific consensus on the efficiency of carbon taxes in mitigating the climate crisis, public support for such policies remains limited. Carbon dividends, whereby (part of) the revenues from the tax are distributed to the general population, have been highlighted in the literature as a critical element to increase social support for carbon taxes. This study presents novel findings on the determinants of support for carbon pricing for a representative sample of the Austrian population two years after the introduction of a national carbon tax combined with a highly visible annual lump-sum dividend, the Klimabonus, distributed to all residents. Using a randomized controlled trial (n = 1601), we assess both behavioral and attitudinal measures of support for carbon pricing. Real-life support is captured through donations to an NGO active in raising carbon prices and the signing of a petition addressed to Austria’s Ministry of Environment. We test whether information about the functioning of the tax, and particularly its link to the Klimabonus, can shift knowledge and attitudes about carbon taxes. Our results illustrate how, despite a relatively high share (72.4 percent) of the population being aware of the existence of a carbon tax in Austria, only about 14.3 percent know that its revenues are redistributed back to the population, and how. While treatments marginally improved knowledge—particularly regarding the link between the carbon tax and the Klimabonus—they had no significant impact on support for car-

bon pricing. We discuss potential explanations, including limited belief updating, insufficient message salience, or purposeful disengagement. Our findings underscore the challenges of increasing support for carbon pricing, even when revenue is returned visibly and fairly. The study contributes to the understanding of behavioral and informational barriers in climate policy acceptance.

Perceptions on Climate Leadership: Evidence from a Survey-Experiment in Germany (Philipp Biermann)

Abstract

Advance climate policy contributions by countries or groups of countries may increase or decrease the likelihood of success for an international climate agreement. The focus of the analysis is on how the population assess the effect of governmental advance contributions / pre-commitment on the probability of success of international climate negotiations, and what factors influence this perception. We measure how large the proportion of the population is that believes that advance payments increase the probability of success. We measure how this proportion relates to several socio-economic variables (affiliation with parties, residence, education, age, self-assessment about own information status on climate policy, assessment about the importance of the climate change problem), how the information treatments affect the assessments on success probability, and how the socioeconomic variables and the information treatments interact. We also expect some interaction effects. For instance, the effect of the information about the scientific findings on the main question might interact and depend on the east/west dimension and on the party affiliation, gender, education etc. Our hypotheses are as follows: H1, Descriptive hypothesis: Due to the existing narrative that Germany has to be a leader in climate policy to strengthen its position to claim an international agreement, the majority of the German population believes that advance contributions increase the likelihood of a successful negotiation for an international agreement while a minority doubts that advance contributions have a positive influence on the probability of successful negotiations for an international climate agreement. H2: The higher the level of socio-economic status, the lower the probability that people believe that advance contributions increase the likelihood of successful international climate negotiations. This hypothesis will be tested using linear and non-linear regression models (OLS Logit & Probit ordered Probit) of the variable on how people evaluate the likelihood of successful negotiations on socio-economic outcome variables elicited in the survey. Both linear and interaction effects will be tested throughout the study. H3: The assessment of the contribution of pre-negotiation abatement policies is influenced by framing and priming effects of H3.1) information about Germany's pre-negotiation abatement strategy (the political goal that Germany should become a lighthouse for abatement policies) H3.2) information about the scientific result that those pre-negotiation abatement measures can decrease the probability of a successful international agreement. We are especially interested in the question whether these treatments have an influence on the distribution of beliefs compared to our neutral scenario H3.0) where we ask the same question without one of the treatments from H3.1 and H3.2. Methodologically, we will apply a difference in differences approach to compare the three information treatments. Overall, three information treatments and a "between subjects" design are chosen. These are: One neutral treatment, one with prior information on scientific results about the relationship between pre-commitment and probability for a negotiation success, and one with prior information about the prior upfront investments in Germany.

Age and Gender (Auditorium 4)

All Kind of Social Preferences in the Lab and in the Field
(Benedikt Herrmann)

Banking for Boomers - A Field Experiment on Technology Adoption in Financial Services
(Katharina Hartinger)

Abstract

Digitization in banking is leaving elderly clients at risk of losing access to financial services, but little is known about technology adoption at an advanced age. We develop and evaluate training interventions to foster internet banking adoption in a field experiment with more than 25,000 elderly clients of a large German savings bank, of whom we randomize 333 into training. Our administrative banking panel data allows us to account for selection on observables and assess the sustainability of treatment effects. After the interventions, the share of clients who use internet banking increases by 26 percentage points in the treatment group relative to a matched control group. In terms of sustainable usage, the share of online transactions increases by 13 percentage points and remains elevated four months later. An extensive placebo analysis suggests that as much as 85% of the effect can be causally attributed to the training interventions. We find that training boosts non-technical adoption skills and reduces key adoption barriers. Treatment effects are larger for women and those not in charge of household finances. We further estimate intent-to-treat effects and predict dropout along the entire multi-stage adoption process to shed light on practical considerations when rolling out large-scale technology adoption interventions in this age group. Specifically, we show that the type of training (self-guided versus social learning) impacts dropout differentially despite similar treatment effects overall, with the social learning treatment being more inclusive.

Get-What-You-Want: Gender Differences in Self-Set Salaries?
(Stella Simons)

Abstract

In Germany, the gross hourly income of men was 6 % higher than that of women in 2024 when controlling for factors such as profession or qualifications. One possible explanation for the remaining gender pay gap may be gender differences in salary expectations and negotiations. Therefore, we examine whether gender differences exist in employees' self-set salaries and if so, we explore potential reasons behind them. Identifying gender differences in the comparatively simplified context of self-set salaries could provide valuable insights beyond the complexities of negotiation scenarios. In particular, we examine how salaries are set when a direct comparison to another worker is evident, and when the self-set salary has external effects on another worker's wage (individual treatment vs. group treatment). Interestingly, results clearly show that women set lower salaries than men in the individual treatment. However, no significant gender differences are observed in the group treatment.

Trust and Cooperation (SR 305)

The Divergent Effects of Conflict on Established and Emerging Relationships (Jan Engelmann)

Abstract

As international tensions and economic interdependence rise, trust remains essential for stable social and economic interactions. This preregistered set of two studies (total N = 800) investigates how conflict and cooperation affect trust and trustworthiness in both established and emerging relationships. In Experiment 1, 400 participants recruited via Prolific were randomly assigned to the role of trustor or trustee in a repeated trust game, and to one of two between-subjects conditions: cooperation or conflict. To examine the effects of conflict on established trust, participants first completed five rounds of a standard trust game (TG1), establishing baseline levels of trust and trustworthiness. Pairs then played either the Stag Hunt Game (SHG, cooperation condition) or the Attacker-Defender Game (ADG, conflict condition), with the trustor serving as the defender in the latter. After this intermediate game, participants completed five additional rounds of the trust game (TG2) to assess changes in behavior. After each phase (TG1, ADG/SHG, TG2), participants rated their counterpart's perceived trustworthiness (-3 to +3), emotional state (happiness, anger, betrayal 4-point Likert scale), and perceived social closeness (Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale). Results show that conflict significantly reduced perceived trustworthiness, happiness, and social connection, while increasing feelings of betrayal and anger. These conflict-induced changes in perception and affect were temporary, with all measures returning to near-baseline levels after TG2. However, despite these affective shifts, actual behavioral trust and reciprocity remained largely unchanged between the conflict and cooperation conditions. Experiment 2 omitted the initial trust game to examine how conflict affects the formation of trust in emerging relationships. Results replicated the affective findings from Experiment 1 and, crucially, showed that conflict significantly reduced both trust and reciprocity relative to the cooperation condition. Overall, these findings suggest that conflict has limited impact on already established trust relationships but significantly impairs the formation of trust in emerging partnerships.

Interregional Trust in a Large Country – The Interplay of Regional Distance and Information. First Results of a Large-scale Online Experiment (Heike Hennig-Schmidt)

Abstract

Our paper studies determinants of interregional trust within large countries spelled out by potential behavioral heterogeneity between regions and ingroup-outgroup bias resulting from the interplay of geographical distance and lacking information about other regions. Studying these factors is important but under-researched so far. Pronounced behavioral differences and tensions between regions can contribute to a lack of trust between different parts of a country, which, in turn, can influence economic collaboration and social stability and lead to disintegration instead of cohesion, potential misunderstanding, distrust, non-cooperation, or frustration. To better understand the above dynamics, one would need data from a large country that enables comparing behavior of spatially rather separated but culturally similar people facing different amounts of potentially relevant information when interacting with persons from other locations. Ideally, the population should be largely homogeneous, but large geographical distances and low spatial mobility prevent frequent interaction with each other for real. Russia actually provides such

conditions and thus constitutes a 'natural laboratory' for our controlled behavioral online trust experiment. By spanning 11 time zones, with over 80% of the population being ethnic Russians, a particularly suitable environment is offered for exploring trust and social preferences of people sharing the same nationality and language. We conducted two treatments of an online trust experiment where participants in twelve locations each interact in real time (N=3,001) all over the country. Senders have to state whether they transfer their whole endowment or nothing to each of the twelve responders they may be randomly matched with in a treatment, including their own place. The transfer is tripled and the responder can return any amount or nothing. A prominent example of such a situation are business relations where an investor has to take a risky investment decision in the own or a more or less distant location with more or less information about it. We find a rather pronounced ingroup-outgroup bias in that about 81% of participants transfer their full endowment to own-location peers on average, but only 56% do so when interacting with other locations. Regressions support the descriptive analyses. We also observe inter-regional heterogeneity with the lowest (highest) average percentage of full-amount senders to home-location participants being 62 (96), whereas the percentages for other locations are 43 (66), respectively. One explanation of these numbers comes from regression analysis showing that the probability of sending the full amount decreases significantly in geographical distance, whereas higher knowledge on receiving locations raises the probability. Furthermore, we observe a negative correlation between knowledge intensity and geographical distance up to about 3,000 km, followed by a rather stable relatively low knowledge intensity until the highest geographical distance of 6,815 km. Further research is necessary to intensify our analyses and find additional determinants of interregional trust behavior. Enhancing regional cohesion through information campaigns that overcome the interregional knowledge gap and emphasize common interdependence, may help to decrease ingroup-outgroup bias and discrimination.

Goals or Outcomes: What Drives Conditional Cooperation? (Andreas Nicklisch)

Abstract

Conditional cooperation is a crucial pattern of human behaviour. The conditional response to other's perceived fairness plays an important role in political disputes, economic relations and even legal cases. While subjects matching of their interaction partners' behaviour is well documented, the unresolved issue is the motivation behind this pattern. On the one hand, subjects may have a preference for appropriate outcomes to others' perceived fairness. On the other hand, subjects may want to reward (punish) their interaction partners for nice (mean) behaviour and teach (prevent) an adjustment towards even nicer (meaner) alternatives. We provide an innovative experimental design that allows us to test both motives. Players participate in a sequence of two public goods games by completing the strategy method for a two-dimensional contribution vector. Our results indicate two general classes of players, free-riders and conditional cooperators. Conditional cooperators do not simply match others' contributions if they differ between the two public good games. They overshoot the higher and undercut the lower of the two average contributions. However, the contribution pattern does not differ between the treatment condition with changing interaction partners in the two games and the treatment condition with the same interaction partners in the two games. Thus, the attribution of appropriate outcomes seems crucial for conditional cooperators. In turn, there is no evidence that subjects attempt to teach their interaction partners higher cooperation degrees.

Conflict and Inequality (SR 308)

Extreme Justifications Fuel Polarization (Christiane Buschinger)

Abstract

How does polarization — as measured by mistreatment of political rivals — spread? In an online experiment, participants choose between splitting financial resources equally or discriminating against a member of the opposing political party. We vary the information subjects receive about others' choices and justifications for discrimination. Exposure to extreme justifications for discrimination increases discrimination — particularly in a polarized environment, when many others are already discriminating — and it leads participants to adopt more extreme justifications themselves. Our findings suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic that may fuel polarization: Exposure to extreme statements increases polarization and the prevalence of extreme reasoning.

What Redistribution Preferences Do Right-wing Populist Voters Have? - A Classic Allocator Game vs. an Allocator Game Modified by an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) (Greta Kyriakidou-Schoolmann)

Abstract

In recent years, right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) have gained significant electoral support across European democracies, resulting in their increasing participation in government coalitions. This shift has enabled RWPPs to exert considerable influence over policy agendas playing a critical role in shaping welfare policy when these parties enter government. While extensive literature examines the demographic profiles of RWPP voters and their impact on democratic institutions, their redistributive preferences—especially regarding universal benefits like Universal Basic Income (UBI)—remain underexplored. This study addresses this gap by investigating how right-wing populist attitudes influence support for redistribution and for UBI, with a particular focus to the role of perceived deservingness. Existing research, which typically uses political orientation as a control variable, suggests that RWPP voters often favor welfare support for “deserving” groups (e.g., the elderly) while opposing benefits for “non-earning” groups and migrants. These attitudes, commonly described as welfare chauvinism, reflect a pattern that does not fit neatly within traditional left-right economic ideologies. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that RWPP voters support conditional redistribution and are more likely to oppose universal benefits like UBI, particularly when the beneficiaries are perceived as outgroup members. To test these hypotheses, we conduct a vignette-based third-person-allocation experiment using a randomized within-subjects design on a quasi-representative German sample. Participants decide on monetary transfers between an average German and another person with a varying profile related to residency status (German citizen/immigrant) and employment status (employed/unemployed). A between-subjects treatment introduces a UBI framing to assess attitudes toward unconditional welfare provision. Additional survey data captures demographic variables, political orientation, and broader attitudes toward redistribution. This study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it advances theoretical understanding of the redistributive preferences among RWPP voters—insights critical to anticipating welfare policy developments in countries where these parties enter government. Second, it is the first to empirically assess RWPP voter attitudes toward UBI. By clarifying how notions of deservingness and group identity shape welfare preferences, our findings contribute to ongoing debates about the future of the welfare state in relation to the existing rightward political shift.

Guns, Butter, and Redistribution: An Experimental Study of Inequality & Conflict
(Thomas Rittmannsberger)

Abstract

This study investigates the emergence of peace and investment in arms in a guns-vs-butter conflict framework. We build on the study by Baier et al. (2024 -- GEB) and explore whether allowing players to reduce pre-existing inequalities influences conflict dynamics. Participants engage in a two-player conflict game where one player (the advantaged) begins with more resources than the other (the disadvantaged). In one condition (TRANSFER), players can voluntarily transfer part of their budget before making conflict-related decisions. In the other (NoTRANSFER), this is not possible. We find that advantaged players use transfers to partially reduce inequality, with median transfer levels of 10 tokens (8% of their budget), whereas disadvantaged players transfer little to nothing. However, the mere availability of transfers does not change conflict behavior -- attack rates and investment in arms remain comparable across conditions. Nevertheless, we find suggestive evidence that disadvantaged players who receive a net positive transfer are less likely to attack and invest less in arms. Our findings suggest that simply enabling redistribution does foster peace. Instead, conflict is mitigated only when redistribution reaches a meaningful threshold. This highlights the importance of designing targeted redistribution mechanisms that ensure that disadvantaged groups receive sufficient resources to reduce conflict incentives effectively.

Special Session on Wargaming and Experiments (SR 310)

Wargames are Experiments – Wargames as Experimental Methods in International Relations
(Philip Schäfer & Joseph Verbovsky)

Abstract

In an increasingly complex international order, experimental research methods are gaining importance. This paper argues that wargames - when appropriately standardized - can be conceptualized as experimental designs for research in International Relations. It develops a methodological foundation for wargames as behavioral experiments that simulate strategic interaction under uncertainty, enable counterfactual scenarios, and allow for empirical analysis. Using the game Entanglement as an example, the paper demonstrates how quantitative and qualitative evaluation can be combined to realistically analyze international decision-making processes.

Turning Warfare into a Science: Wargaming in the Laboratory
(Klaus Beckmann)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new strategic wargame based on the well-known “Colonel Blotto” framework. The intention is to capture multi-dimensional warfare, cognitive and hybrid elements as well as economic considerations, all while keeping the game short and simple enough to be played in a one-hour session. As a result, the game can be used for laboratory experiments to

gain new insights into strategic decision-making by humans. Results from the first 300 sessions are reported.

tba.
(n.n.)

Abstract

Thursday, September 11

Parallel Session 3, 11.00 - 12.30

Knowledge and Beliefs (Auditorium 3)

Market Acceptance in a Commodified Society: Are Economics Students Different?
(Blanca Tena Estrada)

Abstract

This paper examines whether studying economics shapes attitudes toward the commodification of societal exchanges. Survey responses from students across various fields, particularly economics, at a German university reveal their views on different markets. Two concerns define the market scenarios: the potential erosion of norms when a good transitions from non-market to market, and the amplification of societal inequality by markets exploiting the disadvantaged. At the same time, two hypotheses arise on the effect of studying economics on evaluating the markets: the self-selection hypothesis, students who support free market will tend to study economics and the indoctrination hypothesis, the study of economic theories influences student's worldview. In three of the seven market transactions assessed, economics students are significantly more likely than non-economics students to find them appropriate. However, no difference is observed between first semester and more advanced economics students, suggesting that studying economics does not indoctrinate students into accepting markets. Besides not ruling out the self-selection hypothesis, a gender effect emerges, with female respondents finding four of the markets significantly less appropriate.

Wahres Wissen besteht darin, das Ausmaß der eigenen Unwissenheit zu kennen
(Peter von Holten)

Abstract

Führt ein höheres Maß an Unwissenheit zu einer höheren subjektiven Sicherheit bei der Abgabe von Aktienkursprognosen? Diese Frage wird im Rahmen eines kontrollierten Laborexperimentes untersucht. 150 Probanden geben Aktienkursprognosen (Richtungsprognosen: steigt oder steigt nicht) für drei reale Aktien ab. Anschließend wird anhand einer Likertskala erfasst, wie sicher sich die Probanden sind, dass sich ihre Prognosen tatsächlich bewahrheiten werden. Danach beantworten die Probanden 50 kapitalmarktrelevante Fachfragen. Die Anzahl der richtigen Antworten zeigt näherungsweise den Stand des börsenrelevanten Fach- und Erfahrungswissens an. Es stellt sich heraus, dass diejenigen, die über wenig Fach- und Erfahrungswissen verfügen, von ihren Prognosen besonders überzeugt sind und vice versa. Dieses Ergebnis stellt sich bei Männern deutlich ein und ist auch statistisch hochsignifikant. Bei Frauen ist dieser Zusammenhang nur schwach ausgeprägt und erweist sich als statistisch nicht signifikant.

Revising Beliefs in Light of Unforeseen Events (Christoph Becker)

Abstract

Bayesian updating is the dominant theory of learning. However, the theory is silent about how individuals react to events that were previously unforeseeable or unforeseen. We test if subjects update their beliefs according to “reverse Bayesianism”, under which the relative likelihoods of prior beliefs remain unchanged after an unforeseen event materializes. Across two experiments we find that participants do not systematically deviate from reverse Bayesianism. However, we do find well-known violations of Bayesian updating. Furthermore, decision makers vary in their ex-ante unawareness depending on the context.

Public Goods (Auditorium 4)

Incurring Personal Costs for a Better Society: Kindness Behind Public Goods Contributions (Dmitri Bershadsky)

Abstract

In this preregistered experiment, we investigate the effect of different marginal per capita returns (MPCR) and group size on contributions in a one-shot public goods experiment. Further, we link both parameters to the psychological concept of behavioral attitude and behavioral costs (Campbell Paradigm) and show how these factors can be interpreted within the dimension of kindness. We apply a between-subjects design concerning group size and use the strategy method to investigate the effect of MPCRs within subjects. To assess kindness, we calibrate the kindness motivation scale. Our results confirm a significant effect of MPCR. The effect of group size is insignificant. Further, we demonstrate that the applied scale can predict contributions to the public good based on the two dimensions and on the salience measure built using them.

Labor Supply Response to Benefit Salience Under Risk of Unemployment (Anna Esslinger)

Abstract

How does the connection of taxation to public benefits influence motivation to work? This study aims to show how improving tax fairness through exchange equity can influence the labor-leisure decision. We present a model of tax and benefit (mis)-perception. In this model, payoff maximizing work effort increases when the perceived tax burden decreases. Among other mechanisms, increasing the salience of the benefit of taxation, as well as the probability of receiving the benefit, decreases the perceived tax burden. We use a real-effort online experiment to test the suppositions of the model. In the experiment, participants work in a simulated labor market, where they face taxation and a risk of unemployment. Their tax directly funds an unemployment benefit, available to any participant that becomes unemployed. Treatment differs across participants in how they are informed of the benefit. One treatment group receives no information on the benefit, one treatment group receives information on the benefit in which the connection between the tax and benefit is clear, and one treatment group receives the same information on the benefit and additional information on how to accrue the benefit. Throughout the rounds of the experiment, the risk of unemployment (and therefore the probability of receiving the benefit) fluctuates. We measure the number of tasks completed as a proxy for

productivity and motivation to work. Additionally, we elicit their perceived tax burden, motivation to work more or less, and desire to opt out of the tax and transfer system in a post-experimental survey. The experiment will be run in early Summer 2025.

How Does the Number of Contribution Decisions Influence the Ratchet Effect?

(Hendrik Harms)

Abstract

A pilot study with 49 graduate students validated the study's experimental design. The data collection will be completed prior to the conference, and the results will be presented at the conference.

Fairness and Redistribution (SR 305)

Beyond the Contract: Fairness, Observability, and Discretionary Effort

(Mathilde Bechdolf)

Abstract

People generally sign an employment contract when joining an organisation. At the same time, they often enter into a social contract—an implicit or explicit agreement to go beyond the formal job description to support the organisation when needed. Such behaviours, known as organisational citizenship behaviours (OCBs), include volunteering for non-contractual tasks that are essential for institutional functioning but not formally assigned. Because these contributions are governed by the social rather than the formal contract, individuals can opt out at low personal cost. In this study, we investigate two factors that influence individuals' willingness to engage in discretionary organisational citizenship behaviours. First, we examine the role of perceived fairness in compensation and how it affects agents' motivation to take on additional, non-mandatory tasks. Second, we explore the importance of information transparency in the principal-agent relationship—specifically, whether agents are more likely to engage in discretionary effort when they know their actions are observable by the principal. To address these questions, we employ an experimental design using an adapted principal-agent game in the lab. Participants are assigned to roles and complete both contractual and discretionary rounds of an effort task. Fairness perceptions emerge endogenously through the principal's choice of payoff allocation, while we experimentally vary the degree of information available to the principal. This design allows us to isolate the motivational mechanisms behind voluntary contributions in organisational settings.

Loss Aversion Reduces Spectator Redistribution

(Michael Keinprecht)

Abstract

I use an online experiment with a within-subjects design to show that redistribution decisions by third parties are affected by loss aversion. In the experiment, a third party (i.e., spectator) decides for two other people between a status quo and an alternative distribution. The status quo is known to the participants, unequal and purely due to luck. The alternative distribution varies for

each treatment in the gains and losses, and is only known to the spectator. Overall, spectators are 7%-points less likely to redistribute from a status quo to an alternative if the alternative entails a loss for one party, even if inequality aversion, maximin preferences and efficiency pull in the opposite direction. This effect is stronger the higher the loss is compared to the gain and the higher the individual loss aversion of the spectator. The key contribution is to disentangle loss aversion from pure status quo bias and other social preferences, such as inequality aversion, efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and rank reversal aversion in multiple loss scenarios.

Universal Difference Aversion (Abdolkarim Sadrieh)

Abstract

Individuals have been shown to exhibit aversion towards inequalities of their own payoffs compared to those of others. In this paper, we claim that the dislike for inequality goes beyond the payoff differences with ego-involvement. The concept of universal difference aversion (UDA) that we outline in this study also includes a dislike for payoff inequalities amongst others. We introduce a model that includes UDA as an element of the decision-maker's utility function in a formal framework. We find strong support for the presence of UDA in our laboratory experiments. We also conduct an experiment with a broader population to test whether UDA also survives the competition by in-group favoritism towards members of the natural social groups. Our field experiment shows that only strong social identities can reduce the prevalence of UDA type allocation choices.

Conflict and Cooperation (SR 308)

Climate, Conflict, and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Farmer-Pastoralist Interaction (Stephan Geschwind)

Abstract

In the Sahel region, conflicts between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers have intensified, disrupting what was once a largely symbiotic relationship. Historically, pastoralists fertilized farmland with their herds during the dry season, while gaining access to post-harvest forage. Today, shifts toward earlier or extended seasonal migration can lead to crop damage and eroded trust, escalating tensions. Information campaigns highlighting climate-driven shifts in migration are proposed as a conflict mitigation tool, yet empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains scarce. We design a lab experiment that simulates this relationship as a repeated multi-stage game. Participants interact as farmer and pastoralist in groups of two across six rounds, alternating between real-effort tasks representing seasonal productivity and trust games measuring cooperation. Pastoralist effort in the dry season enhances farmer productivity in the rainy season, creating ecological interdependence. Strategic early entry increases short-term gains for pastoralists but lowers returns for the farmer. In later rounds, a climate shock asymmetrically weakens the symbiosis, revealing the impact of collapsing cooperation. By varying whether this shock is publicly or privately known, we examine how information asymmetries affect trust. Our results highlight the fragility of cooperation and identify conditions where information campaigns can mitigate conflict.

Cooperation, Inequality, and Equity in the Endogenous Choice
of Institutions to Provide Public goods
(Carlo Gallier)

Abstract

Mitigating climate change is a global cooperation problem that requires collective action by sovereign and heterogeneous agents. In this paper, we test how the willingness of sovereign and heterogeneous agents to form a coalition to provide a public good – such as climate change mitigation – depends on both how the corresponding costs are shared within the coalition and how the decision to share the costs is made. Burden sharing rules can range from equal contributions from all members to fully proportional contributions based on members' endowments. The rules are either chosen democratically by the group members themselves or imposed exogenously. Our findings show that participants behave strategically when deciding whether to form a coalition. Richer participants try to avoid high obligations and are more likely to join a coalition when the burden sharing rule prescribes that the costs are equally distributed. Participants' behavior within the coalition depends on whether the burden sharing rule is chosen democratically or externally imposed. When burden sharing rules are externally imposed, richer participants – who benefit from an equal cost distribution – contribute more to the public good than what is socially optimal. This reduces inequalities but comes at the expense of efficiency. When the burden sharing rules are democratically chosen, they are less willing to reduce inequalities.

How Environmental Unpredictability Shapes Cooperation
and Conflict Within and Between Groups
(Lennart Reddmann)

Abstract

Climate change can make the environment unpredictable and intergroup conflict more prevalent. At present, however, how climate variability and environmental unpredictability shape conflict between groups and communities remains poorly understood. Here we address as a possible micro-level mechanism that increasing environmental unpredictability shifts individuals away from cooperation within their groups and towards coalitionary attacks on outgroups. We tested this preregistered hypothesis in an incentivized laboratory experiment. Individuals ($n = 168$) in three-person groups had the option to generate wealth for their group by (i) cooperating on their group's commons or (ii) seeking rents from outgroups by investing in coalitionary attacks on exploitable outgroups. Environmental unpredictability was simulated by making the returns of group commons (un)predictable. As expected, unpredictability reduced group cooperation and increased contributions to coalitionary attacks beyond what could be expected from rational payoff-maximizing individuals. Coalitionary attacks were also better coordinated under environmental unpredictability, suggesting that environmental unpredictability fosters parochialism, in which individuals engage in conflict with outgroups to benefit their ingroup. Results suggest that environmental unpredictability threatens peaceful intergroup relations because it fuels parochialism, and the willingness to serve the ingroup by seeking outside rents and joining coalitions for conflict with neighboring groups.

AI (SR 310)

Removing the Human in Human Resource: The Adverse Effect of AI Use in the Recruitment Process (Kai Heinrich)

Abstract

The integration of artificial-intelligence (AI) systems into recruitment—initially for résumé screening and increasingly for interviews and final selection—is accelerating because automation can process a global applicant pool efficiently (Langer et al., 2019). A large recruiter survey by Tidio (2025) reports that 85 % of recruiters expect AI to replace parts of hiring, and 68 % believe it will eradicate unintentional bias. Yet, empirical studies still highlight fairness risks: disadvantages for people with disabilities (Tilmes, 2022), persistent gender and racial bias (Njoto et al., 2022 Di Stasio & Heath, 2020), and even misleading diversity scores (Alexander III et al., 2025). Thus, while AI promises efficiency, its equity implications remain contentious. Academic interest in AI and human-resource management has grown sharply (Pan & Froese, 2023), but candidate reactions remain under-examined, and existing findings are contradictory. Horodyski (2023) reports positive perceptions, and Van Esch et al. (2019) argue firms need not invest in reducing applicant anxiety. By contrast, Köchling et al. (2022) observe higher feelings of “creepiness” and lower perceived opportunity when AI appears later in hiring, although their small study did not measure willingness to apply. To clarify applicant behaviour, we conducted a preregistered online experiment with 1,600 Prolific participants 1503 remained after attention checks. Each participant read a job advertisement and then rated willingness to apply, organisational attractiveness, and perceived procedural fairness. The advertisement’s hiring process varied across four versions: human only AI used for preselection AI used throughout and AI used throughout with an explicit statement that it was trained for fairness by excluding sensitive attributes such as gender or race. This design was implemented for both a high-skill position aimed at graduates with experience and a low-skill assistant role shown to non-graduates. For the high-skill job, merely stating that AI would screen résumés significantly reduced willingness to apply and perceptions of fairness. The decline was strongest among respondents with below-median technological affinity but remained significant for more tech-savvy participants. Mediation analysis shows that lower fairness ratings largely explain the drop in willingness. For the low-skill role, AI confined to preselection had no effect on willingness, whereas full automation reduced it, and the added fairness assurance slightly backfired, particularly among less tech-oriented respondents. Overall, AI involvement lowers both perceived fairness and the inclination to apply, with effects most pronounced in skilled labour markets where firms already struggle for talent. Resistance is not merely technophobia even candidates comfortable with technology prefer human judgment in consequential decisions. Employers hoping to accelerate recruitment through algorithms may instead narrow their applicant pool unless they can restore confidence in the fairness and humanity of AI-driven hiring. Field studies tracking actual applications and longitudinal research on attitudes toward algorithmic management are needed to determine whether this scepticism persists as AI becomes more common in practice. In addition to presenting this first study, we expect to have results from further studies that aim to mitigate some of the adverse effects we have observed. We therefore would like the opportunity to participate in the GfEW annual conference to discuss our findings and especially future research directions.

AI Hiring and the Willingness to Apply for Competitive Positions (Holger Rau)

Abstract

This study examines how AI involvement in hiring processes affects individuals' willingness to apply for competitive positions. Using a controlled online experiment with 1,191 participants, we manipulated the degree of algorithmic involvement across four conditions: human-only decisions, human advised by ChatGPT, ChatGPT advised by human, and ChatGPT-only decisions. We also varied whether candidate gender information was disclosed to evaluators. Our findings reveal systematic algorithm aversion in competitive job applications. Application rates drop significantly when ChatGPT makes hiring decisions alone, with men decreasing by 7 percentage points and women by 10 percentage points compared to human-only evaluation. This aversion extends beyond fully automated decisions to include hybrid human-AI configurations. Importantly, this effect varies substantially by individual competitiveness. Non-competitive candidates show the strongest deterrence, with men decreasing by 16 percentage points and women by 12 percentage points when facing AI evaluation. In contrast, competitive candidates, particularly men, demonstrate resilience to algorithmic evaluation. Hybrid approaches provide partial remediation: human-led evaluations with ChatGPT advisory input restore men's application rates to within 2 percentage points of purely human evaluation, while women remain consistently sensitive to any form of AI integration.

Casting Out the Devil with Beelzebub? On the Interaction of Loss Aversion and Algorithm Aversion (Florian Kirchoff)

Abstract

The phenomenon of algorithm aversion can be defined as a behavioral anomaly whereby individuals exhibit a tendency to distrust the efficacy of algorithmic systems and instead favor the input of human judgment. Consequently, subjects may fail to achieve their optimal potential benefit. The objective of this study is to make a contribution to the question of how algorithm aversion can be reduced. The present study employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the potential contribution of loss aversion, an extensively researched behavioral anomaly, to the reduction of algorithm aversion. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true: the willingness to use an algorithm that is demonstrably more efficient than a human expert actually declines when there is a risk of loss when making a decision. This finding aligns with other research results indicating that algorithm aversion is more prevalent when the potential consequences are more severe. To promote the adoption of algorithm-based systems, it may be more effective to highlight the potential gains associated with their use rather than positioning them as tools for loss avoidance.

Thursday, September 11

Parallel Session 4, 14.00 - 15.30

Preferences and the Environment (Auditorium 3)

Paying for a Good Conscience: Are Carbon Offsets Replacing Environmentally Friendly Behavior?
(Melanie Dunger)

Abstract

This paper investigates whether carbon offset payments substitute individual pro-environmental behavior (PEB). While offsetting CO₂ emissions is increasingly popular, it remains unclear how such compensation mechanisms affect individuals' engagement in environmentally friendly activities. Based on a laboratory experiment, we investigate the behavioral relationship between actual CO₂ offsetting and a specific costly PEB, as well as the differential effects of offsetting and PEB on subjective well-being. In our novel PEB elicitation task, participants choose between an environmentally friendly option (requiring time and effort) and a harmful one (associated with real CO₂ emissions and monetary gains or losses). Subsequently, they can voluntarily offset the emissions caused. Results show that while higher costs reduce PEB, giving subjects the information that they can offset their CO₂ emissions does not significantly crowd out PEB. Moreover, PEB – but not offsetting – has a positive correlation with happiness.

Implicit and Explicit Preferences for Conventional and Organic Eggs
(Samuel Zumthrum)

Abstract

Cunningham and de Quidt (2024) introduced a theoretical framework for identifying implicit preferences. We are among the first to test this framework by applying it to the context of organic food consumption, where we examine both explicit and implicit preferences. While many individuals express explicit preferences for organic food products likely due to self and social image concerns, their purchasing behavior often reflects preferences for cheaper conventional alternatives. To explore this discrepancy, we conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment in which participants stated their willingness to pay for six boiled, colored eggs presented side-by-side in three joint evaluations. By systematically varying product attributes (organic versus conventional and an additional attribute, the painting type), we tested whether individuals adhere to explicit preferences for organic eggs when the eggs differ only with respect to one attribute (organic versus conventional) but revert to implicit preferences for the conventional eggs when an additional attribute (different painting type) dilutes their reasoning. Furthermore, as people may publicly prefer organic eggs (explicit preference) but privately favor conventional eggs (implicit preference), the experiment consisted of two contextual treatments. A public treatment in which individual evaluations were revealed at the end of the experiment to the other participants and a private treatment where the individual evaluations remained concealed. The study offers insights on how the implicit preference framework can explain the discrepancy between stated and revealed preferences for organic food and may guide interventions towards more sustainable food consumption.

Environmentally Conscious Managers and Employee Engagement: An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Management's Environmental Attitudes on Employees' Work Effort (René Fahr)

Abstract

There is a vast amount of research that proves positive influence of corporate social responsibility on employees' engagement (Koppel and Regner, 2012 Kajackaite and Sliwka, 2020). Although organizations often officially endorse sustainability in their mission statements, personal attitudes and values of managers regarding environmental concerns are frequently left unexplored and uncommunicated to the workforce. This leaves a critical gap in our understanding of how leadership's personal beliefs may shape employees' work performance. We intend to bridge this research gap by answering the question: How do pro-environmental concerns of a manager, when clearly communicated, impact employees' work effort? Through experimental analysis, we aim to contribute valuable insights that can inform both academic discourse and practical managerial strategies, fostering a more comprehensive understanding of the factors shaping organizational performance. The experimental design partially relies on the design of Kajackaite and Sliwka (2020) who investigated the relation between readiness of a manager to spend money on social causes and employees' motivation. However, we focus on how personal environmental concerns of leadership can influence employees' work effort. The experiment is conducted online and consists of two parts that take part on different days – a short pre-experimental screening survey and an experiment itself. In the first part participants are presented with six texts that include statements about views, values, and behavior regarding environmental sustainability. The second part involves actual experimental interaction. Participants are grouped into pairs: Player A receives a role of an employee and Player B – a role of a manager. Only those participants, who according to Part 1 of the experiment demonstrate positive environmental attitudes, are assigned a manager role. The experiment proceeds as follows: first, Player "Employee" conducts the real effort task. The results of this task generate "resources of the company". Then Player "Manager" is informed about how many resources they have available based on the employee's previous effort. The manager then decides which part of these resources to keep in the company for profit generation purposes and which to donate to the charity with an environmental focus. Manager's payment depends on this decision – the more manager decides to donate, the lesser is their payment at the end. We expect that employees, who are informed about their managers' environmental attitudes, will perform better than those who do not possess such information (H1a), and this effect to be stronger when agents receive fixed payment (H1b). Additionally, employees whose attitudes align with those of a manager will show higher performance than those whose attitudes are different (H2a), and this difference is bigger in "No Incentives" treatment (H2b). Besides, we supposed that employees with strong environmental concerns show higher effort than those, whose concerns are weaker regardless of the information available (H3a) and type of payment (H3b). The experiment was conducted between March and April 2025 using the Prolific online platform, yielding a total of 340 observations. While participants did perceive differences in the environmental attitudes of their Manager", their effort remained unaffected by either the type of information provided or the payment type. While prior work (e.g., Kajackaite & Sliwka, 2020) demonstrated that managers' pro-sociality can enhance employee motivation, our findings suggest that pro-environmental signals may not operate similarly. Environmental values and attitudes, while being important personally, may not yet translate into motivation at the workplace.

Trust and AI (Auditorium 4)

Do We Trust Humans or AI More? Experimental Evidence on Individual
and Group Trusting Behavior
(Hao Luo)

Abstract

Trust plays an important role in almost all human relationships. While individuals often act as decision-makers, many critical decisions are made collectively by groups, such as governments, firms, committees, or families. Importantly, findings from individual-level experiments cannot simply be generalized to group-level behavior, as group dynamics often lead to distinct patterns of trust. At the same time, the rapid integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into various domains has shifted many interactions from human-human to human-AI. AI systems like ChatGPT are increasingly present in daily life, supporting professional tasks like scheduling, data analysis, and translation, while also providing personalized recommendations for shopping, travel, and entertainment. This raises the question of whether the dynamics of trust in these contexts differ from traditional human interactions. Previous studies have primarily examined either the trust dynamics between groups and individuals in human-human settings or individual trust in AI. This study extends prior findings by addressing two key questions: (i) How do individual and group trust behaviors compare when the trustee is a human versus ChatGPT? (ii) Do individuals or groups show different levels of trust toward ChatGPT compared to a human trustee? To answer these questions, we implemented a one-shot Trust Game (TG) using a 2x2 experimental design, varying the roles of trustors (individuals or groups) and trustees (humans or AI, represented by ChatGPT) across four treatment groups. In the TG, trustors (senders) decide how much of an initial 10-token endowment (1 Token = 0.25€) they want to send to the trustees (receivers). The amount sent is tripled, and trustees then decide how much of the tripled amount to return to the trustors. In the first treatment (I-I), participants were randomly assigned as either trustor or trustee and played the TG as individuals. In the second treatment (G-I), participants were randomly assigned as trustors in groups of three or as individual trustees. Groups had up to 10 minutes to reach a collective decision on the amount to send to the trustee. In the third (I-AI) and fourth treatment (G-AI), ChatGPT acted as the trustee, with individual trustors in I-AI and groups of three trustors in G-AI. The experiment was conducted in BonnEconLab and MPI Decision Lab in Bonn, Germany, with 318 participants during November and December 2024. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four groups. Decisions made during the experiment were incentivized, in addition to a guaranteed show-up fee of 10€. In total, there are 30 independent observations for I-I and I-AI, 33 for G-I, and 32 for G-AI. We find that, overall, both groups and individuals trust ChatGPT more than human trustees. Notably, no individuals or groups send zero to ChatGPT, while four individuals and three groups send zero to the human trustee. Groups, as senders, transfer larger amounts than individuals in both the human and ChatGPT treatments. However, these differences are not statistically significant. When ChatGPT acts as the trustee, groups send statistically significantly larger amounts than individuals.

Echoes of the Unseen Composer: Authenticity, Emotion and Engagement
in the Age of Generative Music
(Stefanie Kühn)

Abstract

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing the creation and consumption of music. According to the IMS Business Report, over 60 million users engaged with AI music tools in 2024, and one in ten listeners has already experimented with composing music using such systems (IMS, 2025). While technologists praise this creative empowerment, listener surveys reveal widespread skepticism: many audiences demand clear labelling of AI-generated tracks and associate such music with a perceived lack of emotional depth or authenticity. Research in music cognition shows that listener expectations shape both aesthetic judgement and emotional response (Hernandez-Olivan et al., 2022 Gioti, 2021). Yet it remains unclear whether AI-generated music is only devalued when disclosed, or whether AI-generated music is processed differently, even in the absence of any source information. Previous studies have identified an “AI-composer bias”: otherwise identical tracks are rated significantly lower when listeners are informed that AI generated them (Ansani et al., 2020 Hong, 2022 Shank et al., 2023). However, these studies typically reveal the music’s origin before playback and do not examine individual listener traits such as openness to technology or musical expertise in detail. Drawing on Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, we hypothesize that disclosing AI authorship after listening may intensify adverse reactions, as listeners are forced to reassess their emotional or aesthetic response considering an unexpected source (Festinger, 1957). In contrast, the absence of any source information may reduce bias and encourage listeners to evaluate the music based only on its acoustic features. To explore these questions, we plan to conduct a 3 x 2 between-subjects online experiment on SoSci Survey. A sample of approximately 1,200 Prolific participants is randomly assigned to hear either a human-generated (SoundCloud) or AI-generated (Suno) 30-second music excerpt in one of three disclosure conditions: no disclosure, disclosure before listening, or disclosure after listening. Participants first report their genre preferences using the Music Preference Questionnaire (Sikkema, 1999) and their self-rated musical expertise. After listening, they evaluate the excerpt based on musical quality, emotional expressiveness, and willingness to stream or pay, using validated instruments (Hong et al., 2022 Ansani et al., 2024). Individual differences such as AI familiarity (Sun et al., 2024), technology affinity (ATI-S Wessel et al., 2019), and demographic background are included as moderators. In addition, we measure the perceived relationship to the artist using an adapted version of the Parasocial Interaction Scale (Rubin et al., 1985) to investigate whether knowing the excerpt was generated by AI disrupts the imagined connection between the listener and the artist. We expect this parasocial disruption to contribute to reduced emotional resonance and lower engagement, particularly among participants with a high affinity for music or strong genre loyalty. Data collection is scheduled to take place at the end of June 2025. We will conduct analysis using ANOVAs and interaction regressions to test for main effects and moderation. The study is preregistered and follows open science standards. This research offers timely theoretical and practical contributions. By isolating the role of disclosure timing, it provides nuanced insight into how AI-generated music is evaluated, not just based on sound, but on the perceived origin of the music. Our findings aim to inform both academic debates on human-computer creativity and real-world labelling practices in the evolving music industry.

The Sound of Trust - An Experimental Approach to the Strategic Use of Audio Deepfakes (Jannik Thomas Greif)

Abstract

Advancements in artificial intelligence have enabled the creation of highly realistic audio deepfakes, raising concerns about their potential use in scams, romance fraud, and other exploitative schemes. This study investigates the strategic use of audio deepfakes to generate trust in a two-player trust game with one-sided pre-play communication. I examine how authentic and artificial voices influence trust and whether deepfakes are utilized to exploit this trust. Results show that artificial voices significantly affect trust: Artificial female voices are perceived as more trustworthy than artificial male voices. This perception transfers to trust decisions, as trust is higher for artificial female voices compared to artificial male voices and authentic voices. Additionally, male speakers are more likely to select artificial female voices than female speakers are to select artificial male voices. Despite this strategic voice selection, there is no evidence of trust exploitation, as return rates remain consistent across authentic and artificial voices. These findings highlight the role of voice-based self-representation and deepfakes on trust in digital interactions.

Reciprocity and Prosociality (SR 305)

Risk and Prosociality: Can Experimental Decisions Predict Health Behavior? (Benedicta Hermanns)

Abstract

Preventive behavior is crucial for containing the spread of infectious diseases, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This study investigates whether experimentally elicited attitudes toward risk and prosociality can predict health-related behaviors during the pandemic in seven European countries. Two online experiments were conducted, comprising a total of four different conditions with varying incentives regarding risk and prosociality. The results, based on data from over 2,400 participants, showed that experimental decisions from both experiments significantly predict health-related behaviors. Experiments solely on risk-taking predicted behaviors focused on avoiding one's own infections. Experimental measures that incorporated prosocial aspects were strong predictors of behaviors aimed at preventing others from becoming infected. The findings emphasize the importance of considering prosocial motives when studying health behaviors and developing effective public health policies. Additionally, the experimental decisions were able to outperform general survey measures on risk and prosociality. This underlines the value of framed experimental tasks in order to elicit preferences.

How Sophisticated is Reciprocity? – Direct and Indirect Reciprocity with Social Cues (Maximilian Kuntze)

Abstract

We investigate direct and indirect reciprocity in a novel comprehensive experimental setting. The first decision is about a distribution of an endowment between two persons (A and B). Two people can make this decision, person A and an independent party (D) with no monetary incentives in the entire experiment. The choice of player D provides a reference point which indicates a social norm. Four different experimental settings vary the information about these decisions to the other

players. They observe either one or both decisions, always learning which has been payoff relevant. In step two, we deploy the strategy method to identify whether and how the recipient (B) and an observer (C) respond to this information in a dictator game. More specifically, we look at direct reciprocity (a transfer from B to A), upstream indirect reciprocity (a transfer from B to another participant C), downstream indirect reciprocity (a transfer from C to A) and contagion (a transfer from C to B). Our preliminary results provide evidence for direct and downstream indirect reciprocity but show no effects for upstream indirect reciprocity. The reference points set by the third party have no strong or systematic effects. These insights suggest that more complex reciprocity motives and social reference are less relevant in economic interactions.

Reciprocity and In-Group Favouritism: Experimental Evidence on Drivers of Cooperation (Johann Graf Lambsdorff)

Abstract

How can the human capacity to cooperate be explained when evolutionary selection favors individual success? This study investigates the question by integrating leading theories on reciprocity and in-group favoritism into a unified experimental framework. While each of these mechanisms has independent empirical support, their relative strength and interaction under strong group identity and one-shot conditions remain unclear. We address this gap using a three-phase lab experiment centered on a novel four-player trust game. In Phase 1, participants form group identities through 15-minute group-building tasks, including puzzle-solving and inter-group competition, with group identity strength validated via the IOS11 scale. In Phase 2, each trustor is paired with three recipients, two from one group and one from another, and allocates money across six pre-set distribution options. Phase 3 applies a strategy method to elicit recipients' back-transfers under all possible trustor decisions. Results reveal strong evidence for direct reciprocity, shown by higher returns to trustors, and in-group favoritism, shown by preferential transfers to group members. Crucially, the two mechanisms operate independently, with no significant interaction, and minimal support for parochial, indirect or network-based reciprocity. These findings support theories of multilevel selection, suggesting that both individual- and group-level evolutionary processes shape cooperative behavior simultaneously.

Conflict and Social Cohesion (SR 308)

Eroding Cement of Society? The Effect of Polarization on Trust and Solidarity in a Behavioral Experiment (Dirk Stierand)

Abstract

While trust is the expectation that others will cooperate and forego the temptations of egoism, solidarity is the willingness to help people in need who are victims of outside influences. Trust and solidarity are elemental components of social cohesion and thus constitute the cement of a cooperative society. Recent years have seen a rise in political polarization both among political elites as well as among citizens in most democracies. In this study, we investigate how affective polarization affects trust and solidarity. While most of the existing research focuses on attitudinal measures in survey research, we conduct an online experiment with a sample of German citizens to examine the behavioral implications of affective polarization in a trust game and a solidarity

game. Our participants learn about several characteristics of their counterparts in the experimental games such as their age, gender, region of residence (Bundesland) and their party preference. Our findings show that political identities have a strong effect on trust. Trust is significantly lower among individuals with different party preferences. Political identities have a significant yet smaller impact on solidarity among individuals, as well. Hence our experiment shows mixed results concerning the effect of polarization on social cohesion. In regard to the German party system, we observe a rift between voters of the right-wing populist AfD and voters of all other parties.

**The Impact of Digital Contact on Social Cohesion:
A Controlled Experiment in a Post-Conflict Setting
(Katharina Werner)**

Abstract

How can digital intergroup contact reduce polarization in conflict-affected societies? In the context of civil intergroup conflict, effective reconciliation strategies are crucial for restoring social cohesion. While intergroup contact has been found to help, little is known about the mechanisms through which it reduces polarization, nor about the effectiveness of digital contact formats, which remain underexplored despite their scalability and low cost. To address this gap, we conduct a controlled lab-in-the-field experiment in a polarized post-conflict setting in Indonesia, designed to isolate the effects of different forms of digital intergroup contact. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three treatments: (1) free communication, (2) conflict-focused discussion, and (3) collaboration on a joint project – or to a no-contact control group. We assess behavioural polarization using two standard behavioural measures: intergroup cooperation (via a multilevel public goods game) and out-group trust (via a trust elicitation task). We find that only free communication significantly reduces polarization and enhances social cohesion across both measures and two locations. In contrast, conflict-focused discussion and joint project collaboration show weaker and less consistent effects. These findings challenge the traditional contact theory assumption that a common goal is necessary for effective interactions. Sentiment analysis and machine-learning evaluation of communication protocols suggest that free communication generates more positive emotional responses, which may underlie its effectiveness. This study contributes to the growing (field) experimental literature on polarization by identifying scalable, evidence-based digital strategies for reconciliation and social repair.

**News, Trust, and the Radical Right
(Christian Koch)**

Abstract

Populist right-wing parties have become increasingly radicalized around immigration in many developed countries in recent years. We study (de-)radicalization of radical right (RR) voters through exposure of slanted (i.e., one-sided) news. In an online experiment in Austria, we provide RR voters with slanted news on the effect of immigration on the welfare state. We find that exposure to anti-immigration news further radicalizes RR voters, reinforcing extreme views. In contrast, pro-immigration news has no significant effect. Surprisingly, balanced news – presenting both sides – reduces radicalization. Pro-immigration news are more effective when paired with opposing views. We argue that trust in news media shapes how RR voters interpret information that contradicts their priors. Balanced coverage enhances credibility, increasing openness to opposing arguments.

Experimental Methods (SR 310)

Purified Randomness? Testing Harsanyi's Idea in the Lab (Philipp K lpmann)

Abstract

Harsanyi's (1973) purification theorem suggests that mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) can often be interpreted as pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria in a game with small private payoff perturbations. We test this idea experimentally by implementing a Bayesian game in which participants face individual-specific payoff shocks. Our study addresses three key questions: (i) Do participants employ pure-strategy cut-off rules, as required for purification? (ii) How do different levels of private payoff perturbations influence observed mixed-strategy frequencies? (iii) Are individual characteristics, such as cognitive skills, predictive of strategy choices? Using a within-subject experimental design with varying levels of perturbation, we analyze deviations from theoretical cut-off strategies and compare the observed behavior to the MSNE predictions. Our results reveal substantial heterogeneity in the adoption of cut-off strategies, with higher adherence among participants with stronger mathematical reasoning skills. These findings provide the first direct empirical test of Harsanyi's purification idea and contribute to understanding its empirical validity in strategic interactions.

Between Non-best Response and Limited Reasoning – Experimental Evidence on Inertia Using Process Data (Dominik Ulke)

Abstract

Process data provide a valuable tool for tracing the cognitive processes behind economic decision-making. These data are typically retrieved by having participants make choices in teams of two. They first exchange an initial proposal and statements explaining their choices, then revise their decisions, with one of the two final choices being implemented. These statements serve as an incentive-compatible method for eliciting the reasoning that underlies decisions and beliefs. While powerful in one-shot games, the use of process data in repeated environments presents a challenge: repeated exposure to others' reasoning may reduce response independence, potentially biasing data in later rounds through spillover effects. We develop a novel method for collecting and analyzing process data in dynamic experiments. Participants engage in a repeated price-setting game with strategic complementarities across 10 rounds, similar to a repeated beauty contest. We seek to explore limits to reasoning and beliefs across rounds. For this purpose, we first collect pilot data where prior statements could bias subsequent choices. These data train an AI system that evaluates statement quality. In the main experiment, participants play alone and are incentivized to submit detailed statements (without seeing others' responses) via the AI's quality assessments. This setup allows us to trace how cognitive limitations, either in best-responding or in belief formation, contribute to departures from Nash equilibria. Our method classifies evolving reasoning levels and identifies cognitive processes without distorting choices or beliefs. Our method expands the applicability of process data in experimental economics, particularly in repeated and dynamic settings.

Revealed Preferences for Policy Experiments (Johannes Lohse)

Abstract

Randomized controlled trials remain underutilized in informing policy design, despite their potential. Moral objections to experimentation (‘‘experiment aversion’’) have been proposed as an explanation. We present three studies with members of the general public and policy-makers that allow us to measure and compare moral approval, stated preferences as well as revealed preferences for policy experimentation, within the overarching context of a public assistance program. We find that evidence based on moral approval systematically underestimates revealed preferences for policy experimentation due to conceptual misalignment and hypothetical bias. People and policy-makers trade off possible moral objections against the benefits of policy experimentation.

Friday, September 12

Parallel Session 5, 9.00 - 11.00

Health (Auditorium 3)

**The Role of Intrinsic Motivation in Healthcare Quality: Insights from a New Experimental Task
(Julia von Hanxleden)**

Abstract

Empirical research suggests that healthcare quality is strongly influenced by healthcare professionals' intrinsic motivation, which is their inner drive to perform tasks for personal satisfaction rather than external incentives like payment. Furthermore, quality of care is driven by prosocial motivation. Research suggests that intrinsic and prosocial motivation are distinct but have synergies in their effect on quality outcomes. However, while there is empirical support, a lack of experimental evidence exists. This study presents a new experimental task to assess intrinsic and prosocial motivation, using varying conditions as priming mechanisms. The resulting outcomes are linked to an established framework for analyzing physicians' choices over quality of care. The experiment has two parts. First, participants write letters to elderly people that are dispatched after the experiment. The letter task mirrors certain characteristics of a patient-physician interaction, such as that the quality of outcomes is difficult to objectify and monitor, and the benefit to the patient/receiver is greatly increasing when the physician/writer is empathetically engaged. Next to the main condition where letters are dispatched, multiple conditions serve as further primings by controlling for specific motivational factors of the task: (i) letters are not dispatched to eliminate prosocial motivators (ii) participants copy pre-written letters to eliminate interest and enjoyment that writing a personal letter may evoke (iii) participants don't write letters to control for further factors of the task itself. Prosocial and intrinsic motivation are measured before and after the task and the number of characters in the letters serves as a quality indicator. In the second part, participants in the role of physicians choose the quality of care in scenarios with varying degrees of illness and different payment systems, which results in real charitable donations as well as payoff for themselves. Hypotheses and the measurement of dependent variables were preregistered at AsPredicted 202754. The results of the experiment show that the primings through the experimental variation yielded causal effects as hypothesized. There were significant differences in patient benefits between the conditions. This suggests that higher intrinsic and prosocial motivations by the variation of the conditions lead to higher qualities of care. Participants reported the highest degree of intrinsic motivation when they wrote own letters that were dispatched and the lowest degree when they copied pre-written letters. Furthermore, higher intrinsic motivation correlated with a higher quality of output as measured by the length of the letters. Another finding was that non-medical students chose a lower quality of care than medical students in the condition without the letter priming. However, with the priming, the selected qualities were equalized between the groups. This suggests that the priming was effective in improving the quality of care for those who would otherwise have chosen a lower quality of care. The findings indicate that tasks encouraging active participation and prosocial benefits significantly enhance motivation, which improves the quality of the outcome. Therefore, by increasing incentives that nurture intrinsic and prosocial motivation

of healthcare workers, patient outcomes could be enhanced, suggesting important implications for policy design.

Reciprocity in Medical Treatment Decisions – A Theoretical Model and a Laboratory Experiment (Johanna Kokot)

Abstract

This paper studies how reciprocal behavior affects treatment decisions in healthcare. We ask two questions: (i) Do physicians adjust their treatment effort in response to a patient's decision to purchase an unrelated, out-of-pocket service? (ii) Do patients anticipate such reciprocity and strategically choose whether to buy? We develop a theoretical model of reciprocity in a healthcare context and test its predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment with medical and non-medical students. Physicians exert less effort for patients who declined the out-of-pocket service, showing negative reciprocity. Patients anticipate this and are more likely to purchase the service when they expect lower effort. Our findings suggest that out-of-pocket payments - even for unrelated services - can influence treatment dynamics and the provision of physician effort.

Health Status and Use of Physician Quality Information in the Outpatient Sector: Results from the KORA-Fit Study (Juliane Hennecke)

Abstract

Providing information about the quality of medical treatment supports patients' choice of a physician and, thus, foster competition in the healthcare system. Our study provides evidence on the determinants of patients' use of physician quality information (PQI) based on a sample of 53- to 74-year-olds from the population-based KORA-Fit study in Southern Germany in 2018/19. The first part of our analysis consists of a reduced-form binary logistic regression model to estimate determinants of PQI use. We consider personal health variables, sociodemographic characteristics, personality traits, and health-related behavior as potential determinants. In a second step, we implement a survey experiment to get a causal estimate of the relationship between health status and PQI use. We find that PQI use is strongly associated to the availability of physician choice options and by variables, which cause a need for new information, such as a changing health status or dissatisfaction with the previous physician. The latter observation is supported by the estimates from our survey experiment. Our findings help to understand the processes underlying PQI use and can assist the introduction of a targeted source that provides more objective information about physician quality in the outpatient sector.

The Effects of Advice-Giving on Medical Upcoding — A Laboratory Experiment (Sandra Eichardt)

Abstract

Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) improve cost transparency in hospitals, but bring misaligned incentives for classifying patients into higher-paying DRGs (upcoding). Physicians lack these direct incentives in hospital settings and decisions in organisations are rarely made in isolation. Limitations of field data make it difficult to identify upcoding and organisational communication at the individual level. To address this, I employ a controlled laboratory experiment to examine how institutionally driven recommendations affect physicians' classification of patients. This experiment extends the design of previous health economics experiments by (i) incorporating incentive structures that reflect the DRG-based hospital reimbursement system, and (ii) providing

an opportunity for a hospital representative to give advice to the physician. The between-subject design compares conditions with (40 observations) and without advice-giving (20 observations). Data collection is in progress, with findings to be presented at the conference.

Expectations (Auditorium 4)

Framing Effects in Expectation Formation (Alexander Nieber)

Abstract

Line charts are a ubiquitous form of presenting financial information. Therefore, it is of great importance to understand how format differences of line charts influence forecasting and financial behavior. In this experimental study, people forecast prices based on price paths where the distance to the lower or upper axis varies. The results show that both the upper and lower axes influence the forecasts. When the price trend is rising, price decreases are forecast more frequently when the distance to the upper axis is small than when the distance is large. In contrast, when the price trend is falling, price increases are forecast more frequently when the distance to the lower axis is small than when the distance is large. Furthermore, forecast errors are more common when the distance is small.

Profit Tax Uncertainty and Investments: Experimental Evidence from German Firms (Maik Sattelmanier)

Abstract

We investigate the influence of profit tax uncertainty on firms' investment plans. To isolate this effect, we conduct a survey-based randomized controlled trial with tax uncertainty treatments. First, profit tax forecasts from scientific tax experts are used to fix the first moment of future profit tax expectations across all treatment arms. Firms are then randomly assigned to receive one of two tailored information treatments that vary in the level of uncertainty while holding the first moment constant. Our empirical analysis reveals that increased perceived tax uncertainty leads to reductions in planned investments in both capital expenditures and intangible assets over subsequent periods.

Same Cues, Different Views: The Impact of Salient Financial Cues on Investor Decisions (Berivan Gürel)

Abstract

Investors rely on various financial cues to guide their decisions, including price paths, historical trends and expert recommendations. These cues influence behavior by signaling past performance and suggesting potential future returns. The present study aims to examine the influence of financial cues on investor decision-making, with a particular focus on the effects of reinforcing signals (e.g., 52-week highs) and of new information (e.g., analyst recommendations) in three treatments (baseline, 52-week, and analyst recommendation).

We conduct a controlled online experiment with 821 participants, pre-screened for financial literacy and recruited via Prolific.com. We will show them six one-year stock price charts, randomly

selected from the 1996–2023 performance data of S&P 500 companies. Participants have to report their return expectations, risk perceptions, and investment intentions when faced with these charts. We vary the presence and type of cues (none, 52-week high, analyst recommendations) to assess their impact on the three outcome variables. Our findings will contribute to a deeper understanding of how salient financial signals influence investment behavior in markets.

A pilot study with 49 graduate students validated the study's experimental design. The data collection will be completed prior to the conference, and the results will be presented at the conference.

Leader Legitimacy and Team Performance (Özgür Gülerk)

Abstract

We study experimentally the impact of two key sources of leader legitimacy on team performance. Procedural legitimacy refers to the way in which a leader is assigned to her role, i.e., whether she was appointed or elected. Behavioral legitimacy relates to the availability of information about a leader's previous actions before assuming her leadership role. In our experiments, participants first engage in a teamwork without a leader. In the next phase, one team member is promoted to the role of team leader. Depending on the experimental treatment, the leader is either selected randomly or elected by her teammates. Teams then play an economic game in a leading-by-example setting, where the leader sets an example by contributing towards a team project before other team members do. We find that procedural legitimacy combined with behavioral legitimacy is key for improving team performance: the increase in contributions towards the team project - compared to the leader-free phase - is higher in teams with elected leaders than in teams with appointed leaders, but only if information about leaders' previous behavior is available.

Effort and Incentives (SR 305)

Pay-for-Creativity: Fostering Creativity of Teams through Monetary Incentives (Lisa Klinkenberg)

Abstract

In an era where creativity is vital for innovation and competitive advantage, identifying optimal incentive mechanisms to enhance creative performance has become a pressing challenge for organizations. While pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes are established tools in routine tasks, their role in stimulating creative output – especially in teams – remains ambiguous. Existing research focuses on sub-aspects of the relations between PfP systems and teams performing non-routine tasks, thereby differing in experimental designs, tasks, and especially incentive intensity, thus leading to partly contradicting findings. This study investigates the impact of monetary incentives and their intensity, piece-rates and tournaments particularly, on the creative performance of dyadic teams. Thereby focusing on whether PfP increases creative performance in comparison to fixed payment and in more detail, if increasing the intensity of performance-based rewards leads to higher creative output. To address these questions, a laboratory experiment was conducted using a between-subject design across 5 treatments, varying in incentive type and intensity. Creativity was measured through the Doodle-task, which was solved by dyadic teams, enlarging the methodology of assessing creative performance of teams.

Preliminary results based on 84 teams suggest that tournament incentives, even when moderate, significantly enhance creative performance in terms of quantity, quality, and originality compared to fixed pay and comparable piece-rate schemes. However, the effect appears effort-driven rather than reflecting a deeper engagement of creative capabilities. While intrinsic motivation was highest under fixed pay, it was not sufficiently strong to outweigh the motivational boost from the tournament structure. Additionally, higher group cohesion in tournament settings further supports the effectiveness of tournament incentives for creative tasks. As the data collection is not yet finished, the following analyses will shed light on the aspects of different intensity of incentives.

Omission and Commission in Tournaments: Testing Three Mechanisms to Reduce Sabotage (Lisa Pütz)

Abstract

In contests, destructive effort in form of sabotage is a prominent problem. In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we compare treatments in which participants in identical strategic settings may either exert commission, i.e., active sabotage, or omission, i.e., passive sabotage by deciding not to prevent harm caused by an external shock. Three different mechanisms to reduce sabotage – a detection probability, a mild monetary team bonus, and a code of conduct – are tested. Without intervention, passive sabotage is considerably higher compared to active sabotage indicating a bias in favor of omission. While potential detection of harmful behavior reduces both kinds of sabotage, the team bonus and the code of conduct only significantly reduce omission behavior.

Communication in Experimental Asset Markets (Tibor Neugebauer)

Abstract

In an experimental asset market that is known for being prone to mispricing (Smith Suchanek and Williams 1988), we allow structured communication. Subjects communicate their beliefs between each other. We measure the effects of communication on efficiency including mispricing. Our results confirm that structured communication makes heterogeneous expectations more homogeneous but does not necessarily enhance mispricing.

Paying for Others' Vaccination: A Study on Social Responsibility (Alexander Fauser)

Abstract

Financial incentives are a promising tool to increase vaccination rates, but their acceptance among the general public remains insufficiently understood. We conducted an online laboratory experiment to investigate participants' willingness to spend part of their own monetary endowment to motivate a vaccine-hesitant individual to get vaccinated. Participants were randomly assigned to either a "vaccine framing" or "neutral framing" condition and made allocation decisions in a risk dictator game. Participants in the role of the dictator (A) could offer a monetary incentive to a participant in the role of a receiver (B). Higher incentives increased the likelihood that B would accept the vaccine, which in turn yielded a social benefit for Player A. This social benefit varied across the experiment and reflected the societal gains from reduced transmission. We find that participants are more willing to invest in vaccination incentives when the associated

social benefit is higher. Vaccine framing significantly increases support for such incentives compared to neutral framing. Moreover, we observe a positive association between participants' general pro-sociality and their willingness to allocate their own resources to encourage vaccination. These insights may guide policy-makers in designing effective incentive programs to address vaccine hesitancy during health crises.